PacketCable™ 2.0

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Abstract

This technical report describes the PacketCable security architecture, components, and reference points. The following information is included:

- Overview of PacketCable alignment with 3GPP IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) specifications;
- Description of threats to PacketCable architecture and data flows;
- Security architecture description;
- Explanation and description of PacketCable enhancements to 3GPP IMS requirements.

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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 PacketCable Overview

PacketCable is a CableLabs specification effort designed to extend cable's IP service architecture and to accelerate the convergence of voice, video, data, and mobility technologies. PacketCable defines a modular architecture and a set of interoperable interfaces that leverage emerging communications technologies, such as SIP, Presence, and IM, to support the rapid introduction of new IP-based services onto the cable network.

PacketCable is based on Release 7 of the IMS as developed by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). The IMS is a SIP-based architecture for providing multimedia services. PacketCable defines enhancements to the IMS when necessary in order to ensure PacketCable addresses requirements that are not addressed by the IMS.

For more information, refer to the PacketCable Architecture Framework Technical Report [ARCH-FRM TR].

1.2 PacketCable Security Architecture Motivation and Goals

The PacketCable Security Architecture protects the data, interfaces, and components that make up the PacketCable architecture. This Technical Report describes the security relationships between the elements in the PacketCable architecture.

Design goals for the PacketCable security architecture include:

- Support for confidentiality, authentication, integrity, and access control mechanisms;
- Protection of the network from denial of service, network disruption, theft-of-service attacks;
- Protection of the UEs (i.e., clients) from denial of service attacks, security vulnerabilities, unauthorized access (from network);
- Support for end-user privacy through encryption and mechanisms that control access to subscriber data such as presence information;
- Mechanisms for device, UE, and user authentication, secure provisioning, secure signaling, and secure software download;
- Leverage and extend the IMS security architecture in furtherance of the previously stated goals.

2 REFERENCES

2.1 Normative References

There are no normative references in this specification.

2.2 Informative References

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[RFC 3415]	IETF STD 62 (RFC 3415), View-based Access Control Model (VACM) for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP), December 2002.
[RFC 3489]	IETF RFC 3489, STUN - Simple Traversal of User Datagram Protocol (UDP) Through Network Address Translators (NATs), March 2003.

[RFC 4086]	IETF RFC 4086, Randomness Requirements for Security, June 2005.
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[SIP TR]	PacketCable SIP Signaling Technical Report, PKT-TR-SIP-V03-070925, September 25, 2007, Cable Television Laboratories, Inc.
[TS 23.002]	3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and Systems Aspects; Network architecture (Release 7); June 2007.
[TS 33.222]	3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Access to network application functions using Hypertext Transfer Protocol over Transport Layer Security (HTTPS) (Release 7); September 2006.
[ID TURN]	IETF Internet-Draft, Obtaining Relay Addresses from Simple Traversal Underneath NAT (STUN), draft-ietf-behave-turn-04, July 2007, work in progress.

2.3 Reference Acquisition

- 3rd Generation Partnership Project: www.3gpp.org
- Cable Television Laboratories, Inc., 858 Coal Creek Circle, Louisville, CO 80027;
  Phone 303-661-9100; Fax 303-661-9199; Internet: http://www.cablelabs.com
- Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), Internet: http://www.ietf.org/
  Note: Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time.
  The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt

3 TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

This Technical Report uses the following terms and definitions:

ISIM	IM Services Identity Module - the collection of IMS security data and functions on a UICC; may be a distinct application.
PacketCable Multimedia	An application-agnostic QoS architecture for services delivered over DOCSIS networks.
Private Identity	See Private User Identity.
Private User Identity	Used, for example, for Registration, Authorization, Administration, and Accounting purposes. A Private User Identity is associated with one or more Public User Identities.
Public User Identity	Used by any user for requesting communications to other users or applications.
Server	A network element that receives requests in order to service them and sends back responses to those requests. Examples of servers are proxies, User Agent servers, redirect servers, and registrars.
SIP User Agent	As defined by [RFC 3261], a logical entity that can act as both a user agent client and user agent server, meaning that it can generate requests and manage the resulting transaction, and it can generate responses to incoming requests and manage the resulting transition.
Subscriber	An entity (comprising one or more users) that is engaged in a Subscription with a service provider.
Subscription	A contract for service(s) between a user and a service provider.
User	A person who, in the context of this document, uses a defined service or invokes a feature on a UE.
User Agent (UA)	A SIP User Agent.

4 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

This Technical Report uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:

3GPP	3rd Generation Partnership Project
AKA	Authentication and Key Agreement
BSF	Bootstrapping Server Function
CMS	Call Management Server
CMTS	Cable Modem Termination System
CSCF	Call Session Control Function
DDOS	Distributed Denial Of Service Attack
DHCP	Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
DNS	Domain Name System
DNSSEC	DNS Security
DOCSIS®	Data-Over-Cable Service Interface Specifications
DOS	Denial of Service
EMS	Element Management System
E-MTA	Embedded Multimedia Terminal Adapter
ESP	Encapsulating Security Payload
FQDN	Fully Qualified Domain Name
FW	Firewall
GBA	Generic Bootstrapping Architecture
HSS	Home Subscriber Server
HTTP	Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
I-CSCF	Interrogating Call Session Control Function
IDS	Intrusion Detection System
IMS	IP Multimedia Subsystem
IP	Internet Protocol
IPsec	Internet Protocol Security
MG	Media Gateway
MGC	Media Gateway Controller
MitM	Man in the Middle
MSO	Multi-System Operator: A company that owns and operates more than one cable system
MRF	Multimedia Resource Function
NA(P)T	Network Address and Port Translation; used interchangeably with NAT
NAT	Network Address Translation
NMS	Network Management System
PAC (PAC Element)	Provisioning, Activation and Configuration Element
P-CSCF	Proxy Call Session Control Function
PDS	Profile Delivery Server

PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
PSTN	Public Switched Telephone Network
QoS	Quality of Service
RTP	Real-time Transport Protocol
SA	Security Association
S-CSCF	Serving Call Session Control Function
SDP	Session Description Protocol
SG	Signaling Gateway
SIP	Session Initiation Protocol
SLF	Subscription Location Function
SNMP	Simple Network Management Protocol
SNTP	Simple Network Time Protocol
STUN	Simple Traversal of UDP Through NAT
TCP	Transmission Control Protocol
TLS	Transport Layer Security
TR	Technical Report
UA	User Agent
UDP	User Datagram Protocol
UE	User Equipment
UICC	Universal Integrated Circuit Card
URI	Uniform Resource Identifier
XCAP	XML Configuration Access Protocol
XDS	XCAP Data Server

5 PACKETCABLE SECURITY

The PacketCable Security Architecture describes the reference points and logical components and the data flows between these components.

This section provides:

- A description of the relationship between PacketCable and 3GPP IMS releases;
- An overview of the PacketCable architecture;
- A description of the threats to the PacketCable architecture;
- A description of the PacketCable security mechanisms.

5.1 Relationship with 3GPP IMS

PacketCable is based on the IMS as defined by the 3rd Generation partnership Project (3GPP). 3GPP is a collaboration agreement between various standards bodies. The scope of 3GPP is to produce Technical Specifications and Technical Reports for GSM and 3rd Generation (3G) Mobile System networks.

Within the overall PacketCable goal to leverage existing industry standards whenever possible, there is a specific objective to align with the IMS architecture and specifications being developed by 3GPP. Specifically, PacketCable will reuse many of the basic IMS functional entities and interfaces. Although this Technical Report discusses IMS, the main goal is to describe the enhancements and modifications to 3GPP specifications. Refer to [TS 23.002] for additional information on the 3GPP IMS architecture.

5.2 PacketCable Reference Architecture

An overview of the PacketCable architecture elements and functional groupings is illustrated in Figure 1.



Figure 1 - PacketCable Reference Architecture

The PacketCable architecture is based on the IMS architecture, with the addition of some incremental extensions to support cable networks. These extensions include the use of additional or alternate components, as well as enhancements to capabilities provided by IMS functional components.

Some of the major PacketCable enhancements to the IMS include:

- Support for Quality Of Service for IMS-based applications on cable access networks, leveraging the PacketCable multimedia architecture;
- Support for signaling and media traversal of Network Address Translation (NAT) and Firewall (FW) devices, based on IETF mechanisms;
- Support for the ability to uniquely identify and communicate with an individual when multiple UEs are registered under the same Public Identity;
- Support for additional access signaling security and UE authentication mechanisms for PacketCable UEs;
- Support for provisioning, activation, configuration, and management of PacketCable UEs.

PacketCable includes both the existing IMS logical components and reference points, and logical elements and reference points added to support PacketCable requirements.

For more information refer to the PacketCable Architecture Framework Technical Report [ARCH-FRM TR].

5.3 PacketCable Security Threats

5.3.1 General Threats: Classification and Analysis

Following is an overview of the general threats in the context of a generic IP multimedia communications architecture.

5.3.1.1 Trust Domain Threats

A Trust Domain is a logical grouping of network elements that are trusted to communicate in a manner consistent with a set of relevant security policies. Trust domains can be demarcated by physical or logical boundaries. Communication across trust domains must always be reviewed for authentication and authorization. Interfaces of interest for an IP multimedia infrastructure are:

- Intra-network domain interfaces, which connect network elements within a service provider's domain. A compromise to any network element can be detrimental to the proper functioning of the network itself. Threats involve almost all the ones mentioned in this section.
- Inter-network domain interfaces, which connect two domains. The domains can be different service providers, or the same provider. Inter-domain trust levels can dictate the level of trust one can have within a domain (intra-domain), and hence, it is imperative that such interfaces be secured. Further, the security of two domains connected in such a manner relies on all the other connections established by each individual domain.
- Access domain interfaces, which allow UEs to connect to a service provider. This set of interfaces is highly vulnerable to a multitude of security threats, largely due to the fact that access domains typically contain trusted as well as un-trusted UEs and network elements. Strong authentication for any kind of network access would be vital for a service provider. If authentication is to be foregone, the services offered and the network elements to which such an unauthenticated access is provided should be minimized.

5.3.1.2 Theft of Service

"Theft of Service" refers to a multitude of threats, including but not limited to:

- Manipulation of the UE – UEs, especially software UEs, are vulnerable to Trojan attacks and manipulation of behavior. Mitigation techniques include signed code and embedded UEs.
- Protocol weakness exploitation – Exploitation of weak cryptographic measures can have a large impact, as it typically involves major redeployment. Mitigation techniques include defense in depth architecture.
- Identity spoofing – the act of impersonating another user in order to gain access to services. This can lead to loss of credibility and revenue. Mitigation includes the use of strong authentication and user education.
- UE cloning – the act of imitating a legitimate UE. This is typically an issue when UE identities are deemed sufficient to offer services, such as in architectures without the distinction of a 'user' and a 'client'. The recommendation would be to require UE credentials, to authenticate users before offering services, and to build infrastructures that can identify cloning and mitigate threats.

- Subscription fraud and non-payment of services – subscriptions established with falsified information and detection of non-payment are beyond the scope of this specification.

5.3.1.3 Disruption and Denial of Service

General DoS attacks aim to cause service interruption by crippling some or all service providing entities in the network. These attacks occur at layer 2 through layer 4 of the OSI reference model. Denial of service attacks focus on rendering a particular network element unavailable, using one of several different mechanisms. DoS attacks include:

- Malformed message attacks - an attacker issues malformed messages that attempt to exploit a weakness in the robustness of a stack. Weaknesses include buffer overflows, or insufficient corner case and error handling. Mitigating this attack requires well-designed software protocol stacks and robustness testing.
- Layer four depletion attacks - an attacker causes excessive state information to be consumed on a victim device, often in the context of state-aware protocol stacks. An example is a TCP-level attack such as a SYN flood, used to exhaust stack resources that keep track of session state. These attacks can be mitigated by Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and firewalls, and by well-designed software protocol stacks and robustness testing.
- Bearer-level flooding attacks - denial of service attacks that focus on rendering a particular network element unavailable, usually by directing an excessive amount of media network traffic at its interfaces. Preventing this attack requires state-aware firewalls that open pinholes for media only if the trusted side of the firewall initiates the connection first. Flooding attacks often make use of spoofed source addresses to open firewall pinholes. Source address verification through 3-way handshakes can mitigate this threat. Quality of Service (QoS) can also prevent excessive flows through a router.

Flooding attacks generally make use of IP packets with spoofed source addresses. By preventing packets with spoofed addresses, some flooding attacks can be mitigated. There are several mechanisms to prevent address spoofing:

- Use a challenge/response mechanism such as STUN or STUN Relay;
- Use of TCP makes source address verification easier (3-way handshake);
- Unicast reverse path forwarding (uRPF) - uses routing tables to determine whether the route to the source of the packet (the reverse path) is pointing to the interface the packet came in on.

Zombie attacks consist of any type of denial of service attack that is launched from an authenticated endpoint. In addition, most zombie attacks make use of many zombies, resulting in a distributed denial of service attack (DDOS). Typically, a Trojan compromises an endpoint in order to leverage the endpoint's authentication. It is very difficult to defend against a zombie attack, because the endpoint is authenticated and authorized. Zombie attacks can be thwarted by detecting anomalous traffic behavior and filtering malicious traffic.

5.3.1.4 Signaling Channel Threats

In a multimedia environment such as a SIP architecture, signaling messages include data pertaining to identity, services, routing and other sensitive and critical data. Multimedia components such as proxies exist in the access domain, exposing them to a greater number of threats.

Attacks on signaling security include:

- Compromise of confidentiality - Signaling information, such as the caller identity and the services to which a customer subscribes may be vulnerable to discovery. The caller's identification information may also be used to locate the caller even if the caller wished to keep their location private.

- Man in the middle (MitM) attacks – attacks resulting from the interception and possible modification of traffic passing between two communication parties. These attacks are successful if the communicating parties can't distinguish communications with the intended recipient from those of the attacker. Attacks, some of which are described in other sections, include impersonating a proxy, undesired redirection, and loss of privacy due to MitM intervention.
- Denial of service attacks – DOS attacks in the signaling channel range from the creation of bogus requests resulting in amplification attacks to falsifying routing headers. The use of multicast to transmit SIP requests greatly increases the potential for DOS attacks.

Many of these threats can be mitigated by requiring mutual authentication, identity assertion, confidentiality, and integrity on the signaling plane.

5.3.1.5 Bearer Channel Threats

Threats to the bearer channel relate to the media traffic transferred between communicating parties.

Attacks on Bearer security include:

- Compromise of confidentiality – confidentiality in this sense is protection of the media messages themselves, which could be an audio session, instant messaging, or other multimedia message transfer. Depending on the security mechanism negotiated, end-to-end confidentiality may not be under the control of the sender.
- Compromise of integrity – modification, deletion, and replay are all possible attacks to the bearer channel.
- Disruption attacks – as with any media technology, the ability of parties to communicate introduces unwanted communications. This category includes all the "normal" Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) attacks such as harassment, as well as some new threats relating to degradation and disruption of service in the IP model.

Bearer channel attacks are mitigated by requiring mutual authentication, confidentiality and integrity on the bearer plane to prevent manipulation of data on the bearer plane, and ensuring privacy of sensitive information.

5.3.1.6 Reconnaissance

Well-planned attacks on Service Providers normally start with gaining reconnaissance on a network. Reconnaissance threats can be mitigated by using topology hiding mechanisms, including the introduction of border elements. Enforcing filtering techniques in the access domain allows for traffic policy enforcement at the edge of the network.

5.3.1.7 Roaming Model Considerations

Roaming models can minimize or add to security threats. UEs accessing services through alien environments can expose both the UE and the home network to greater risks. The trust relationship between the home and visited networks is enforced at the inter-domain security boundary.

5.3.2 Protocol Specific Security threats

The following sections highlight threats to multimedia protocols. While this list does not include every multimedia protocol, it includes the major protocols discussed in the architecture and in later sections.

5.3.2.1 SIP

Examples of attacks that can be performed from information gained by capturing SIP messages on the network include:

- Tampering with message bodies (e.g., sending malformed SIP messages to disrupt a SIP network element; sending fake REGISTER messages to cause signaling messages to be redirected, rendering the hijacked UE unable to initiate or accept sessions);
- Tearing down sessions (e.g., sending BYE or CANCEL messages to end a session prematurely);
- Impersonating a server (e.g., sending false INVITEs);
- Masquerading and faking server responses leading to service unavailability or Denial of Service (e.g., Flooding the network with 302 Redirect or 401 Unauthorized messages).

Some of the important vulnerabilities are explained in the following subsections.

5.3.2.1.1 Registration Hijacking

Registration hijacking involves a malicious endpoint that changes the registration of a different, existing endpoint, to point either back to the attacker, or to a different location. Registration hijacking can take several forms:

- SIP endpoint cloning - an attacker User Agent (UA) may attempt to register as an existing victim UE. The attacker UE becomes a "clone" of the victim UA, stealing the victim's identity.
- Exploitation of weak identity - if a registrar assesses the identity of a UA, the From: header of a SIP request can be arbitrarily modified and hence open to malicious registration.
- Attackers could de-register some or all users in an administrative domain, thereby preventing these users from being invited to new sessions, resulting in a type of DoS attack.

Refer to section 26.1.1 in [RFC 3261] for more information about Registration Hijacking. The general method to prevent registration hijacking is to use secure identity assertion.

5.3.2.1.2 Faking User Identity

Unless authenticated, SIP messages are vulnerable to identity spoofing. Fields such as 'From:' are not required to be filled and 'P-Asserted-Identity', unless populated by a trusted element securely, can be manipulated.

Possible solutions to mitigate such a threat include:

- Use strong credentials, and establish secure tunnels for message flows.
- Use appropriate SIP Identity mechanism like "SIP identity" that supports cryptographically verifiable assertions.

5.3.2.1.3 Malformed SIP Messages

An attacker can issue malformed SIP messages that attempt to exploit a weakness in the robustness of a SIP stack or the protocol itself. Weaknesses include unwarranted DoS initiation, buffer overflows, or insufficient corner case handling. Mitigating this attack requires stack robustness testing. Specific scenarios that lead to DoS attacks include:

- Using falsified Via header fields identifying a targeted host as the originator of the request and then sending these requests to a large number of SIP network elements.
- Using falsified Route headers in a request that identify the target host and then sending such messages to forking proxies that will amplify messaging sent to the target.

SIP proxy servers by nature accept requests from varied IP endpoints, and are consequently exposed to an increased number of threats.

5.3.2.1.4 SIP Message Storms

SIP message storms can consist of sending random SIP messages so that memory or processing power is exhausted by exhausting state storage or requiring encryption steps, respectively. SIP message storms can happen either from within a network, or from the outside. Mitigation techniques to thwart such attacks include:

- Debugging stacks for resource depletion;
- Use of anti-replay countermeasures;
- Avoiding multiple responses to a single event (e.g., multiple 401 messages for authentication challenge);
- Detecting storms and using appropriate filters to shutdown misbehaving UEs.

Message storms may arise from registration floods, where a large number of endpoints attempt to register, but fail authentication at the edge of the network and bog down the edge proxies. In addition, edge proxies may allow endpoints to register without authentication, and then defer the UE challenge to servers internal to the network, in which case the internal servers are susceptible to DoS floods. There are several ways to mitigate these types of attacks:

- Require authentication at the edge proxies, to spread the load of authentication and better defend against registration DoS floods;
- Impose flood-control measures – provide a nonce to UEs that authenticate for the first time, which can be used later, under less strict rate limiting;
- Allow the P-CSCF to prioritize signaling, based on previously successful challenges from the same UE.

5.3.2.1.5 Session Hijacking

Methods of launching a session hijacking attack include the following:

- Modification of SDP information;
- Using messages like "301 moved permanently" to redirect INVITEs to another location (assuming the attacker knows Call-ID, To, From, Cseq fields).

The general method to prevent session hijacking is to require authentication of all SIP messages.

5.3.2.1.6 Impersonating a Server

SIP servers may be impersonated in the network by an attacker. SIP server impersonation can result in a DoS or privacy breach. It presents a possibly greater problem when SIP mobility is considered. The general method to prevent impersonation is server authentication by UAs.

Refer to section 26.1.2 in [RFC 3261] for more information.

5.3.2.1.7 Tampering with Message Bodies

Refer to section 26.1.3 in [RFC 3261] for more information.

5.3.2.1.8 Tearing Down Sessions

Refer to section 26.1.4 in [RFC 3261] for more information.

5.3.2.1.9 Reconnaissance Threats

Certain SIP messages and fields facilitate reconnaissance threats. Mitigation of such threats can be facilitated by preventing the usage of certain fields (e.g., OPTIONS) in messages.

5.3.2.2 STUN

In general, attacks on STUN can be classified into denial of service attacks and eavesdropping attacks. Denial of service attacks can be launched against a STUN server itself, or against other elements using the STUN protocol.

Many of the attacks require the attacker to generate a response to a legitimate STUN request, in order to provide the UE with a faked MAPPED-ADDRESS. The attacks that can be launched using such a technique include:

- DDOS Against a Target
- Silencing a UE
- Assuming the Identity of a UE
- Eavesdropping

More detailed information on these attacks and how the threats are addressed by the STUN protocol itself can be found in [RFC 3489].

5.3.2.3 STUN Relay

A STUN Relay server acts as a redirector to funnel media streams through a NAT to a destination. A STUN Relay server therefore has the potential to become a source for a DoS attack that utilizes high-bandwidth media streams. Critical to preventing misuse of a STUN Relay server is a cryptographically verifiable way of establishing an authentication and authorization mechanism to allow recipients of media streams to authorize the STUN Relay server to forward media.

5.3.2.4 TLS

Because Transport Layer Security (TLS) is hop-by-hop, it may be compromised within a server that terminates and re-originates signaling.

TLS also relies on a mechanism to establish trust between two communicating entities, such as a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) within an administrative domain. TLS establishment between servers should involve mutual authentication.

TLS generally relies on transitive trust for hop-by-hop security. If each endpoint has its own local server, and the servers trust each other, then the endpoints can assume through transitive trust that the end-to-end communication is secure.

5.3.2.5 HTTP Digest

The primary threat posed to HTTP-Digest authentication involves a MitM (man in the middle) attack. HTTP Digest operates by verifying that a user has a pre-shared password. After the UE requests access to a resource, the server challenges the UE for a password. In the challenge, the server sends down a nonce in the clear that should be used by the UE to generate a securely formed hash of the password. The hashed password is sent to the server in the clear. This method of authentication is susceptible to a MitM using a dictionary attack, in an attempt to find a password that results in the same secure hash as the value sent back to the server. Consequently, HTTP Digest should be used over secure data paths.

5.3.2.6 DNS

The Domain Name Service in general is insecure without the use of DNSSEC. Possible security threats include manipulation of request or response queries leading to redirection or denial of service, and usage of Dynamic DNS functionality, if enabled, to manipulate DNS Servers and reflect incorrect topologies.

To mitigate some of these threats, DNS should only be used for general information and other configuration mechanisms, such as authentication, used to validate network elements.

5.3.2.7 Software-based UEs

PacketCable support software-based UEs to authenticate and use network services. Software-based UEs present challenges that lead to vulnerabilities:

- Even though software-based UEs may have a provision to connect to a secure hardware keystore, such as a smart card, they generally store credentials in unprotected storage;
- The software image on a soft UE is not tamper-proof;
- Applications on software-based UEs may store a user's password for later automated entry.

5.4 PacketCable Security Architecture Overview

This section describes the PacketCable Security Architecture, including enhancements to the IMS. The trust domains described in Section 5.3 are used to decompose the PacketCable architecture. Each trust domain is discussed in further detail in the following sections.

5.4.1 Access Domain

UEs connect to the network through the Access domain. Interfaces and components present in the Access domain are shown in Figure 2.



Figure 2 - Access Domain Reference Points

UE interactions with the network occur in the Access domain. Access methods are varied, and include DOCSIS and wireless. Due to these characteristics, the access domain is home to a multitude of threats, as described in Section 5.3.

Table 1 provides a high-level overview of the security architecture that results from the PacketCable enhancements to IMS. Each Access domain reference point, along with the security mechanism employed for that interface, are included.

Table 1 - Access Domain Reference Points Description

Reference Point	PacketCable Network Elements	Reference Point Security Description
pkt-nat-1	UE<->STUN Relay Server	STUN Relay: STUN Relay requests are authenticated and authorized within the STUN Relay protocol itself.
pkt-nat-2	UE – External STUN Server	STUN: Message integrity is provided by STUN mechanisms.
pkt-pacm-1	UE - DHCP Server	DHCP: PacketCable does not define security for the DHCP protocol.
pkt-pacm-2	UE - DNS Server	DNS: PacketCable does not define security for the DNS protocol.
pkt-pacm-3	UE - PDS Server	SIP: Message integrity and privacy via IPsec or TLS.

Reference Point	PacketCable Network Elements	Reference Point Security Description
pkt-pacm-4	UE - XDS Server	XCAP: Message integrity and privacy via HTTP over TLS
pkt-pacm-5	UE – Time Server	SNTP: PacketCable does not define security for the SNTP protocol.
pkt-pacm-6	UE - EMS&NMS Server	SNMP: Authentication, privacy and integrity provided by SNMPv3.
Gm	UE - P-CSCF	SIP: Message integrity and privacy via IPsec or TLS. STUN: Message integrity is provided by STUN mechanisms (as STUN requests are sent to the standard SIP port, P-CSCF must logically contain STUN functionality).
Mb	UE - UE UE - Media Server UE - MG UE – E-MTA UE - MRF	RTP: Media security is out of scope for this specification.
Ub	UE – BSF	HTTP: Message integrity and privacy via IPsec or TLS.

5.4.2 Intra-Network Domain

Intra-domain reference points and components are contained within a service provider's network, and consequently, a holistic security policy.

IMS defines the security of intra-domain connections with the Zb interface, as described in [PKT 33.210]. Within IMS, integrity is required and confidentiality is optional when the Zb interface is implemented. IPsec ESP is used to provide security services for the Zb interface between intra-domain components.

PacketCable enhances the Zb interface by adding TLS to provide security services for intra-domain TCP data flows. Section 6.6 describes the Zb reference point TLS requirements.

Refer to [ARCH-FRM TR] for a description of the varied intra-domain reference points and components.

5.4.3 Inter-Network Domain

Inter-domain reference points connect the operator security domain with external partners and networks. These connections provide interworking between the operator's network and other service providers and networks, including the PSTN. Figure 3 shows the Inter-domain trust boundary.



Figure 3 - Inter-Network Domain Reference Points

IMS defines the security of inter-domain connectivity with the Za interface, as described in [PKT 33.210]. Both integrity and confidentiality are required for the Za interface, based on IPsec ESP. Inter-domain traffic in IMS is required to pass through a Security Gateway (SEG). The SEG terminates reference point Za IPsec tunnels and enforces security policy on inter-domain traffic flows. Figure 3 shows an architecture including the SEG functionality in the Border Element, but the SEG may be a separate element.

The PSTN Gateway to PSTN reference point is secured using PSTN security mechanisms.

PacketCable adds support for inter-networking to PacketCable networks. The Call Management Server (CMS) provides translation for PacketCable messaging. Security for the CMS reference point is detailed in [SEC].

6 PACKETCABLE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

The following sections describe the PacketCable enhancements to the IMS security architecture.

6.1 User and UE Authentication

3GPP IMS relies completely on credentials stored in a Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC) for access security. The UICC is a platform for security applications used for authentication and key agreement. PacketCable has a requirement to support multiple types of UEs, such as software UEs, that will not contain or have access to UICCs.

[PKT 33.203] describes the IMS approach to authentication and establishing transport security between the UE and the P-CSCF. The IMS uses a combination of IPsec for integrity and optional confidentiality, and IMS-AKA for authentication. To meet the IMS requirements of minimal round trips, the security elements of the negotiation "piggy-back" on the SIP register messaging flow. [RFC 3329] is used to negotiate security between the UE and the P-CSCF, and IMS-AKA [RFC 3310] is used between the UE and the S-CSCF to perform mutual authentication. [RFC 2617] is extended to pass authentication data from the UE to the S-CSCF. The communications between the UE and the P-CSCF and the communications between the UE and the S-CSCF are related in that the keying material for the security associations between the UE and the P-CSCF are computed from the long-term shared secret stored in the Home Subscriber Server (HSS) and the UICC in the UE. Figure 4 shows the high-level message flows for authentication during registration. Some elements and messages are not displayed in order to simplify discussion.



Figure 4 - IMS Registration Message Flow

For authentication during registration, the following basic steps occur:

1. The UE sends a register request to the P-CSCF. The message includes an RFC 3329 Security-Client header which includes the security mechanisms the UE supports. IMS mandates 'ipsec-3gpp'. The message also includes an authorize header which includes the private identity of the subscriber.

2. The P-CSCF strips the security agreement headers, inserts 'integrity-protected=no' in the authorized header, and forwards the register request to the appropriate I-CSCF, which forwards the request to the appropriate S-CSCF of the subscribers home network.

3. The S-CSCF contacts the HSS to update the S-CSCF URI for that user, and if necessary, request one or more authentication vectors.

4. The HSS returns one or more authentication vectors if requested. The authentication vectors provide the necessary data for the S-CSCF to create a www-authenticate header and challenge the user.

5. The S-CSCF creates and sends a SIP 401 (Unauthorized) response, containing a www-authenticate header that includes a challenge. This response is routed back to the P-CSCF.

6. The P-CSCF strips the integrity key (IK) and the confidentiality key (CK) from the 401 response to use for IPsec SAs between the P-CSCF and the UE, and sends the rest of the response to the UE.

7. Upon receiving the challenge message, the UE determines the validity of the received authentication challenge. The UE sets up security associations with the P-CSCF using the IK and CK that was derived from the data sent by the HSS, utilizing the long-term shared key in its UICC. The UE then calculates a response (RES) and sends a second register request with an Authorization header including the challenge response. This message includes Security-Verify headers as per [RFC 3329].

8. The P-CSCF strips the security agreement headers, inserts 'integrity-protected=yes' in the authorize header, and forwards to the appropriate I-CSCF, which forwards to the appropriate S-CSCF.

9. The S-CSCF compares the authentication challenge response received from the UE with the expected response received from the HSS. If they match, the S-CSCF updates HSS data using the Cx interface.

10. The HSS provides the S-CSCF with subscriber data over the Cx interface, including service profiles, which contain Initial Filter Criteria.

11. The S-CSCF forwards a 200 OK response to the UE. The 200 OK contains a P-Associated-URI header which includes the list of public user identities that are associated to the public user identity under registration.

12. The P-CSCF forwards the 200 OK to the UE. Because the user has now been authenticated and there is an existing security association between the P-CSCF and the UE, the P-CSCF inserts a P-Asserted-Identity header in all subsequent messages from that UE.

PacketCable has requirements to support UEs and authentication schemes not considered in the IMS architecture, as well as additional transport security mechanisms. PacketCable enhances the IMS specifications in several areas in order to support these requirements.

6.1.1 Description

The PacketCable architecture supports the following authentication mechanisms:

- IMS AKA
- SIP Digest Authentication
- Certificate Bootstrapping

The architecture must also accommodate UEs with multiple authentication credentials. For example, a UE may have a certificate for accessing services while on a cable network, and a UICC for accessing services while on a cellular network.

A subscriber may have multiple credentials. A subscriber may have multiple UEs, with different capabilities related to those credentials. For example, a subscriber may have an MTA with a certificate for home use, and a UICC-based UE for traveling.

6.1.1.1 IMS AKA

IMS AKA authentication with UICC credentials will continue to operate as described in 3GPP specifications.

6.1.1.2 SIP Digest Authentication

IMS also supports SIP authentication which is also described in [PKT 33.203]. SIP authentication uses a challenge-response framework for authentication of SIP messages and access to services. In this approach, a user is challenged to prove their identity, either during registration or during other SIP dialogues initiations.

SIP authentication is handled in a similar manner to IMS AKA, and follows [RFC 3261] and [RFC 2617]. This approach minimizes impact to the existing IMS authentication flow by maintaining existing headers and round trips. Unlike IMS AKA, however, challenges are not precomputed. In order to maximize the security of SIP Digest authentication, cnonces and qop "auth" directives are used, which requires challenges to be computed in real-time at the S-CSCF.

Figure 5 shows the message flow for SIP based authentication during a registration.



Figure 5 - SIP Digest Authentication

For SIP Digest authentication during registration, the following basic steps occur. [RFC 3329] headers and other SIP header content is not shown for simplicity.

1. The UE sends a register request to the P-CSCF. The message includes an Authorization header which includes the private identity of the subscriber. An example authorization header is shown below:

```
REGISTER sip:home.atlanta.com SIP/2.0
Authorization: Digest username="alice_private@atlanta.com",
      realm=" atlanta.com", nonce="", uri="sip:home.atlanta.com",
      response=""
```

2. The P-CSCF forwards the register request to the appropriate I-CSCF, which forwards the request to the appropriate S-CSCF of the subscriber's home network.

3. The S-CSCF contacts the HSS using a MAR command towards the HSS on the Cx interface. The MAR message includes the private identity of the subscriber, the S-CSCF information, and the number of authentication vectors requested. This information is used by the HSS to update the S-CSCF URI for the private identity and to deliver the correct authentication vector information to the S-CSCF.

4. The HSS returns an MAA message on the Cx interface. The MAA message includes the public identities and authentication vectors for that subscriber. The contents of the authentication vector for SIP Digest are detailed in a later section. The main differences are the lack of a CK and IK, and the contents of the SIP-Authenticate data element. Instead of AKA data, the SIP-Authenticate AVP contains data the S-CSCF requires for computing a Digest response, primarily HA1.

5. The S-CSCF creates a SIP 401 (Unauthorized) response, which includes a challenge in the www-authenticate header field, and other [RFC 3261] fields. An example header is shown below:

```
SIP/2.0 401 Unauthorized
      WWW-Authenticate: Digest realm="atlanta.com",
        nonce="CjPk9mRqNuT25eRkajM09uTl9nM09uTl9nMz5OX25PZz==",
        qop=auth, opaque="5ccc069c403ebaf9f0171e9517f40e41",
              algorithm="MD5"
```

6. This response is routed back to the I-CSCF, then the P-CSCF, and then to the UE.

7. Once the UE receives the challenge, the UE calculates the response based on items in the WWW-Authenticate header and additional items (e.g., cnonce) generated by the UE. The values in the Authorize header are calculated as per [RFC 3261], and thus [RFC 2617]. The UE sends a second register request with the Authorization header. An example Authorization header is shown below:

```
REGISTER sip:home.atlanta.com SIP/2.0
      Authorization: Digest
              username="alice_private@atlanta.com", realm="atlanta.com",
              nonce="CjPk9mRqNuT25eRkajM09uTl9nM09uTl9nMz5OX25PZz==",
              uri="sip:home.atlanta.com", qop=auth, nc=00000001,
              cnonce="0a4f113b", response="6629fae49393a05397450978507c4ef1",
              opaque="5ccc069c403ebaf9f0171e9517f40e41", algorithm="MD5"
```

8. The P-CSCF forwards the message to the appropriate I-CSCF which forwards to the appropriate S-CSCF.

9. Upon receiving the second register from the UE, the S-CSCF calculates the challenge in the same manner as the UE, in order to compare the two results and thus authenticate the subscriber. Using parameters from the HSS such as HA1, and the parameters from the Authorization header such as cnonce, the S-CSCF computes the challenge response as per [RFC 3261] and thus [RFC 2617]. The computation is performed in a manner consistent with the qop parameter with the value of 'auth'.

If the two challenge results are identical, the S-CSCF performs a SAR procedure on the Cx interface, informing the HSS the user is registered and requesting the user profile.

10. The HSS returns a SAA message to the S-CSCF containing the user profile, which includes, among other things, the collection of all the Public User Identities allocated for authentication of the Private User Identity, as well as the initial filter criteria.

11. The S-CSCF sends a 200 OK response to the register request. The response includes an Authentication-Info header, which allows the UE to authenticate the network, or S-CSCF. The rspauth value is calculated per [RFC 2617]. The 200 OK message is forwarded to the UE. An example Authentication-Info header is shown below:

```
SIP/2.0 200 OK
        Authentication-Info:
        qop=auth, rspauth="7729fae49393a05397450978507c4ef1",
        cnonce="0a4f113b",nc=00000001,
        nextnonce="8829fae49393a05397450978507c4ef1"
```

12. The 200 OK is routed to the appropriate P-CSCF, and then to the UE.

13. The UE validates the rspauth value, to authenticate the network, or S-CSCF.

Because the user has now been authenticated and there is an existing security association between the P-CSCF and the UE, the P-CSCF inserts a P-Asserted-Identity header in all subsequent messages from that UE. In the case that signaling security is disabled, the S-CSCF inserts P-Asserted-Identity after successful authentication.

Adding support for SIP digest impacts the IMS specifications in the following ways:

- New digest algorithms are allowed to be present in the www-authenticate and Authorization headers.
- The HSS must compute and store new types of data elements.
- UEs must be able to support and compute new types of digest responses.
- The home network (or S-CSCF) authenticates to the UE by including an Authentication-Info header in the 2xx response following a successful authentication of the UE.

Impacts to specific components are discussed in Section 6.1.2.

6.1.1.3 Certificate Bootstrapping

PacketCable UEs are embedded with digital certificates, however SIP [RFC 3261] does not define an authentication solution for certificates. PacketCable defines procedures for the UE to bootstrap SIP Digest credentials using an X.509 certificate.

As shown in Figure 6, the UE utilizes the pkt-pacm-3 and pkt-pacm-4 reference points to obtain the certificate bootstrapping configuration. The UE connects to the XDS and performs mutually authenticated TLS procedures.



Figure 6 - Certificate Bootstrapping

Once the UE has been successfully authenticated by the XDS, and the XDS has been authenticated by the UE, the UE retrieves SIP Digest Credentials from the XDS using the XCAP. The UE can then authenticate through normal registration procedures using the bootstrapped credentials.

6.1.2 Impacted Components

The following sections describe the impacts to IMS components in order to accommodate PacketCable authentication requirements.

6.1.2.1 UE

PacketCable UEs supporting Digest authentication must conform to [RFC 3261], and thus RFC [RFC 2617]. Upon receiving a challenge from the S-CSCF in a 401 Unauthorized message, UEs must create an Authorization header including a challenge response as described in [RFC 2617] based on the algorithm parameter in the www-Authenticate header. Cnonce and nc parameters must be included in the challenge response. UEs must be able to validate Authentication-Info header values returned from the S-CSCF with the 200 OK message.

UEs must be able to securely store usernames and passwords in a manner that minimizes risk. UEs may optionally prompt users for username and password input.

6.1.2.2 S-CSCF

In order to support SIP Digest, the S-CSCF must be able to calculate Digest responses as described in [RFC 3261] and [RFC 2617]. The S-CSCF will receive HA1 from the HSS over the Cx interface, and the S-CSCF must use this HA1 value to create the digest response for this private identity. This response is compared to the response received by the UE, so it must be calculated in the same manner. If the S-CSCF calculated response is identical to the response received from the UE, the S-CSCF sends a 200 OK containing an Authentication-Info header per [RFC 2617].

Based on local policy, the S-CSCF should:

- Accept a previously used nonce with a valid nonce-count, for example, to allow for PRACK and other types of requests received before a 2xx response.

- Only accept a previously used nonce for a specific period of time. It is recommended to use a time value of 10 minutes or less.
- Only accept a previously used nonce for a specific number of times. It is recommended to use a value of 5 times or less.
- Accept an old nonce based on the above policy rules even if nextnonce was sent.

The above policy rules are mainly related to the case where signaling security is disabled in the network.

6.1.2.3 HSS

In order to support new authentication schemes, the Cx interface and procedures must be extended. Digest authentication adds new parameters to the Cx interface, specifically the SIP-Auth-Data-Item AVP present in both MAR and MAA procedures. The authentication vector provides the S-CSCF with HA1 and other elements to allow the S-CSCF to compute responses. For further details, see [HSS TR].

6.1.3 Signaling Security

The IMS defines IPsec and TLS for the secure signaling between UEs and edge proxies. The UICC provides credentials for authentication and IPsec. The security mechanism is negotiated using [RFC 3329] SIP Security Agreement. TLS as an option for signaling security between the UE and the P-CSCF. The use of TLS by the UE is optional, and is based on the following advantages:

- TLS is the recommended security mechanism specified in [RFC 3261].
- There is a general shift towards the use of TCP to better handle longer messages.
- TLS supports NAT traversal at the protocol layer.
- TLS is implemented at the application level instead of the kernel level, which provides some advantages such as easier support in multiple environments.

Adding support for TLS for signaling leads to the consideration of TLS credentials.

- Mutually Authenticated TLS - UE and server both provide certificates when establishing signaling security. The server must validate the UE certificate, and the UE must validate the server certificate. Mutual authentication provides a high degree of security.
- Server Side Authentication – Only the sever provides a certificate when establishing signaling security. This approach avoids the extra computational overhead of a PKI operation on the UE. Provides a medium level of security, with lower CPU requirements on the UE. May be used to secure HTTP Digest sessions.

Both of these models require the P-CSCF and the UE to support PKI features, such as certificate validation and certificate management. As not all UEs utilize certificates, only server side authentication is supported in PacketCable.

Adding support for TLS also leads to the consideration of TLS port assignments and TLS connection management. PacketCable will use the standard SIP ports for UDP, TCP, and TLS as defaults. UEs negotiating TLS connect to the SIPS port of 5061. Otherwise, UEs use the standard SIP UDP/TCP port of 5060. Operators may configure other ports for requests. Requests and responses are performed according to procedures in [ID SIP-OUTBOUND].

Figure 7 shows signaling security negotiation during a successful register dialogue. Only signaling security headers are shown for simplicity.



Figure 7 - Transport Security

To support TLS for signaling security between the UE and the P-CSCF, the IMS specifications must be enhanced to allow TLS as an optional SIP security mechanism to be negotiated. [RFC 3329] includes TLS as a security mechanism that can be negotiated; thus the only change is to IMS specifications.

At a high-level, the impacts to IMS components are:

- UE must support the ability to negotiate TLS using [RFC 3329];
- P-CSCF must support the ability to negotiate TLS using [RFC 3329].

6.1.3.1 Impacted Components

The following sections describe the impacts to IMS components in order to negotiate signaling security.

6.1.3.1.1 UE

In order to support the negotiation of signaling security, PacketCable UEs must support TLS as defined in [RFC 2246].

UEs must support the construction and interpretation of [RFC 3329] headers containing the mechanism-name of 'tls'.

6.1.3.1.2 P-CSCF

The P-CSCF must be able to establish TLS sessions based on a request from a UE. The P-CSCF must not request UE certificates, as not all UEs will have certificates. If TLS is established, the P-CSCF must set integrity-protected=tls-yes in Authorization headers. If TLS is not established, the P-CSCF does not include an integrity-protected header. These rules are in addition to the existing rules for IPsec establishment.

The P-CSCF must support the [RFC 3329] mechanism-name of 'tls'. The same rules for assigning integrity-protected values apply as above.

Certificates should be validated according to [RFC 3280].

6.1.3.1.3 S-CSCF

The S-CSCF can challenge any SIP message. Messages containing Authorize headers with no integrity-protected parameter should be challenged, as this flag indicates the lack of signaling security between the UE and the P-CSCF on non-initial register requests. If the S-CSCF successfully challenges a subscriber, the S-CSCF must insert the P-Asserted-Identity header in subsequent messages from that subscriber if the P-Asserted-Identity header does not exist.

6.1.3.2 Disabling Signaling Security

While not recommended, signaling security may be disabled at the P-CSCF. By disabling signaling security, UEs and the network are exposed to many of the threats described in Section 5.3, especially when combined with a weaker form of authentication such as SIP Digest.

The PacketCable SIP Signaling Technical Report [SIP TR] and the PacketCable [PKT 24.229] delta specification contain detailed information on the procedures for disabling signaling security. The major difference in procedures for disabling signaling security is non-register dialog requests should be challenged.

6.2 Identity Assertion

PacketCable environments require a way for trusted network elements to convey the identity of subscribers to other elements or services, and to remove the identity when communicating with untrusted networks. Identity assertion is the mechanism by which elements and services can trust the identity of a user.

As described in [PKT 24.229], IMS assigns the task of identity assertion to P-CSCFs for all SIP messages, based on the strict flow described in Section 6.1. Once the IPsec Security Associations (SA) are established and the subscriber is authenticated, the P-CSCF asserts the identity of the subscriber. By monitoring SIP messaging towards the UE, the P-CSCF observes the 200 OK message from the subscribers S-CSCF. This information, plus the presence of SAs to the UE, allow the P-CSCF to substantiate successful authentication of the UE.

PacketCable enhances IMS with the following requirements:

- A P-CSCF with an established TLS session with a UE that observes a 200 OK response from the S-CSCF for that subscriber can assert the identity of the public identity used by that UE.
- A P-CSCF without an established TLS session that observes a 200 OK response from the UEs S-CSCF during SIP authentication cannot assert the identity of that UE. In this case, the S-CSCF asserts the identity after successful authentication of the subscriber.

6.3 NAT Traversal Security

The following sections describe STUN and STUN Relay security.

6.3.1 STUN

The STUN protocol [RFC 3489] defines the countermeasures for the attacks described in Section 5.3.2.2. These include network architecture recommendations as well as message integrity mechanisms provided by STUN itself. No additional mechanisms are proposed for this version of the Technical Report.

6.3.2 STUN Relay

The STUN Relay server represents a network resource that is utilized for the duration of a connection, therefore security for this resource is an important consideration.

The STUN Relay protocol [ID TURN] defines the countermeasures for the attacks described in Section 5.3.2.3. These include network architecture recommendations as well as message integrity mechanisms provided by STUN Relay itself. No additional mechanisms are proposed.

Note: Security for STUN Relay is being updated. Details will be provided once the STUN Relay draft becomes available.

6.4 Configuration Security

6.4.1 Generic Bootstrapping Architecture

The 3GPP authentication infrastructure has been recognized for its ability to enable application functions in the network and on the user side to establish shared keys. Therefore, 3GPP designed the "bootstrapping of application security" to authenticate the subscriber by defining a Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) based on the AKA protocol. GBA reference points and components are shown in Figure 8.



Figure 8 - GBA Reference Points and Components

IMS currently describes the Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) based on the AKA protocol. This architecture provides a means for a UE to bootstrap to a server, in order to receive configuration information, and to derive keys that can be used by the UE and application servers to secure communications on the Ua interface.

According to [PKT 33.220], a generic Bootstrapping Server Function (BSF) and the UE shall mutually authenticate using the AKA protocol, and agree on session keys that are afterwards used between the UA and Network Application Function (NAF). For this purpose, the BSF shall acquire the GBA user security settings (GUSS) from the HSS, and shall restrict the applicability of the key material to a specific NAF by using a key derivation procedure. As described in [PKT 33.220], the IMS uses the GBA to authenticate and receive configuration information over IPsec. The IMS requires a UICC-based ISIM for this process, as it relies on IMS AKA for authentication and IPsec for secure transport.

Because PacketCable is extending IMS to support non-UICC deployment scenarios, the AKA protocol cannot be used by all PacketCable clients to achieve mutual authentication between the UE and the BSF. Consequently, a new procedure is needed. PacketCable adds an option for the Ub interface to support HTTP Digest over TLS for GBA authentication and key derivation.

Note that in PacketCable, the NAF is an XCAP server, which provides the configuration to the UE.

For UEs that do not support IPsec and AKA, when the UE starts communicating with the NAF, it must establish a TLS tunnel with the NAF. The NAF is authenticated to the UE by means of a public key certificate. The UE must verify that the server certificate corresponds to the FQDN of the NAF with which it established the tunnel. No UE authentication is performed as part of TLS (i.e., there is no UE certificate necessary). The Zh, Zn and Ua are standard interfaces defined in [PKT 33.220].

The Ub interface uses the HTTP Digest mechanism to establish the credentials (e.g., session key(s)) between the UE and the BSF.

The new bootstrapping exchange on the Ub interface is illustrated in Figure 9.



Figure 9 - GBA Message Flow

The following steps describe the bootstrapping procedure for HTTP Digest over TLS.

1. The UE starts the bootstrapping procedure by initiating a TLS session with the BSF. The UE and BSF negotiate server side authenticated TLS. The UE authenticates the BSF by the certificate presented by the BSF. The BSF does not require authentication from the UE at this point.

2. The UE starts the bootstrapping procedure by sending an HTTP Request message to the BSF containing the private identity in an Authorization header.

3. The BSF sends a MAR command to the HSS to retrieve an authentication vector for that user. The HSS responds with the appropriate authentication vector for that user and algorithm in a MAA message. The authentication vector contents allow the BSF to calculate a challenge to the UE as described in [RFC 2617].

Note: In a multiple HSS environment, the BSF may have to obtain the address of the HSS where the subscription of the user is stored by querying the SLF, prior to step 3.

4. The BSF responds to the UE request with a 401 Unauthorized message containing a www-authenticate header to force the UE to authenticate itself. The www-authenticate header includes a nonce. The algorithm parameter informs the UE of the algorithm it should use to calculate its response.

5. Upon receiving the challenge, the UE uses the data received in the www-authenticate header to create a second HTTP Request with the challenge response in an Authorization header. The challenge response is calculated per [RFC 2617]. A cnonce must be included. The UE must select a qop value from the list of qop values sent by the BSF. The message is sent to the BSF over the TLS session.

6. The BSF checks the validity of the challenge response sent the UE by calculating the response on its own and comparing the values. The BSF calculates the response per [RFC 2617]. It uses the HA1 value supplied by the HSS over the Zh reference point.

7. If the challenge response sent by the UE is identical to the response calculated by the BSF, the BSF must send a 200 OK message including the B-TID to the UE to indicate successful authentication. In addition, in a 200 OK message, the BSF shall supply the lifetime of the key Ks.

   The B-TID value must be generated in the format of NAI by taking the base64 encoded [12] nonce value from step 4, and the BSF server name, i.e., base64encode(nonce)@BSF_servers_domain_name.

   Note: Before base64 encoding the nonce from step 4, the nonce must first be converted from a hexadecimal ASCII-encoded value to a binary-encoded value.

8. Both the UE and the BSF must use the TLS master secret from the existing TLS session for Ks. Both the UE and the BSF must use the Ks to derive the key material Ks_NAF. Ks_NAF must be used for securing the reference point Ua.

   Ks_NAF is computed as Ks_NAF=KDF(Ks, "gba-h", nonce, IMPI, NAF_Id) where KDF is the key derivation function described in Annex B of [PKT 33.220]. The binary-encoded nonce is substituted for the AKA-based RAND variable when calculating Ks_NAF. Ks is the master secret from the existing TLS session.

   The UE and the BSF must store the key Ks with the associated B-TID for further use, until the lifetime of Ks has expired, or until the key is updated.

   The key Ks is used to derive keys for communications with application severs, such as the Provisioning, Activation and Configuration (PAC)element, using the Ua reference point.

6.4.2 Management Security

In order to provide security protection for management information for devices that are not behind NATs, the User-based Security Model (USM) [RFC 3414] and the View-based Access Control Model (VACM) [RFC 3415] features of SNMPv3 are supported. USM provides authentication, integrity and privacy services for SNMP through the specification of two cryptographic functions: authentication and encryption. VACM provides further security protection to management information by controlling access to managed objects.

6.4.3 Secure Software Download

Secure software download is out-of-scope for this version of the Technical Report.

6.5 Media Security

Media security is out-of-scope for this version of the Technical Report.

6.6 Using TLS for Intra-Domain Security

As defined by IMS-delta specification [PKT 33.210], the Zb reference point connects IMS components within the same trust domain in a secure manner. Implementation of the Zb interface is optional. If implemented, the Zb interface must use IPsec ESP for authentication and integrity. Confidentiality (encryption) is optional.

PacketCable adds TLS support for intra-domain security, for the following reasons:

- TLS is the recommended security mechanism specified in [RFC 3261].
- TLS supports NAT traversal at the protocol layer.
- TLS is implemented at the application level instead of the kernel level, which provides some advantages such as easier support in multiple environments.

PacketCable components with TCP or SCTP SIP interfaces are required to support TLS for intra-domain security, in addition to IMS-defined IPsec.

Unless specified within this section, SIP interfaces requiring TLS must be compliant with the TLS specification [RFC 2246] and any requirements specified in [RFC 3261] relating to its usage in SIP.

TLS [RFC 2246] supports the negotiation and use of compression methods. However, since these methods are not specified within TLS RFC 2246, compression must not be used.

6.6.1 TLS Authentication Algorithms

The HMAC-SHA-1 (with 160-bit key) algorithm must be supported in order to provide data origin authentication and data integrity services in TLS. AES-XCBC is not required.

6.6.2 Key Exchange Algorithms for TLS

The following are the requirements relating to methods for key exchange within the TLS protocol:

- Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA) must be supported.

6.6.3 Use of X.509 Certificates in TLS

X.509 certificates are used for authentication in TLS, and all X.509 certificates should be signed by a trusted party. Self Signed certificates may be used.

6.6.4 Random Number Generator for TLS

Random number generation implementations tend to be weak. Many semiconductor manufacturers are adding secure random number generators to their integrated circuits, which should be used if available. If no hardware is available, strong pseudo-random number generator software may optionally be used, in keeping with [RFC 4086].

6.6.5 TLS Encryption Algorithms

The following are the TLS Client and TLS Server requirements related to cryptographic algorithms for providing encryption services for TLS-SA:

- 3DES CBC-mode (with three independent 56-bit keys) must be supported.
- AES CBC (with 128-bit key) must be supported.
- Null encryption may be supported.

6.6.6 Ciphersuites for TLS

TLS specifies various ciphersuites for use within the TLS protocol, as discussed in detail in Reference [RFC 3268]. Ciphersuites represent the recommendations combinations of encryption authentication and key exchange algorithms to be used within the TLS.

The following are the requirements related to Ciphersuites.

- "TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA" must be supported.
- "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, must be supported.

6.6.7 TLS Authentication

TLS allows either unidirectional authentication where the server is authenticated to the client only, or bidirectional authentication where both client and server authenticate to each other. Unidirectional authentication is the usual method used in the public internet; however, for network signaling and control applications, bidirectional authentication is mandatory to allow both parties to know they are communicating with the desired endpoint.

The following are the requirements related to TLS authentication.

- Bi-directional authentication for TLS applications must be supported.

6.7 Certificate Validation

[RFC 3280] should be used for guidance on validation of certificates.

6.8 Certificate Revocation

Certificate revocation is out-of-scope for this version of the Technical Report.

Appendix I Open Issues

- STUN Relay security needs to be updated when new STUN Relay draft is issued.
- Secure Software Download, Secure Media sections need to be updated.

Appendix II Acknowledgements

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