

DOCSIS® Provisioning of EPON Specifications

DPoEv2.0

DPoE Security and Certificate Specification

DPoE-SP-SECv2.0-I05-160602

ISSUED

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1 INTRODUCTION¹

DOCSIS Provisioning of EPON (DPoE) version 2.0 specifications are a joint effort of Cable Television Laboratories (CableLabs), cable operators, vendors, and suppliers to support EPON technology using existing DOCSIS-based back office systems and processes. DPoEv2.0 specifications augment the DPoE v1.0 specifications to provide requirements for additional service capabilities and corresponding provisioning and network management capabilities.

Ethernet PON (EPON) is an [802.3] standard for a passive optical network (PON). A PON is a specific type of multi-access optical network. A multi-access optical network is an optical fiber based network technology that permits more than two network elements to transmit and receive on the same fiber.

DPoE specifications are focused on DOCSIS-based provisioning and operations of Internet Protocol (IP) using DOCSIS Internet service (which is typically referred to as High Speed Data (HSD)), or IP(HSD) for short, and Metro Ethernet services as described by Metro Ethernet Forum (MEF) standards. DPoE Networks offer IP(HSD) services, functionally equivalent to DOCSIS networks, where the DPoE System acts like a DOCSIS CMTS and the DPoE System and DPoE Optical Network Unit (ONU) together act like a DOCSIS CM.

1.1 DPoE Technology Introduction

DPoE technology was established with the following common requirements already developed by operators. Each of the participant operators had previously selected 1G-EPON and 10G-EPON as the appropriate technology for one or more applications. EPON is a widely deployed technology with a sufficient and large supply of vendors offering a variety of products for each component of the access network. 2G-EPON, described Annex A of [DPoE-SP-PHYv2.0], uses the same 1G upstream as 1G-EPON (operates at the effective rate of 1 Gbps), but provides a 2G downstream (operates at the effective rate of 2 Gbps). With the exception of requirements specified in Annex A of [DPoE-SP-PHYv2.0], 2G-EPON is expected to meet all of the requirements specified for 1G-EPON. 10G-EPON technology is backwards compatible with 1G-EPON. A 1G-EPON network can be incrementally upgraded to 10G-EPON, adding or replacing ONUs as business needs require. 1G-EPON, 2G-EPON, and 10G-EPON are compatible with [SCTE 174].

1G-EPON and 10G-EPON, originally defined in [802.3] and [802.3av] respectively, support a point-to-multipoint architecture with a centralized controller called an Optical Line Terminal (OLT) and distributed low cost Layer 2 ONUs. The basic service mapping architecture in EPON is to map Ethernet (or IP) frame header information (e.g., addresses, IP Differentiated Service Code Points, Ethernet Q tag, S-VLAN/C-VLAN ID, ISID, bridge address, etc.) to a logical circuit called a Logical Link Identifier (LLID) in [802.3]. The service mapping function in DPoE specifications is similar to that used in DOCSIS specifications. Both DOCSIS and DPoE networks rely on a centralized scheduler though EPON utilizes an LLID which functions like a SID in DOCSIS to support unicast, broadcast, and multicast.

At the time when development efforts around the DPoE specifications started, there were no standard management interfaces for the ongoing operations and maintenance of the network, including fault management, performance management, security, etc. Operators already had fully working and scaled-out systems that solve these challenges for DOCSIS networks. One of the primary goals for DPoE specifications was therefore to use the existing DOCSIS back office infrastructure to scale up EPON-based business services.

¹ Revised per SECv2.0-N-14.0176-1 and per SECv2.0-N-14.0191-2 on 7/18/14 by JB.

1.2 Scope

This specification identifies recommendations for the adaptation or additions to DOCSIS specifications that are required to support DOCSIS Provisioning of EPON (DPoE).

Security services may be divided into the following major areas:

- Subscriber data privacy, includes device authentication and key exchanges to verify that the device (and accompanying certificates) can insure data path encryption for subscriber data.
- Service provider network security.
- Device software and configuration, including measures used to verify the integrity of the devices, software on them, and their configurations. Without device security, the other forms of security could be compromised.

In this document, the term "subscriber" is used synonymously with "customer."

1.3 Goals

The DPoE SEC specification accomplishes the following objectives:

- Provides a detailed explanation of downstream-only and bi-directional encryption requirements.
- Discusses the protocol and messages used to authenticate the D-ONU and exchange cryptographic keys.
- Defines requirements for secure software download.
- Describes access control behavior for unauthorized and duplicate MAC addresses.
- Covers IP source address verification requirements.

1.4 Requirements

Throughout this document, the words that are used to define the significance of particular requirements are capitalized. These words are:

"MUST"	This word means that the item is an absolute requirement of this specification.
"MUST NOT"	This phrase means that the item is an absolute prohibition of this specification.
"SHOULD"	This word means that there may exist valid reasons in particular circumstances to ignore this item, but the full implications should be understood and the case carefully weighed before choosing a different course.
"SHOULD NOT"	This phrase means that there may exist valid reasons in particular circumstances when the listed behavior is acceptable or even useful, but the full implications should be understood and the case carefully weighed before implementing any behavior described with this label.
"MAY"	This word means that this item is truly optional. One vendor may choose to include the item because a particular marketplace requires it or because it enhances the product, for example; another vendor may omit the same item.

1.5 DPoE Version 2.0 Specifications

A list of the specifications included in the DPoEv2.0 series is provided in Table 1. For further information please refer to <http://www.cablelabs.com/specs/specification-search/?cat=dpoe&scat=dpoe-2-0>.

Table 1 - DPoEv2.0 Series of Specifications²

Designation	Title
DPoE-SP-ARCHv2.0	DPoE Architecture Specification
DPoE-SP-OAMv2.0	DPoE OAM Extensions Specification
DPoE-SP-PHYv2.0	DPoE Physical Layer Specification
DPoE-SP-SECv2.0	DPoE Security and Certificate Specification
DPoE-SP-IPNEv2.0	DPoE IP Network Element Requirements
DPoE-SP-MULPIv2.0	DPoE MAC and Upper Layer Protocols Interface Specification
DPoE-SP-MEFv2.0	DPoE Metro Ethernet Forum Specification
DPoE-SP-OSSIV2.0	DPoE Operations and Support System Interface Specification

² Revised per SECv2.0-N-15.0232-1 on 02/06/2016 and per SECv2.0-N-16.0242-1 on 6/2/16 by JB.

1.6 Reference Architecture

The DPoE reference architecture shown in Figure 1 identifies the elements that a DPoE Network minimally requires to illustrate and communicate the physical hardware and logical software interfaces between the functional subsystems of the DPoE architecture. The principal elements in the architecture are the DPoE System that resides in the headend or hub site, and the DPoE ONU (D-ONU) which may be an off-the-shelf EPON ONU, EPON SFP-ONU, or an EPON ONU with additional subsystems. The remaining elements in the architecture are existing servers and systems in the operator's network. All the server elements have connectivity through an IP (TCP/IP) network. Transport of bearer traffic, and (in some cases) Layer 2 OAM Protocol Data Units (PDUs) are available through either IP or Layer 2 Ethernet-based Network Interfaces.




Figure 1 - DPoE 2.0 Reference Architecture³

³ Replaced per SECv2.0-N-16.0242-1 on 6/2/16 by JB.

1.7 DPoE Interfaces and Reference Points

The DPoE interfaces and reference points shown in Figure 2 provide a basis for the description and enumeration of DPoE specifications for the DPoE architecture. Each interface or reference point indicates a point between separate subsystems. The reference points have protocols that run across them, or have a common format of bearer traffic (with no signaling protocol). All the interfaces are bi-directional interfaces that support two-way communications. The protocols in DPoE specifications operate within different layers based on the [802.3], [802.1], IETF, MEF, and CableLabs specifications. The C reference points are uni-directional for upstream (C_0) or downstream (C_s) classification, respectively.




Figure 2 - DPoE 2.0 Interfaces and Reference Points⁴

⁴ Replaced per SECV2.0-N-16.0242-1 on 6/2/16 by JB.

Table 2 - DPoE Interface and Reference Point Descriptions

Interface or Reference Point		Interface or Reference Point Description
MN		MN is a logical concept used for the specification of requirements for MEF INNI that apply to both MN _E and MN _I . MN logically provides the equivalent function of a MEF INNI or L2VPN NSI. It is an NNI for Metro Ethernet services only.
	MN _E	The MN _E (MEF INNI External) interface is a substitute for the MN reference interface from DPoE version 1.0 specifications. The MN interface is an [802.3] interface for Ethernet (or MEF or L2VPN emulated) services only. It serves the role of a MEF INNI or L2VPN NSI. It is an NNI for Metro Ethernet services only.
	MN _I	The MN _I reference interface is used to describe the virtual interface between an OLT and a VPLS Virtual Switch Instance (VSI). In particular, it is used to describe the requirements for stitching VSIs to DPoE System and OLT [802.1] components such as [802.1d] bridge groups, [802.1ad] S-VLAN or C-VLAN (S-component or C-component), or [802.1ad] I-BEB (I-component) or B-BEB (B-component) backbone edge bridges. The DPoE System stitches VPLS and VPWS transport and forwarding for Metro Ethernet Services between the D interface and the MN _I reference interface ⁵ .
D		The D interface is the DOCSIS IP NNI interface. It is an operator network facing interface, sometimes called a Network Systems Interface (NSI) in DOCSIS specifications. The D interface allows a DPoE System to communicate with an IP network. The D interface carries all IP management traffic including OSSI and IP NE traffic. The D interface carries all DOCSIS IP service traffic, IP/MPLS/VPLS traffic, and IP/MPLS/VPWS traffic.
TU		The TU interface is a short form of expressing the interface between the DPoE System and the D-ONU.
TUL		The TUL interface is a virtual interface representing a logical EPON on an ODN. Each ODN has at least one TUL, and each TUL represents a MAC domain.
C		The C reference point is used for explanation of traffic ingress to a DPoE classifier.
	C _O	The C _O reference point is used for explanation of traffic ingress to a D-ONU upstream classifier.
	C _S	The C _S reference point is used for explanation of traffic ingress to a DPoE System downstream classifier.
S		The S interface is an IEEE 802 interface. The S interface may be an internal interface, such as [802.3] across a SERDES (GMII or XGMII) interface in a BP-ONU (such as a SFP-ONU, SFP+ONU or XFP-ONU), or it may be an external Ethernet interface in a BB-ONU or S-ONU. S ₁ is an interface for an S-ONU. S ₂ is a reference point used for explanation of services with the B-ONU.
	S ₁	The S ₁ interfaces are the general case of all interfaces on an S-ONU. S ₁ interfaces may be CMCI, LCI, MI, or MU interfaces.
	S ₂	The S ₂ reference point is used for explanation of traffic ingress to and egress from interfaces on a DEMARC device in a DPoE System. Although there are no specifications or requirements for the S ₂ reference point, informative text refers to the S ₂ reference point to provide the full context for the use of a B-ONU with a DEMARC device providing Metro Ethernet services.
LCI		The Logical CPE Interface (LCI) interface is an eDOCSIS interface as defined in [eDOCSIS]. eSAFEs are connected to LCI interfaces.
CMCI		CMCI is the DPoE interface equivalent of the DOCSIS Cable Modem CPE Interface as defined in [CMCIv3.0]. This is the service interface for DOCSIS-based IP services. Customer Premise Equipment (CPE) is connected to CMCI interfaces.

⁵ MN_I is required for IP-based forwarding and transport of Metro Ethernet services with DPoE in order to provide MEF E-LAN and E-Tree services described in DPoE version 2.0. While these services can be constructed with MN_E, these specifications do not describe the process to do so.

Interface or Reference Point	Interface or Reference Point Description
MI	MI is an S interface that operates as a MEF INNI with additional requirements as specified in [DPoE-SP-MEFv2.0]. The MI interface is an [802.3] interface (or reference point) between a D-ONU and a DEMARC device. • A D-ONU that provides a MEF INNI has an MI interface. • A D-ONU can have MU as an interface and an MI reference point on different S interfaces in a single D-ONU. DEMARC devices are connected to MI interfaces.
MU	MU is an S interface (or S reference interface) that operates as a MEF UNI. The MU reference interface is an [802.3] interface (or reference point) between a D-ONU or a DEMARC device and a customer's equipment. • A D-ONU that directly provides a MEF UNI (MU) interface has MU as an interface. • A D-ONU can have MU as an interface and an MI reference point on different S interfaces in a single D-ONU. Customer Edge (CE) devices are connected to MU interfaces.

2 REFERENCES⁶

2.1 Normative References

In order to claim compliance with this specification, it is necessary to conform to the following standards and other works as indicated, in addition to the other requirements of this specification. Notwithstanding, intellectual property rights may be required to use or implement such normative references. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All references are subject to revision, and users of this document are encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent editions of the documents listed below. References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies.

[802.1d]	IEEE Std 802.1d™-2004, IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Media Access Control (MAC) Bridges
[802.1q]	IEEE Std 802.1q-2009, IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks-Virtual Bridged Local Area Networks, January 2010.
[802.3]	IEEE Std 802.3-2012, IEEE Standard for Ethernet, December 2012.
[802.3ah]	IEEE Std 802.3ah™-2004, IEEE Standard for Information technology-Telecommunications and information systems-Local and metropolitan area networks-Specific requirements, Part 3: Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Detection (CSMA/CD) Access Method and Physical Layer Specifications, Amendment: Media Access Control Parameters, Physical Layers, and Management Parameters for Subscriber Access Networks, now part of [802.3].
[802.3av]	IEEE Std 802.3av™-2009, IEEE Standard for Information technology-Telecommunications and information systems-Local and metropolitan area networks-Specific requirements, Part 3: Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Detection (CSMA/CD) Access Method and Physical Layer Specifications Amendment 1: Physical Layer Specifications and Management Parameters for 10Gb/s Passive Optical Networks, now part of [802.3].
[DPoE-SP-ARCHv2.0]	DOCSIS Provisioning of EPON, DPoE Architecture Specification, DPoE-SP-ARCHv2.0-I05-160602, June 2, 2016, Cable Television Laboratories, Inc.
[DPoE-SP-IPNEv2.0]	DOCSIS Provisioning of EPON, IP Network Element Requirements, DPoE-SP-IPNEv2.0-I06-160602, June 2, 2016, Cable Television Laboratories, Inc.
[DPoE-SP-MEFv2.0]	DOCSIS Provisioning of EPON, Metro Ethernet Forum Specification, DPoE-SP-MEFv2.0-I04-160602, June 2, 2016, Cable Television Laboratories, Inc.
[DPoE-SP-MULPIv2.0]	DOCSIS Provisioning of EPON, MAC and Upper Layer Protocols Interface Specification, DPoE-SP-MULPIv2.0-I10-160602, June 2, 2016, Cable Television Laboratories, Inc.
[DPoE-SP-OAMv2.0]	DOCSIS Provisioning of EPON, OAM Extensions Specification, DPoE-SP-OAMv2.0-I09-160602, June 2, 2016, Cable Television Laboratories, Inc.
[DPoE-SP-OSSIV2.0]	DOCSIS Provisioning of EPON, Operations and Support System Interface Specification, DPoE-SP-OSSIV2.0-I09-160602, June 2, 2016, Cable Television Laboratories, Inc.
[DPoE-SP-PHYv2.0]	DOCSIS Provisioning of EPON, Physical Layer Specification, DPoE-SP-PHYv2.0-I05-160602, June 2, 2016, Cable Television Laboratories, Inc.

⁶ Revised per SECv2.0-N-14.0176-1 on 7/18/14 by JB. Revised per SECv2.0-N-15.0232-1 on 2/6/16 by JB.

[eDOCSIS]	Data-Over-Cable Service Interface Specifications, eDOCSIS Specification, CM-SP-eDOCSIS-I28-150503, May 3, 2015, Cable Television Laboratories, Inc.
[FIPS-140-2]	Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS PUB) 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, June 2001.
[NIST 800-108]	NIST Special Publication 800-108, Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions, October 2009.
[RFC 1750]	IETF RFC 1750, Randomness Recommendations for Security, December 1994.
[RFC 4346]	IETF RFC 4346, The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol, Version 1.1, April 2006.
[SECv3.0]	Data-Over-Cable Service Interface Specifications, Security Specification, CM-SP-SECv3.0-I15.130808, August 8, 2013, Cable Television Laboratories, Inc.

2.2 Informative References

This specification uses the following informative references.

[802.1]	Refers to entire suite of IEEE 802.1 standards unless otherwise specified.
[802.1ad]	IEEE Std 802.1ad™-2005, IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks – Virtual Bridged Local Area Networks Amendment 4: Provider Bridges, May 2006.
[802.1X]	IEEE 802.1X-2010, Port Based Network Access Control.
[802.1ae]	IEEE Std 802.1ae-2006, IEEE Standard Medium Access Control (MAC) Security, "Media Access Control (MAC) Security", June 2006.
[802.1ag]	IEEE Std 802.1ag™-2007, IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan Area Networks – Virtual Bridged Local Area Networks Amendment 5: Connectivity Fault Management, December 2007.
[CMCIv3.0]	Data-Over-Cable Service Interface Specifications, Cable Modem to Customer Premise Equipment Interface Specification, CM-SP-CMCIv3.0-C01-081104, November 4, 2008, Cable Television Laboratories, Inc.
[DOCSIS]	Refers to entire suite of DOCSIS 3.0 specifications unless otherwise specified.
[FIPS-197]	Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS PUB) 197, Advanced Encryption Standard, November, 2001.
[MULPIv3.0]	Data-Over-Cable Service Interface Specifications, MAC and Upper Layer Protocols Interface Specification, CM-SP-MULPIv3.0-I29-151210, December 10, 2015, Cable Television Laboratories, Inc.
[OSSIV3.0]	Data-Over-Cable Service Interface Specifications, Operations Support System Interface Specification, CM-SP-OSSIV3.0-I28-151210, December 10, 2015, Cable Television Laboratories, Inc.
[RFC 3748]	IETF RFC 3748, Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), June 2004.
[RFC 5216]	IETF RFC 5216, The EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol, March 2008.
[SCTE 174]	ANSI/SCTE 174 2010, Radio Frequency over Glass Fiber-to-the-Home Specification.

2.3 Reference Acquisition

- Cable Television Laboratories, Inc., 858 Coal Creek Circle, Louisville, CO 80027; Phone +1-303-661-9100; Fax +1-303-661-9199; <http://www.cablelabs.com>
- FIPS Publications, NIST, 100 Bureau Drive, Gaithersburg, MD 20899-3460; Internet: <http://www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/>
- Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Secretariat, 48377 Fremont Blvd., Suite 117, Fremont, California 94538, USA, Phone: +1-510-492-4080, Fax: +1-510-492-4001, <http://www.ietf.org>
- Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), +1 800 422 4633 (USA and Canada); <http://www.ieee.org>
- SCTE, Society of Cable Telecommunications Engineers Inc., 140 Philips Road, Exton, PA 19341 Phone: +1-800-542-5040, Fax: +1-610-363-5898, Internet: <http://www.scte.org/>

3 TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

3.1 DPoE Network Elements⁷

DPoE Network	This term means all the elements of a DPoE implementation, including at least one DPoE System, and one or more D-ONUs connected to that DPoE System.
DPoE System	This term refers to the set of subsystems within the hub site that provides the functions necessary to meet DPoE specification requirements.
DPoE ONU (D-ONU)	This term means a DPoE-capable ONU that complies with all the DPoE specifications. There are two logical types of D-ONUs. These are the DPoE Standalone ONU (S-ONU) and the DPoE Bridge ONU (B-ONU). Requirements specified for a D-ONU must be met by all ONUs.
DPoE Standalone ONU (S-ONU)	This term means a D-ONU that provides all the functions of a B-ONU and also provides at least one CMCI port. An S-ONU can optionally have one or more eSAFEs.
DPoE Bridge ONU (B-ONU)	This term means a D-ONU that is capable of [802.1] forwarding but cannot do all the encapsulation functions required to be an S-ONU. The B-ONU is a logical definition used by the specification for requirements that apply to all types of B-ONUs. The two types of B-ONUs are the BP-ONU and the BB-ONU.
DPoE Bridge Pluggable ONU (BP-ONU)	This term means a D-ONU that is a B-ONU which is pluggable. Pluggable BP-ONUs include devices such as an SFP-ONU (1G-EPON), SFP+ONU (10G-EPON), or XFP-ONU (10G-EPON).
DPoE Bridge Baseband ONU (BB-ONU)	This term means a D-ONU that is a B-ONU which has a baseband IEEE Ethernet interface. BB-ONUs include those with one or more [802.3] baseband PMDs. (See [DPoE-SP-ARCHv2.0], section 7.2.6.2 for examples.)
DEMARC	Short form of "Demarcation Device." This term means the device, owned and operated by the operator that provides the demarcation (sometimes called the UNI interface) to the customer. Some architectures describe this device as the CPE (as in DOCSIS) or the NID (as in the MEF model).

⁷ Revised per SECv2.0-N-15.0232-1 on 2/6/16 by JB.




Figure 3 - D-ONU Types




Figure 4 - DPoE Network Elements

3.2 Other Terms⁸

1G-EPON	EPON as first defined in [802.3ah], now part of [802.3]
2G-EPON	EPON as defined in Annex A, 2G-EPON System Definition, of [DPoE-SP-PHYv2.0]
10G-EPON	EPON as first defined in [802.3av], now part of [802.3]
Cable Modem CPE Interface	CMCI as defined in [MULPIv3.0]
Customer Premise Equipment (CPE)	Customer Premise Equipment as defined in [DOCSIS]
Multi-Layer Switching (MLS)	A switch that can switch based on Layer 2, Layer 3, Layer 4, etc.
Ethernet Passive Optical Network (EPON)	Refers to 1G-EPON, 2G-EPON, and 10G-EPON collectively
EPON Operations and Maintenance Messaging (OAM)	EPON OAM messaging as defined in [802.3] and [DPoE-SP-OAMv2.0]; Ethernet OAM is not the same as EPON OAM; Ethernet OAM is defined in [802.1ag]
Logical CPE Interface	LCI as defined in [eDOCSIS]
Network Interface Device (NID)	A DEMARC device in DPoE specifications

⁸ Revised per SECv2.0-N-14.0176-1 and per SECv2.0-N-14.0191-2 on 7/18/14 by JB.

4 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

This specification uses the following abbreviations:

AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
CMCI	Cable Modem CPE Interface
CPE	Customer Premise Equipment.
DA	Destination Address
DEMARC	Demarcation Device
DoS	Denial of Service
DPoE	DOCSIS Provisioning of EPON
EAP	Extensible Authentication Protocol
eCM	embedded Cable Modem
eDVA	embedded Digital Voice Adapter
EPL	Ethernet Private Line
EPON	Ethernet Passive Optical Network
EVC	Ethernet Virtual Connection
IP	Internet Protocol
LLID	Logical Link Identifier
MEF	Metro Ethernet Forum
MEN	Metro Ethernet Network
MI	MEF INNI Interface at a customer premise
MKA	MACSec Key Agreement protocol
MN	MEF INNI Interface to operators MEN
MPCP	Multi-Point Control Protocol
MPCPDU	MPCP Data Unit
MU	MEF UNI Interface
ODN	Optical Distribution Network
OLT	Optical Line Termination
OSC	Optical Splitter Combiner
ONU	Optical Network Unit
PHY	PHYsical Layer
PON	Passive optical network
QoS	Quality of Service
R	IP Router
SA	Source Address
SCB	Single Copy Broadcast
SFP	Small Form-factor Pluggable

SSD	Secure Software Download
UNI	User Network Interface
vCM	Virtual Cable Modem
X	IEEE Ethernet Switch (Generic)

5 OVERVIEW

DPoE security comprises functions within each of the DPoE Network elements and interfaces between the OSS, DPoE Network elements, and interfaces between the DPoE Network elements and subscriber devices or networks.

The security architecture is composed of discrete security functions and protocols that individually or collectively provide security for each of the security areas.

- Subscriber data privacy (TU interface)
- Subscriber network security (TU and C interfaces)
- Service provider network security (TU and C interfaces)
- Device software and configuration (D, TU, and C interfaces)

Security for the D interface is out of the scope of this specification. Some security functions for the TU interface rely on communication over the D interface.

Security on the TU interface includes subscriber data privacy, subscriber network security, service provider network security, and device software and configuration. Encryption is used on the TU interface to implement these features. Provisioning and control of these services also requires configuration protocols that operate across the D interface. Those protocols are specified in the DPoE OSSI Specifications.

The S interface is the User to Network Interface for DPoE services. IP services rely on the use of a Layer 2 to Layer 3 address relationship (ARP in IPv4). IP services are limited to a single IP address and single MAC address at the CPE (across the S interface) for the IP (HSD) or DOCSIS equivalent service.

5.1 Subscriber Data Privacy

Subscriber data privacy includes device authentication and key exchanges required to verify that the device (and accompanying certificates) can ensure data path encryption for subscriber data. There are three encryption modes: 1G Downstream-only, 10G Downstream-only, and 10G Bidirectional.

Downstream-only modes protect downstream traffic from the DPoE System to the D-ONU. These modes are used when the upstream channel can be assumed secure and does not require traffic encryption.

Traffic is encrypted in both directions in bidirectional mode. In bidirectional encryption mode, if a hostile device gets access to the EPON and is able to observe or collect the raw transmission on the fiber, the device will still not be able to recreate the data that is being communicated through DPoE system. In DOCSIS specifications, this is the traffic across the HFC interface. In DPoE specifications, this is the traffic across the TU interface.

As with DOCSIS specifications, the system and network from the D interface "northbound" or towards the core of the network (to the left in Figure 2) are assumed to be secure because those networks are physically separate from the subscriber access network and operate across complex multiservice transport networks that may have their own additional security. Transport, core IP, and Internet security are beyond the scope of this specification.

5.1.1 Traffic encryption

DOCSIS specifications support upstream and downstream traffic encryption with the optional choice of DES or AES-128. The only cipher used in DPoE specifications is AES-128. In DOCSIS specifications message authentication with a message digest code is used for some unencrypted control messages that carry important system information. DPoE specifications do not use this feature. Instead, all configuration and management messages are confined to an encrypted channel between the authorized management source (the DPoE System) and the ONU, so that individual clear-text messages do not have to be individually authenticated.

5.1.2 Key Exchange

In current DOCSIS specifications, the BPKM protocol is used for key exchange between CMTS and CM. It uses a combination of private/public key cryptography and symmetric cryptography to securely exchange keys. Public/private keys are installed with the X.509 certificate instead of being generated on the fly.

Depending on the cryptographic method configured for the PON, DPoE specifications use either DPoE OAM or the [802.1X] MKA protocol to exchange keys.

5.1.3 DPoE ONU Device Authentication⁹

Authenticating the D-ONU device helps assure that the key exchange and forwarding of encrypted traffic is done with a subscriber's device that is compliant to the DPoE specification. This helps prevent D-ONU device cloning and theft of service. The EAP-TLS protocol, along with X.509 certificates, are used to perform D-ONU device authentication.

5.1.4 Early Authentication and Encryption

Device authentication and traffic encryption can occur before a D-ONU receives a configuration file and is provisioned for service. This is referred to as Early Authentication and Encryption (EAE) and is similar to DOCSIS 3.0. It may be desirable to control the enabling/disabling of EAE for diagnostic purposes. The DOCSIS 3.0 SNMP MIB docsIf3MdCfgEarlyAuthEncrCtrl is used to Control EAE. The DPoE System MUST support the docsIf3MdCfgEarlyAuthEncrCtrl MIB with values having the following functions:

Value Name	DPoE Functional Meaning
disableEAE(1)	Disable EAE for all DPoE ONU devices.
enableEaeRangingBasedEnforcement(2)	N/A
enableEaeCapabilityBasedEnforcement(3)	N/A
enableEaeTotalEnforcement(4) Default value	Enable EAE for all DPoE ONU devices.

5.1.5 Configuration File Security Control

The D-ONU configuration file TLV 29 encoding controls enabling/disabling device authentication and traffic encryption for each D-ONU. Since EAE can occur before the D-ONU configuration file is received and processed, TLV 29 settings control subsequent device authentication and traffic encryption functions for that D-ONU. The DPoE System MUST support TLV 29 values having the following functions:

⁹ Added sections 5.13 through 5.15 per SECV2.0-N-13.0090-1 on 7/24/13 by JB.

TLV 29 Value	DPoE Functional Meaning
0	Disable device authentication and traffic encryption for the DPoE ONU. If EAE is enabled, disable traffic encryption for the DPoE ONU.
1	Enable device authentication and traffic encryption for the DPoE ONU. If EAE is enabled, do nothing.

The DPoE System MUST use a default value of 1 if TLV 29 is not included in the configuration file.

5.2 Service Provider Network Security

Service provider network security includes services to secure the provider's network against theft of service, and denial of service.

Secure provisioning plays a critical role in protecting D-ONUs and the DPoE Network against attacks, and in preventing theft of service. This section places requirements on the DPoE System and D-ONUs to support the following secure provisioning functions: control message encryption, source address verification,, MAC address quantity limitation, MAC address learning limits, and anti-DoS attack mechanisms.

5.2.1 Control Message Encryption

When encryption is enabled for a logical link, all control messages, for example DHCP, IGMP, ARP, MPCP, and OAM messages, MUST be encrypted by the DPoE System using the specified cipher suite, except those messages necessary for PON discovery and initial authentication used to establish this encryption.

5.2.2 IP Denial of Service attack mitigation

These are the measures that prevent malicious CPE from disrupting the system operation by presenting to the system stimulus that it cannot handle properly.

The DPoE System MUST provide a mechanism to prevent occurrence of the DoS (flooding) attack originating from a D-ONU. Examples include the ping of death, SYN flood, UDP flood, ICMP flood, TCP flood, etc. When the DPoE System discovers that the system is under any one of these attacks, the DPoE System MUST support an operator configurable option to drop IP packets if configured.

The DPoE System MUST support the capability to enable or disable each individual anti-DoS attack mechanism. The DPoE System MUST by default enable all anti-DoS attack mechanisms.

Requirements for IP network security across the D interface are out of the scope of this specification.

5.2.3 Ethernet Denial of Services Mitigation: Broadcast MAC forwarding

Malicious CPEs can send broadcast Ethernet packets across the network and disrupt normal communication.

The Metro Ethernet service delivers a private Ethernet service and considers clients within the Metro Ethernet service to be trusted. In Metro Ethernet services, there is no need for filtering or blocking of MAC broadcasts.

The IP (HSD) service uses Ethernet as a transport from the DPoE System to the D-ONU and does not use Ethernet for any traffic between subscribers. The IP service will need to allow broadcast Ethernet traffic to be directed from the D-ONU to the DPoE System where the DPoE System will process the traffic. An example of a required broadcast is DHCP. DPoE Systems MAY offer operator configurable filters to control the data rate or block broadcast frames within a given VLAN. However, since the IP service does not carry frames between VLANs, this function is not required.

For a detailed description of Ethernet forwarding for IP (HSD), refer to [DPoE-SP-ARCHv2.0].

5.2.4 Limitation of the MAC address learning capacity

The D-ONU MUST support limitation of the number of MAC addresses learned on the S interface. The number of MAC address for each D-ONU S interface (port) MUST be configurable.

The D-ONU MUST support limitation of the MAC address learning capacity on per Ethernet port basis. The number of MAC addresses for each D-ONU port (across the C interface) MUST be configurable.

The D-ONU MUST NOT preserve nor remember learned MAC address when it is rebooted or power-cycled or re-registered in EPON. The D-ONU MUST store all learned MACs up to the configured maximum number of MAC addresses until a previously learned MAC address is aged out or the MAC cache is cleared.

The DPoE System MUST support clearing the MAC cache on a per D-ONU and per D-ONU S interface (or CMCI, LCI, MI, or MU) basis.

5.2.5 MAC address binding

The D-ONU MUST support the capability to configure specific SA MAC addresses and/or DA MAC addresses, which are bound to specific UNI ports, providing access from the specific devices or to specific devices, depending on the transmission direction. Any access for CPE devices whose source MAC addresses are not in the list of authorized addresses MUST be denied by the D-ONU.

5.2.6 Source Address Verification

CPE may attempt to use IP addresses in an unauthorized manner. The Source Address Verification (SAV) feature is used to verify that the source IP address of upstream packets is provisioned or allowed by the service provider. The DPoE System MUST support the SAV functions that apply to IPv4 packets defined in [SECv3.0]

5.3 eDOCSIS

eDOCSIS eSAFE subsystems such as eDSG, eDVA, etc., are specified elsewhere. In cases where there is a fully operable embedded device within the D-ONU, those eSAFEs will use the same SSD mechanism implemented by the D-ONU. eSAFE software can be updated along with D-ONU firmware or separately. Such SSD procedures are outside the scope of this document.

5.4 Secure Software Download

DPoE uses a secure mechanism for downloading software images to D-ONU devices. It is based on the DOCSIS secure software download (SSD) mechanism. Digital certificates are used for software image signing and validation. Vendors sign their images and give them to MSOs for download. When a software image is downloaded the vCM in the DPoE System validates the signed image and then forwards it to the D-ONU over a secure channel. The D-ONU also validates the signed image before installing it.

6 ENCRYPTED FRAME FORMAT

6.1 1G and 2G Downstream-only Cipher Suite (1Down)¹⁰

The term “1Down” refers to the downstream-only cipher suite associated with 1 Gbps (1G-EPON) and 2 Gbps (2G-EPON) capable downstreams.

The DPoE System MUST only encrypt the DA through FCS bytes of the forwarded 1Down frame.




Figure 5 - Cipher Text Region (1Down)

The fifth octet of the preamble (immediately before the LLID) is used to carry security information.




Figure 6 - Security Octet (1Down)

The DPoE System MUST set bit 1 in the security octet in the preamble of the 1Down frame to indicate that the data transferred is cipher text, and set bit 0 to the key identification number used to encrypt the frame. For 1Down encryption, bits [7:2] of the security octet are reserved, and the DPoE System MUST set them to 010101 (binary), matching the normal IDLE pattern. When encryption is disabled, the DPoE System MUST set the 1Down security octet to a value of 0x55.

6.2 10G Zero-Overhead Cipher Suite (10Down, 10Bi)

This section defines the frame format used with encryption on 10G EPON devices. Note that the upstream path uses this encryption method even with a 10G down / 1G up PON.

6.2.1 10G Zero-Overhead Frame Format

In the 10G mode, as in the 1G mode, the entire frame from DA through FCS is encrypted. Only the preamble remains as clear-text.




Figure 7 - Cipher Text Region (10Down, 10Bi)

The fifth byte of the preamble (immediately before the EPON LLID) is the security octet.

¹⁰ Revised per SECv2.0-N-14.0191-2 on 7/18/14 by JB.




Figure 8 - Security Octet (10G Zero Overhead)

Fields in the security octet are:

Bits	Meaning
7:2	LSB of the MPCP time of the frame DA at the transmitter
1	1 if frame is encrypted; 0 if frame is not encrypted
0	Key identification number (0..1) of the key used to encrypt this frame

When encryption is disabled, the security octet has the value 0x55.

7 KEY MANAGEMENT PROTOCOLS

7.1 1G and 2G Downstream-only Key Exchange Protocol¹¹

The key exchange protocol defined in this section **MUST** be used by DPoE System operating at 1 Gbps using the downstream-only encryption option and operating at 1 Gbps or 2 Gbps. The key exchange protocol defined in this section **MUST** be used by D-ONU operating at 1 Gbps using the downstream-only encryption option.




Figure 9 - D-ONU Key Exchange State Machine

The states in this state machine are described below.

¹¹ Revised per SECv2.0-N-14.0191-2 on 7/18/14 by JB.

7.1.1 Set Key Exchange Timer

After MPCP and OAM discovery, the DPoE System configures a given logical link as a secure channel by sending a Set Key Exchange Timer OAM message to the D-ONU. This message contains a single timer value, Timeout, which will be used by the key exchange process. The D-ONU then transmits a Set Key Exchange Timer Ack indicating to the DPoE System that the link was successfully configured.




Figure 10 - Setting the Key Exchange Timer

The DPoE System SHOULD implement a retry mechanism in the event that the ACK is not received.

7.1.2 Create Key Exchange Timer

When a key exchange occurs, the D-ONU creates a timer initialized to the value specified by the Key Exchange Timer attribute that was used to enable encryption. The use of this timer is described in Section 7.1.7, Key Exchange Timer Expiration Event. The D-ONU MUST only accept a Key Exchange Timer value of at least 10 seconds. The D-ONU MUST NOT accept a Key Exchange Timer value of more than 65,535 seconds.

7.1.3 Generate Random Key

Once a given logical link has been configured as a secure channel, the D-ONU immediately generates a 128 -bit random key string associated with the link. The key string will be used by the DPoE System to encrypt data and by the D-ONU to decrypt cipher text received from the DPoE System.

7.1.4 Send Key to DPoE System

The D-ONU immediately transfers the key string along with a 1-bit key identification number to the DPoE System. The DPoE System uses the key string to generate cipher text using the cipher algorithm specified for the cryptographic method. (See Section 11, Cryptographic Methods.)




Figure 11 - Send Key to the DPoE System

7.1.5 Create Switchover Verification Timer (Optional)

After transferring the key to the DPoE System, the D-ONU SHOULD create a failsafe switchover verification timer. When this timer expires, the D-ONU verifies that the DPoE System is transferring cipher-text on the associated logical link using the latest key. If the link is still receiving plain-text, or data encrypted with the previous key, the D-ONU SHOULD retransmit the key to the OLT in the DPoE System. Refer to Section 7.1.7, Key Exchange Timer Expiration Event, for more information on Key Exchange.




Figure 12 - Key Exchange Failure Detected by Link

The D-ONU MUST wait at least 1 second before verifying that the key exchange has taken place. This is long enough to guarantee that the D-ONU has received at least one encrypted MPCP GATE PDU from the DPoE System. The D-ONU SHOULD NOT wait more than $\frac{1}{2}$ of the actual key exchange timer value before verifying the key exchange.

7.1.6 Switchover Verification Event (Optional for ONU)

This event triggers the D-ONU to validate that the encryption key has been successfully updated by the DPoE System. If the key exchange has not occurred successfully, the D-ONU SHOULD send an appropriate alarm message to the DPoE System on the failing link and resend the key. Refer to Section 7.1.5, Create Switchover Verification Timer (Optional).

7.1.7 Key Exchange Timer Expiration Event

This event will trigger the D-ONU to generate a new security key and transfer it to the DPoE System. The D-ONU MUST retain the original key and transfer the new key with a different key identification number from the original. The D-ONU MUST accept and decrypt cipher-text with either the active or the next key. The key identification number transferred in the preamble of the cipher-text identifies the encryption key used by the DPoE System for that frame. The key exchange mechanism expires keys to limit the useful lifetime of a successful key extraction attack. Refer to Figure 13 below depicting two key exchange cycles.

On the DPoE System, expiration of the key exchange timer SHOULD generate an alarm to management software.

7.1.8 Link Deregistration Event

Link deregistration triggers the D-ONU to disable security for that link (only). Security should be re-enabled upon link discovery.




Figure 13 - Changing Keys On Timer Expiration

7.1.9 Detecting Key Exchange Failures at the DPoE System

The DPoE System SHOULD detect failure to receive a new key from the D-ONU within the provisioned key exchange time. The DPoE System MAY deregister the logical link when it fails to receive a new key from the D-

ONU. The D-ONU SHOULD retry the key exchange message; see Section 7.1.6, Switchover Verification Event (Optional for ONU), for more details.




Figure 14 - Key Exchange Failure Detected By DPoE System

It is also possible that the DPoE System could fail to receive a response to the initial Set Key Exchange Timer sent to the D-ONU. The DPoE System SHOULD retry this message. If no response is received from the D-ONU, the DPoE System SHOULD deregister the logical link.




Figure 15 - Set Key Exchange Timer Failure Detected by DPoE System

7.1.10 DPoE OAM Key Exchange Messages

Key exchange message formats and attributes are defined by the [DPoE-SP-OAMv2.0] specification. The Key Exchange PDU type carries key values, while the Encrypt Key Expiry Time attribute controls the Key Exchange Timer interval.

7.1.11 Summary of 1Down Encryption Parameters

Property	Description	Unit	Min	Max	Default
Key Exchange Timer	A repeating timer, an instance of which should be maintained by the D-ONU for every link configured as a secured channel.	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Key Size	Number of octets of the key value to follow. Used to determine the length of the Encryption Key.	Octet	16	16	16
Key Security Key Encryption Key	String of bits used as input into the AES algorithm. A unique security key is generated by the D-ONU for each link configured as a secure channel.	N/A	0	$2^{128} - 1$	N/A
Encryption Key Expiry Time Key Exchange Timer Value	Time interval at which the D-ONU shall generate a new Key and transfer it to the DPoE System. A separate attribute is defined for each link associated with a particular D-ONU. Setting the attribute to 0 for a given link shall disable security on that link.	Seconds	10 (0)	65535	0
Encryption Enabled	Flag present in every forwarded frame that is used to determine if the payload contains plain-text or cipher-text. 1= enabled, 0=disabled	N/A	0	1	0
Key Identification Number	The key identification number sent in every forwarded frame configured as a secure link and used by the D-ONU to determine which of the two possible keys associated with the link shall be used to decrypt the payload.	N/A	0	1	N/A

7.2 10G Downstream-only Key Exchange Protocol

The 10Down key exchange protocol is identical to the 1Down key exchange protocol. Keys are generated on the D-ONU and transmitted to the DPoE System in DPoE OAM Key Exchange PDUs.

7.3 10G Bidirectional Key Exchange Protocol

10Bi uses the MACSec Key Agreement (MKA) protocol defined in [802.1X].

7.4 1G / 10G Multicast LLID Key Exchange Protocol

The multicast LLID (mLLID) key exchange protocol is similar to the 1Down protocol. However, since more than one ONU may listen to the same mLLID, and all ONUs with the mLLID must have the same key, the key is generated by the OLT and transferred to the ONU. In order to preserve security of the key,

the DPoE System **MUST** send the key downstream on a previously registered and encrypted unicast LLID to each ONU.




Figure 16 - mLLID Key Exchange DPoE System State Machine

7.4.1 Set Key Exchange Timer

The DPoE System maintains a timer to measure the interval between key changes on the mLLID. This timer is internal to the DPoE System. The DPoE System **MUST** set the Key Exchange Timer interval to be at least 10 seconds and no more than 65,535 seconds.

7.4.2 Generate Random Key

The DPoE system generates a 128-bit random bit string to use as the new key. This key will be used by the DPoE system to encrypt traffic on the mLLID, and by the D-ONU to decrypt traffic on that mLLID. The DPoE System **MUST** generate the key in accordance with requirements in Section 11, Cryptographic Methods.

A key is identified by a 1-bit Key Identification Number. When the DPoE System generates a new key, it increments this Key Identification Number. The DPoE System MAY begin with either key 0 or key 1; key 0 is recommended.

7.4.3 Send Key to Each D-ONU

The DPoE System sends a copy of the Key Exchange PDU to each D-ONU in the L-OAM Key Exchange PDU, using an encrypted unicast LLID to that D-ONU. Keys are not multicast on the mLLID itself.

Each D-ONU acknowledges receipt of the key. When the DPoE System receives an ack from each D-ONU, it changes the encryption key in use to the new key.




Figure 17 - Sending mLLID Keys to D-ONUs

7.4.4 Create Switchover Verification Timer

The DPoE System creates a timer to limit the length of time that D-ONUs are allowed to acknowledge receipt of the Key Exchange PDU. D-ONUs MUST acknowledge receipt of the Key Exchange PDU within 1 second after receiving the frame. The DPoE System SHOULD implement a retry mechanism to re-send keys to D-ONUs that fail to acknowledge during this interval.

7.4.5 Raise/Clear Key Exchange Alarm

For each D-ONU that fails to acknowledge the Key Exchange PDU, the DPoE System MUST signal an alarm to management software. For each D-ONU that successfully acknowledges the Key Exchange PDU, the DPoE System clears any previous alarm condition that may be standing for that ONU.

7.4.6 Switch Encryption to New Key

If at least one D-ONU assigned the mLLID has successfully acknowledged the key exchange, the DPoE System updates hardware to begin encrypting traffic on the mLLID with the new key. If no D-ONUs acknowledged the key exchange, then the DPoE MUST continue encrypting traffic on the mLLID with the old key until the next key exchange interval occurs.

7.4.7 Link Deregistration Event

If all D-ONUs assigned an mLLID deregister from the PON, the DPoE System discontinues the key exchange process, setting its Key Exchange Timer interval to zero.

7.4.8 Detecting Key Exchange Failures at the D-ONU (Optional)

D-ONUs MAY implement a feature to detect a key exchange failure at the D-ONU. If a D-ONU does not sense a change in the key in use on the mLLID to the new key within 5 times the Switchover Verification interval, it MAY send an alarm to the DPoE system.

A D-ONU MUST continue to forward traffic using the old key if the switchover does not occur.

8 AUTHENTICATION AND ENCRYPTION

DPoE authentication and encryption is always "early" in the DOCSIS 3.0 sense, which is to say that it occurs before any D-ONU provisioning or user data traffic is allowed to be exchanged between the DPoE System and D-ONU.

A DPoE System **MUST NOT** configure a D-ONU or enable services either locally at the DPoE System, or at the D-ONU, until the authentication and encryption procedures configured for the DPoE Network have been completed.

Authentication and encryption functions are enabled and disabled using TLV 29 in the config file.

8.1 DOCSIS and DPoE Authentication Comparison¹²

Apart from terminology differences, packet formats, and details of the cipher suite, the authentication and key exchange process in DOCSIS specifications and the DPoE 10Bi method are similar. Compare the two high level messaging diagrams below, with the DOCSISv3.0 method on the left and DPoE bi-directional method on the right.




Figure 18 - Authentication in Bidirectional Methods

For downstream-only encryption modes, authentication remains nearly the same, while the key exchange differs in that the keys are generated at the ONU, transmitted upstream, and thus do not require encryption.

¹² Revised per SECv2.0-N-13.0071-1 on 7/24/13 by JB.




Figure 19 - Authentication in Downstream-Only Methods

TLS hello messages contain a CipherSuite list. In DPoE, these lists are not used. The D-ONU MUST set the length of the CipherSuite list to zero. Cipher suites as described in this specification are always used between the DPoE System and DPoE ONU as provisioned; they are not negotiated. The certificate_verify message from the DPoE ONU proves the D-ONU holds the private key that matches the reported cert, as this message contains a hash of the previous message contents, encrypted by the private key. The DPoE System decrypts the hash using the public key in the reported certificate, and verifies the D-ONU's value against the value calculated by the DPoE System.

8.2 D-ONU Authentication¹³

The DPoE Network uses device identity and authentication procedures functionally equivalent to DOCSIS. The DPoE Network uses existing DOCSIS protocols for all interfaces from the DPoE Network to the OSS for back office compatibility. However, the protocols and procedures for device authentication within the DPoE Network (from the DPoE System to the D-ONU across the TU interface) are different from those in DOCSIS. All of the TU interface protocols are distinct from the subscriber interfaces (C and S) and the OSS and NSI interfaces (D and M). Because none of these protocols are visible to the subscriber or the service provider, the DPoE specifications do not affect existing products, services, or operations for service providers. These specifications are for interoperability between DPoE Network elements (the DPoE System or D-ONU).

8.2.1 D-ONU MAC Address Identity

DOCSIS uses the DOCSIS CM MAC address as the identity of the CM. The identity is not implicitly trusted, but is the basic identify for all DOCSIS service OAMP. DPoE System MUST use the EPON ONU MAC address as the identity of the D-ONU.

When a D-ONU is powered on, each logical link reports its MAC address to the DPoE System through the MPCP discovery process as defined in [802.3].

¹³ Revised per SECv2.0-N-14.0176-1 on 7/18/14 by JB.

The DPoE System MUST support verification of the D-ONU's identity as authorized for the particular DPoE System port on which it is discovered. The DPoE System MUST NOT admit an authorized D-ONU on a different DPoE System port. The DPoE System MUST NOT admit an unauthorized D-ONU from accessing the network from any location. The DPoE System MAY use characteristics of the ONU in addition to the MAC address and DPoE System port, such as round-trip time, to deny access to D-ONU that are unexpectedly relocated.

The first D-ONU to register with a particular MAC address and pass authentication MUST be the only D-ONU with that MAC address allowed by the DPoE System on the DPoE System port. Duplicate D-ONU MAC addresses MUST NOT be allowed by the DPoE System.

8.2.2 D-ONU Authentication

The DPoE System assumes that the D-ONU identity cannot be trusted until the D-ONU has been authenticated. Authentication of the device is a prerequisite for later software download, device configuration, service configuration, and service operation. The DPoE Network emulates the behavior of the DOCSIS system, although the implementation within the DPoE Network across the TU interface differs in terms of packet formats. To external systems across the D interface, the D-ONU device authentication (based on the MAC address and certificates) operates as specified [SECv3.0], [OSSiv3.0], and [DPoE-SP-OSSiv2.0].

The DPoE System MUST validate the D-ONU certificate using the procedures and criteria defined in [SECv3.0] and deny service to D-ONUs presenting invalid certificates. The DPoE System MUST verify that the MAC address in the D-ONU device certificate is the same as the source MAC address in the Ethernet frame it received from the D-ONU as part of D-ONU device certificate validation.

The length of time to authenticate a D-ONU SHOULD NOT exceed 300 seconds.

8.3 Use of EAP-TLS for D-ONU Authentication

The packet format used to retrieve D-ONU certificates is EAP-TLS as defined in [RFC 5216]. This is a method of the EAP authentication framework, defined in [RFC 3748]. EAP is conveyed in Ethernet frames according to the EAP Over LAN (EAPOL) format as defined in [802.1X]. The summary of these specifications in this section is for informative purposes only. Normative requirements for use of these specifications are signaled below with the usual upper-case keywords.

A typical message sequence for EAP-TLS in downstream-only mode is shown in Figure 20.




Figure 20 - EAP-TLS Message Sequence

The EAP-TLS frame format is summarized in Figure 21.




Figure 21 - EAP-TLS Frame Format

- DA Ethernet Destination Address
- SA Ethernet Source Address
- 88 8E EtherType assigned to EAPOL
- Ver EAPOL Version
- Type EAPOL Type (0x00, "EAP")
- Len Length of EAPOL Packet Body to follow
- Code EAP Packet Type Code (1-4, Request / Response / Success / Failure)

ID Arbitrary ID number that matches Responses to Requests

Len Length of packet to follow

Type EAP authentication method (0x0D, "TLS")

EAP-TLS in turn encapsulates the TLS protocol ([RFC 4346]). TLS exchanges TLS Records of various types that actually contain the data for key exchanges, authentication, and so on, as described earlier. TLS Records are a series of TLVs that can in theory be very long (2^{24} bytes). The primary function of EAP-TLS in the protocol layering is to fragment a single TLS record (which is agnostic to maximum packet sizes) across multiple EAP frames (as EAP itself does not support fragmentation). The DPoE System MUST support EAP-TLS fragmentation as defined in RFC 5216. The D-ONU MUST support EAP-TLS fragmentation as defined in RFC 5216. In DPoE, the TLS record most likely to be fragmented is the D-ONU certificate response, which contains two X.509 certifications and could be a few thousand bytes long. Figure 22 shows a Flags field and TLS Len value for a fragmented TLS record containing a certificate message.




Figure 22 - EAP-TLS Frame Format 2

EAP-TLS frames always have a Flags field which indicates whether there is a 32-bit length field in this frame, and whether more frames with fragments of the current TLS record are expected. Only the frame containing the beginning of a particular TLS record has a TLS Len field; subsequent frames do not have the TLS Len field. All frames except the last frame containing a particular TLS Record have the “More Fragments” flag set; the final frame has the flag clear. A frame with a TLS Record that fits entirely in one frame has the More Fragments flag cleared (as it is the last frame), and also has the Length Present flag set (as it is also the first frame).

There are many length values in the entire frame, one at each protocol layer, each one measuring a slightly different sequence of bytes. The EAP-TLS length, shown as “TLS Len” in Figure 22 - EAP-TLS Frame Format 2 indicates the length of the entire TLS record across all fragments. The length inside the TLS record, shown as “Frag Len”, indicates the length of this particular fragment only. Finally, the lengths inside the Handshake type Certificate TLV, shown as “Len” above, indicate the total length of the individual certificate that follows, whether fragmented or not. Appendix I.2 shows an example Certificate response fragmented across two Ethernet frames.

8.3.1 EAPOL Notes

The presence of a D-ONU is already well known to the DPoE System due to MPCP Registration and OAM Discovery, and so the Authenticator-Initiated option of EAPOL is used. A D-ONU MUST NOT send an EAPOL-Start frame to initiate Supplicant-Initiated Authentication.

Similarly, D-ONU deregistration is handled by MPCP. The D-ONU MUST NOT send an EAPOL-Logoff message before deregistering.

8.3.2 EAP Notes

The identity of a D-ONU is its MAC address. So, the DPoE System MUST NOT send an EAPOL-Request/Identity to the D-ONU to request its identity. Authentication begins with the DPoE System sending an EAP-Request/TLS-Start PDU to the D-ONU.

EAP-Success or Failure is determined by the DPoE System validation of the D-ONU certificate as described in Section 13, X.509 Certificate Profile and Management.

8.3.3 TLS Notes

The following notes describe changes to the TLS standard to support DPoE:

CipherSuite & Compression Negotiation

DPoE does not support CipherSuite and compression method negotiation. The key exchange and encryption algorithms to be used for DPoE are defined in this specification. The DPoE System MUST ignore the CipherSuite and compression fields in the ClientHello message. The D-ONU SHOULD NOT send any CipherSuites or compression methods in the ClientHello message. The D-ONU MUST ignore the CipherSuite and compression fields in the ServerHello message.

DPoE System Authentication

The DPoE System is assumed trusted and therefore is not authenticated. The DPoE System MUST NOT send a Certificate message to the D-ONU for server authentication.

D-ONU Authentication

D-ONU device authentication is supported by sending certificates to the DPoE System for validation. The DPoE system MUST send a CertificateRequest message to the D-ONU. The D-ONU MUST include a Certificate and CertificateVerify message in its response. The Certificate message sent by the D-ONU MUST contain the D-ONU device certificate and the CableLabs DPoE Mfr CA certificate. The CertificateVerify message contains hash values of the concatenation of all handshake messages, sent or received. For downstream-only mode those handshake messages are: ClientHello, ServerHello, CertificateRequest, ServerHelloDone, and Certificate. For bi-directional mode those handshake messages are: ClientHello, ServerHello, ServerKeyExchange, CertificateRequest, ServerHelloDone, Certificate, and ClientKeyExchange.

Key Exchange

TLS message requirements for exchanging keys depend upon the encryption mode. For downstream-only mode the ServerKeyExchange message and the ClientKeyExchange message are not used since the encryption keys have already been exchanged. The DPoE System MUST NOT send a ServerKeyExchange message when operating in downstream-only encryption mode. The D-ONU MUST NOT send a ClientKeyExchange message when operating in downstream-only encryption mode.

In bi-directional encryption mode both the ServerKeyExchange and ClientKeyExchange messages are used. The DPoE System MUST use a 2048 bit RSA public and private key pair for supporting exchange of the pre-master secret with D-ONU devices. The DPoE System's RSA public key MUST be sent to the D-ONU in the ServerKeyExchange message. After the D-ONU creates the premaster secret it MUST encrypt it using the DPoE System's public key and send it to the DPoE System in the ClientKeyExchange message. The DPoE System can then decrypt the pre-master secret using its private key. The CAK is derived from the pre-master secret.

ChangeCipherSpec Messages

The ChangeCipherSpec message is used by the client and server to indicate they are ready to begin L4 encryption of traffic (as in SSL). In DPoE there is another key exchange that occurs after EAP-TLS

messaging to setup the traffic encryption key. Therefore, the ChangeCipherSpec messages do not apply. The DPoE System MUST NOT send a ChangeCipherSpec message. The D-ONU MUST NOT send a ChangeCipherSpec message.

Finished Messages

Finished messages are sent by the client and server to indicate that the TLS message exchange is complete. Since DPoE traffic encryption keys may not be exchanged until after EAP-TLS messaging the finished messages may not be encrypted. Downstream-only methods encrypt the channel before the TLS authentication sequence, and so all messages would be encrypted at L2. Bidirectional methods begin L2 encryption after the entire TLS sequence is complete. The DPoE System MUST NOT include hash results, a MAC value, or apply L4 encryption to the Finished message. The D-ONU MUST NOT include hash results, a MAC value, or apply L4 encryption to the Finished message. The Finished messages used with DPoE are thus zero length.

9 SECURE PROVISIONING

D-ONU configuration files are transferred from the OSS to the DPoE System over the D interface by the same mechanism as specified by [DOCSIS].

These configuration files are translated by the DPoE System into a series of DPoE OAM PDUs for transport across the TU interface to configure the D-ONU. The DPoE System **MUST** encrypt OAM PDUs for D-ONU configuration over the TU interface with the cryptographic methods defined in this specification.

9.1 ONU and CM Management Comparison

The DPoE System **MUST NOT** configure an IP address on a D-ONU that operates as the CM equivalent management address. In place of direct ONU configuration via an L3 configuration file transfer, the DPoE System operates a virtual CM (vCM) within the DPoE System. The DPoE System downloads the configuration for the "CM" into this vCM. Since the vCM resides within the DPoE System, which is always in the physical control of the operator, it (unlike a real CM) can be trusted.

The vCM controls the configuration of the D-ONU with DPoE OAM PDUs. The OAM messages are distinctly marked separate from subscriber traffic, and EPON OLTs and ONUs (in general) or DPoE Systems and D-ONU do not forward OAM messages across the D, C, or S interfaces. OAM messages only operate across the TU interface and are protected by encryption. Thus, there is no security threat based on a subscriber capability to create OAM messages and inject them into the control path.

This architecture provides additional security, and fast, simple, and low cost D-ONU implementation and operations. For example, if a D-ONU were configured by a private OLT and then later connected to a DPoE System in an operator network, it would be re-configured by the new operator OLT before any services were enabled. No matter what the state of the D-ONU configuration was prior to its registration, it will always be re-configured by OAM messages every time it re-registers with a DPoE System. In addition, the CVC process for the software (executable image) provides protection for firmware changes.

A DOCSIS CMTS performs a service authentication check during CM initialization. A CM may request the correct configuration file, but may then request services in the registration message that do not correspond to the configuration file contents. To prevent this error (or attack), DOCSIS recommends that the CMTS proxy TFTP file transfers to the CM, intercepting file transfers which happen to be configuration files destined for a CM, and comparing the contents of the registration message with the config file to be sure the services match.

In DPoE specifications, such a TFTP proxy is not required, since the D-ONU does not "request" service from the DPoE System over TFTP; service provisioning is always "pushed" from the DPoE System to the D-ONU using DPoE OAM.

10 USING CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS

10.1 DPoE System

The DPoE System **MUST** be capable of maintaining two keys per logical link for encrypting downstream frames. The keys alternate to maintain continuous encryption of traffic when changing keys. The DPoE System **MUST** be capable of maintaining two keys per logical link for decrypting received upstream traffic. The DPoE System **MUST** be capable of decrypting received traffic with either of the keys, as indicated by the key identification number in each received frame. The DPoE System **MUST** also be capable of receiving unencrypted traffic even while encryption is enabled.

10.2 D-ONU

The D-ONU **MUST** maintain two keys per logical link for encrypting frames transmitted upstream. These keys alternate to maintain continuous encryption of traffic when changing keys. The D-ONU **MUST** maintain two keys per logical link for decrypting downstream frames. The D-ONU **MUST** be capable of decrypting received downstream traffic with either of the keys, as indicated by the key identification number in each received frame. The D-ONU **MUST** also be capable of receiving unencrypted traffic even while encryption is enabled.

10.3 Authentication of Dynamic Service Requests

Unlike DOCSIS, all DPoE OAM messages are encrypted. Individual messages are not signed with HMAC, and so the [802.1ae] CAK plays no role in signing control messages.

11 CRYPTOGRAPHIC METHODS¹⁴

Encryption is a mechanism used to guarantee security and privacy features. The physical properties of the PON medium used in the DPoE Network, as distinct from the RF over coaxial cable medium used in DOCSIS, affect the network design and requirements for privacy.

In a PON system, downstream frames are visible to all ONUs on a PON segment. Each frame is physically replicated by an optical splitter to every ONU. An ONU must permit only that data intended for that ONU to be forwarded. In EPON, this is accomplished by assigning each ONU a unique value known as a Logical Link Identifier (LLID). The OLT marks transmitted frames with the LLID, which is then used by the ONU to discard frames intended for other ONUs on the same PON segment.

Unfortunately, the nature of a PON system leads to the possibility that a malicious ONU can potentially ignore the LLID and gain illicit access to downstream data intended for other ONUs.

Encryption is used in the downstream channel to ensure that a frame intended for one D-ONU can only be received by that ONU. Each ONU has a unique key, and frames intended for that D-ONU are encrypted with that key. Multicast groups can be created on the PON by the OLT sharing the key for an LLID with more than one ONU. The special multicast group known as the "broadcast" LLID is usually not encrypted, as all ONUs would have that key, and thus there would be no point in encrypting that data.

In the upstream direction, the properties of the optical splitter and commercially available optics modules make it effectively impossible for a D-ONU to successfully decode data transmitted by other users. The upstream wavelength is different from that used by the downstream receiver at the ONU. Even if the ONU receiver were modified, optical splitters typically have about a -55 dB return loss for reflection of the upstream signal, at least 26 dB more loss than the entire optical budget of the PON. Thus without tapping into the physical network on the trunk fiber upstream of all splitters, it is highly unlikely that a user can gain illicit access to upstream information.

Clearly a mechanism must be implemented to ensure that downstream data is securely transferred.

A DPoE System MUST implement the downstream encryption modes (1Down and 10Down) and the 10Bi encryption mode as described in this document. A D-ONU MUST implement the downstream encryption modes (1D and 10Down) as described in this document. A D-ONU SHOULD implement the 10Bi encryption mode as described in this document. The 10Bi method can be used by operators in cases where the upstream security of the PON may be suspect. A DPoE System and D-ONU MAY implement upstream encryption for a 1G bidirectional mode; such a method is outside the scope of this specification.

11.1 General encryption requirements

1. DPoE System data encryption MUST be supported on a per logical link basis. Some logical links may be encrypted on the PON while other logical links are not. This requirement retains compatibility with existing and future security standards and practices, and allows for the possibility of heterogeneous deployment, in which multiple security mechanisms are used on the same DPoE Network. Every downstream link MUST be configured at the DPoE System and D-ONU as an encrypted or non-encrypted channel. The DPoE System MUST be able to support both encrypted and unencrypted links on the same PON.
2. Each encrypted link MUST have a unique encryption key randomly generated by the DPoE System or D-ONU, as appropriate for the encryption method in use and type of logical link. If a non-deterministic random number generator is not available, the DPoE System or D-ONU, whichever device is generating the key, MUST make use of sufficient entropy to generate a good quality seed as per [NIST 800-108], also following the guidelines in [RFC 1750].

¹⁴ Revised per SECv2.0-N-14.0119-1 on 2/21/14 by JB.

3. DPoE System encryption MUST operate at full line rate of the DPoE Network.
4. D-ONU decryption MUST operate at full line rate of the DPoE Network.
5. The DPoE System encryption process MUST NOT introduce jitter, though some additional constant latency is expected. The latency added by DPoE System encryption MUST NOT exceed 1 microsecond in either the upstream or downstream direction.
6. The D-ONU decryption process MUST NOT introduce jitter, though some additional constant latency is expected. The latency added by D-ONU decryption MUST NOT exceed 1 microsecond in either the upstream or downstream direction.

11.2 DPoE Cipher Suites¹⁵

11.2.1 1G and 2G Downstream-only Cipher Suite (1Down)

The DPoE System MUST implement the AES algorithm in Cipher Feed Back (CFB) Mode as described in this section when operating at 1 Gbps or 2 Gbps, and provide all necessary functions and interfaces to the software to support the key exchange described in Section 7.1.

The D-ONU MUST implement the AES algorithm in Cipher Feed Back (CFB) Mode as described in this section when operating at 1 Gbps or 2 Gbps, and provide all necessary functions and interfaces to the software to support the key exchange described in Section 7.1. 1Down uses AES 128 CFB mode to generate cipher-text, as described in Section 11.3. The key exchange protocol uses DPoE OAM, as defined in Section 7.1.

11.2.2 10G Downstream-only Cipher Suite (10Down)

DPoE Systems that support 10 Gbps downstream operation MUST support the 10Down encryption method as defined in this section.

10Down uses AES 128 bit CTR mode to generate cipher-text, as described in Section 11.4. The key exchange protocol is the same as for the 1Down method, as defined in Section 7.2.

11.2.3 10G Bidirectional Cipher Suite (10Bi)

DPoE Systems that support 10Gbps/10Gbps or 10Gbps/1Gbps MUST support the 10Bi encryption as defined in this section.

10Bi uses AES 128 bit CTR mode to generate cipher-text as described in Section 11.4. The key exchange protocol is the [802.1X] MKA protocol, as defined in Section 7.3.

11.3 1 Down Cryptographic Method

11.3.1 Encrypting Frames

The DPoE System MUST encrypt frames using AES in cipher-feedback mode (CFB).

¹⁵ Revised per SECv2.0-N-14.0191-2 on 7/18/14 by JB.




Figure 23 - Encrypting Data with Cipher Feedback Algorithm

The AES algorithm is used to generate a cipher based on the input encryption key and a seed value known as the "Initial Vector" (IV). The IV must be known to both the host generating the cipher text and the host that must decrypt the text. (The IV may also be known to other hosts without affecting the security of the cipher.) The derivation of the IV for the 1Down encryption method is described in Section 11.3.3.

The cipher is logically XORed with the plain text P₁ to produce the first 16 octet block of cipher text C₁. This block of cipher text is then used as the IV for the next block of plain text (hence the term "cipher feedback"). This process is repeated until the entire frame is encrypted.

11.3.1.1 Handling Frames of Non-Ordinal Length

If the clear-text length (the entire MAC frame, DA through FCS) in octets cannot be divided by 16 without remainder, the final block of cipher text will be generated by first zero- extending the clear-text to a 16 octet boundary, encrypting a full 16 octet block, and then discarding the unneeded cipher-text that corresponds to the padding of the clear-text.

11.3.2 Decrypting Frames




Figure 24 - Decrypting Data with Cipher Feedback Algorithm

To decrypt the frame, the IVs and key are used to create the original cipher blocks used to encrypt the data. XORing the cipher block with the cipher text produces the original plain text. Refer to Figure 24, the figure above, which illustrates the decryption process for 4 blocks of cipher text.

11.3.3 Initial Vector (IV) Source




Figure 25 - Determining the Initial Vector

The IV is taken from the last 128 bits of the previous frame received from the EPON at the RS sublayer, which includes all downstream frames destined for any ONU regardless of LLID. Since the last 128 bits of the previous frame contains the FCS, the IV computation is a function of every bit of the previous frame. The initial vector is based on the last encrypted frame forwarded downstream on the EPON to any logical link, not the last frame forwarded downstream to any particular link.




Figure 26 - Octet Order within the Initial Vector (1G)

The octets in the initial vector are ordered starting with the first octet transferred (or received) and continuing sequentially in network byte order. The last four octets of the IV are those corresponding to the FCS of the previous frame.

11.4 10 Down / 10BiCryptographic Method

11.4.1 Encrypting Frames

In 10Bi mode the DPoE System MUST encrypt frames using the AES Counter (CTR) mode. Similarly, in 10Bi mode the D-ONU MUST encrypt frames using AES Counter (CTR) mode.




Figure 27 - Encrypting Data with CTR Mode

The AES algorithm is used to generate a cipher based on the input encryption key and a seed value known as the IIV. The IV must be known to both the transmitter generating the cipher text and the receiver that must decrypt the text. (The IV may also be known to other hosts without affecting the security of the cipher.) The derivation of the IV for the 10G cipher is described in Section 11.4.3.

In the second stage, the IV is used as input to AES along with the key. The AES output is logically XORed with the plain text, Plaintext 1, to produce the first 16 octet block of cipher text, Ciphertext 1. The counter is then incremented to produce the counter for the next input block, Counter 2. This process is repeated block by block until the entire frame is encrypted, as shown in Figure 27.

If the plain-text length in octets cannot be divided by 16 without remainder, the final block of cipher text will be generated by first zero-padding the plain-text to a 16 octet boundary, encrypting the data, and then discarding the excess cipher-text corresponding to the pad value.

11.4.2 Decrypting Frames

To decrypt the frame, the IVs and key are used to create the original cipher blocks used to encrypt the data. XORing the cipher block with the cipher text produces the original plain text. The process is as shown in Figure 27, except with ciphertext as input and plaintext as the result of the XOR.

11.4.3 Initial Vector (IV) Source

In this method, the IV is formed by concatenating the transmitter's Source Address + the LLID + the MPCP time + a counter (called "Yincr") which increments for each 128-bit block from the start of the frame.

The transmitter Source Address is not the SA in each received frame, but is the Source Address of the peer of the link. That is, in the downstream, this is the SA of the OLT, not of the originator of the frame; in the upstream, this is the SA of the ONU for that logical link. These SAs have previously been learned by the encryption peers during the MPCP registration and OAM discovery phases. The 15-bit LLID value is extended to 16 bits with a leading 0 in the most significant bit (MSB) when forming the IV.

The MPCP time for the IV is the time of the first byte of the DA of the frame.




Figure 28 - Octet Order within the Initial Vector (10G)

Since the MPCP time between OLT and ONU is allowed to vary to accommodate clock jitter, the MPCP receive time at the ONU will not necessarily exactly match the MPCP time when the frame was transmitted. This jitter is accommodated by carrying the 6 low-order bits of the MPCP clock from the transmitter to the receiver in the security octet of the preamble of the frame. The receiver then compares these bits to its own MPCP time to determine the precise value of the transmitter's MPCP clock when the frame was sent. The full 32-bit MPCP transmit time is corrected for jitter and used in the IV for the frame.

11.4.4 MPCP Jitter Correction¹⁶

In the downstream direction, the ONU MPCP clock lags behind the OLT MPCP clock by the propagation delay between the two. This delay is already accounted for in the MPCP clock values, and does not

¹⁶ Revised per SECv2.0-N-14.0176-1 on 7/18/14 by JB.

require adjustment. However, the MPCP time at the receiver must be adjusted for jitter before it can exactly match the MPCP time used by the transmitter.

In the upstream direction, the OLT receive MPCP clock will be in advance of the ONU transmit MPCP clock value by the round-trip time (RTT) between the OLT and ONU, as discovered during MPCP registration, plus or minus jitter as allowed by [802.3]. In the upstream direction, the OLT subtracts the RTT from the receive time. The OLT must also correct the MPCP receive time for jitter as in the downstream direction.

To determine the MPCP time used by the transmitter to encrypt the frame, the MPCP time of a frame at reception is rounded up or down to the nearest MPCP value with the correct low-order bits according to the following procedure (or equivalent behavior). Recall from Section 6.2.1 that the least significant six bits of the MPCP time are carried in the security octet in the preamble of each frame.

```
lsb_MPCP : lowest 6-bit MPCP value sent in security octet
local_MPCP : local MPCP time of the 1st byte of the DA of the frame
corr_MPCP : high-order bits of MPCP value corrected for jitter
MPCP : final MPCP value to be used in IV for the frame

if lsb_MPCP[5] xor local_MPCP[5]
    // MPCP rollover has occurred at one end but not the other
    if (local_MPCP[4] == 1)
        // increment the local MPCP to the nearest future value which
        // has the local_MPCP[5] = lsb_MPCP[5]
        corr_MPCP[31:5] = local_MPCP[31:5] + 1;
    else
        // decrement the local MPCP to the nearest past value which
        // has the local_MPCP[5] = lsb_MPCP[5]
        corr_MPCP[31:5] = local_MPCP[31:5] - 1;
    end
else
    corr_MPCP[31:5] = local_MPCP[31:5];
end

MPCP[31:0] = {corr_MPCP[31:6], lsb_MPCP[5:0]};
```

Yincr begins at a value of 1 at the DA of each frame, and is incremented with each successive 128-bit block of data in the frame.

12 PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF SECURITY DATA IN THE ONU

D-ONUs **MUST** implement the requirements of [SECv3.0] for secure non-volatile storage of certificate and the corresponding public/private keys.

The D-ONU **MUST** store the certificate private key in a manner that deters unauthorized disclosure and modification. Also, a D-ONU **SHOULD** prevent debugger tools from reading the D-ONU certificate private key in production devices by restricting or blocking physical access to memory containing this key.

D-ONUs **SHOULD** use one-time-programmable (OTP) memory to store certificates and keys to make it more difficult to "clone" a valid D-ONU.

The D-ONU **MUST** meet [FIPS-140-2] Security requirements for all instances of private and public permanent key storage.

The D-ONU **MUST** meet [FIPS-140-2] Security Level 1, which requires minimal physical protection through the use of production-grade enclosures. The reader should refer to the cited document for the formal requirements; however, as a summary, the specifications require D-ONU chips to be of production-grade quality, including standard passivation sealing. The circuitry within the D-ONU **MUST** be implemented as a production-grade multi-chip embodiment as with an IC printed circuit board. The D-ONU **MUST** be contained within a metal or hard plastic enclosure, which may contain doors or removable covers.

13 X.509 CERTIFICATE PROFILE AND MANAGEMENT

X.509 digital certificates are used for D-ONU authentication and validating software image downloads. The D-ONU MUST support DOCSIS CM & CVC certificate requirements and profiles defined in [SECv3.0] except where otherwise noted in this specification. The DPoE System MUST support DOCSIS CMTS certificate requirements and profiles defined in [SECv3.0] except where otherwise noted in this specification.

13.1 DPoE-ONU-Certificate Profiles

An X.509 certificate is used to authenticate the D-ONU identity in a manner similar to DOCSIS cable modems. If a D-ONU duplicates (copies) another D-ONU MAC Address and presents it to the DPoE system during authentication, the DPoE system MUST prevent EPON registration of such a duplicate D-ONU. Each D-ONU is assigned a unique X.509 device certificate, which is programmed into it during the manufacturing process. Such a certificate contains information unique to the particular D-ONU, including the MAC address, manufacturer's serial number, and public key. The format of this certificate is as defined in [SECv3.0], except that the D-ONU certificate key modulus size can be 1024 or 2048.

RSA cryptographic operations may cause excessive authentication delay in some legacy D-ONU devices. To help reduce this delay 1G D-ONU devices MAY use a 1024 or 2048 bit key modulus size for device certificates. 2048 is recommended as long as the authentication time does not exceed 300 secs (see Section 8.2.2). 10G D-ONU devices MUST use 2048 bit key modulus size for device certificates.

The certificates are signed by a chain of trust established through an intermediate CA and Root CA. The signing process involves three certificates in a chain. The D-ONU certificate is signed by the intermediate CA, and the intermediate CA's certificate is signed by a Root CA. The CAs making up the chain of trust for D-ONU certificates are the CableLabs Manufacturer Root CA (CMRCA) and the CableLabs DPoE Manufacturer CA (CDMCA). The tables below define values for certain CA certificate fields:

Table 3 - CableLabs Manufacturer Root CA Certificate

Certificate Field	Certificate Field Description
Subject	C=US O=CableLabs CN=CableLabs Manufacturer Root CA
Validity	30+ years. It is intended that the validity period is long enough that this certificate is never re-issued.
subjectPublicKeyInfo	The certificate's RSA public key (modulus length is 2048 bits)
Extensions	keyUsage[c,m](keyCertSign, cRLSign) subjectKeyIdentifier[n,m] basicConstraints[c,m](cA=TRUE)

Table 4 - CableLabs DPoE Manufacturer CA Certificate

Certificate Field	Certificate Field Description
Subject	C=US O=CableLabs S=Colorado L=Louisville OU=CA00008 CN= CableLabs Mfg CA
Validity	Up to 30 years
subjectPublicKeyInfo	The certificate's RSA public key (modulus length is 2048 bits)
Extensions	keyUsage[c,m](keyCertSign, cRLSign) subjectKeyIdentifier[n,m] authorityKeyIdentifier[n,m](keyIdentifier=<subjectKeyIdentifier value from CA certificate>) basicConstraints[c,m](cA=TRUE, pathLenConstraint=0) subjectAltName[n,o] (Directory Address)

The CMRCA certificate is installed in the DPoE System and is used to validate certificates received from D-ONUs. The CDMCA certificate is installed in each D-ONU along with the unique device certificate & private key. The D-ONU sends the CDMCA certificate and device certificate to the DPoE System when performing authentication.

13.2 D-ONU Certificate Transport and Verification ¹⁷

In DOCSIS, X.509 device certificates are transported to the CMTS using the BPKM protocol. In DPoE Networks, the certificates are transported using EAP-TLS, as defined in [RFC 5216], over the EAPOL framework defined in [802.1X].

The total length of all X.509 certificates for a D-ONU MUST NOT exceed 3000 bytes in length.

An EAP-Request PDU is sent by the authenticator (DPoE System) to retrieve the D-ONU certificates. The D-ONU returns two certificates in a certificate list. The D-ONU MUST send the ONU certificate first in this list, followed by the manufacturer certificate.

Once the certificates are delivered, the DPoE System can verify them. The DPoE System MUST validate the D-ONU certificate using the procedures and criteria defined in [SECv3.0] (considering the different DPoE CA certificates) and deny service to D-ONUs presenting invalid certificates. The DPoE System MUST deregister any D-ONU that fails authentication.

Once the certificates are validated, the DPoE System MUST further prove that the D-ONU that sent the certificate is also in possession of the private key that matches that certificate. This is done by verifying the digital signature in the EAP-TLS CertificateVerify message sent by the ONU.

For DPoE Networks that use bi-directional encryption methods, the Connectivity Association Key (CAK) is derived from the TLS pre-master secret according to the requirements for CAK generation defined in [802.1X].

¹⁷ Revised per SECv2.0-N-13.0071-1 on 7/24/13 by JB.

13.3 Code Verification Certificate Profiles

Code Verification Certificates (CVCs) are used to digitally sign and validate D-ONU firmware image files when using Secure Software Download (see Section 14). DPoE CVCs are signed by a chain of trust established through an intermediate CA and Root CA. The signing process involves three certificates in a chain. The manufacturer or co-signer CVC is signed by the intermediate CA certificate, and the intermediate CA's certificate is signed by a Root CA's certificate. The CAs making up the chain of trust for CVC certificates are the CableLabs Code Verification Root CA (CCVRCA) and the CableLabs Code Verification CA (CCVCA). The tables below define values for certain certificate fields:

Table 5 - CableLabs Code Verification Root CA Certificate

Certificate Field	Certificate Field Description
Subject	C=US O=CableLabs CN=CableLabs Manufacturer Root CA
Validity	30+ years. It is intended that the validity period is long enough that this certificate is never re-issued.
subjectPublicKeyInfo	The certificate's RSA public key (modulus length is 2048 bits)
Extensions	keyUsage[c,m](keyCertSign, cRLSign) subjectKeyIdentifier[n,m] basicConstraints[c,m](cA=TRUE)

Table 6 - CableLabs Code Verification CA Certificate

Certificate Field	Certificate Field Description
Subject	C=US O=CableLabs CN= CableLabs CVC CA
Validity	Up to 20 years
subjectPublicKeyInfo	The certificate's RSA public key (modulus length is 2048 bits)
Extensions	keyUsage[c,m](keyCertSign, cRLSign) subjectKeyIdentifier[n,m] authorityKeyIdentifier[n,m](keyIdentifier=<subjectKeyIdentifier value from CA certificate>) basicConstraints[c,m](cA=TRUE, pathLenConstraint=0) subjectAltName[n,o] (Directory Address)

Table 7 - Manufacturer Code Verification Certificate

Certificate Field	Certificate Field Description
Subject	C= <2-digit Country Code> O= <Company Name (not to exceed 64 characters)> OU= DPoE CN= Code Verification Certificate
Validity	Up to 10 years
subjectPublicKeyInfo	The certificate's RSA public key (modulus length is 1024 or 2048 bits)

Certificate Field	Certificate Field Description
Extensions	extendedKeyUsage[c,m](codeSigning)

Table 8 - Co-signer Code Verification Certificate

Certificate Field	Certificate Field Description
Subject	C=US O= <printable string of eight hexadecimal digits> OU= DPoE CN= Code Verification Certificate
Validity	Up to 10 years
subjectPublicKeyInfo	The certificate's RSA public key (modulus length is 1024 or 2048 bits)
Extensions	extendedKeyUsage[c,m](codeSigning)

CCVRCA and CCVCA certificates are installed in the DPoE System and the D-ONU. These CA certificates are used to validate manufacturer CVCs or co-signer CVCs received in downloaded config files or code files. The manufacturer CVC and/or co-signer CVC are used to sign code files. They are also included in the config file to enable secure software download.

14 SECURE SOFTWARE DOWNLOAD (SSD)

The DPoE Network differs from DOCSIS in that many of the functions of the CM in DOCSIS are emulated in the DPoE System through the vCM. The implementation of SSD is thus split into two parts: one from the OSS to the DPoE System across the D interface, and the second from the DPoE System to D-ONU across the TU interface as defined in [SECv3.0] except where otherwise noted in this specification.

14.1 Secure File Transfer across the D Interface

SSD is used to transfer a new executable image to the D-ONU. The DPoE System MUST support SSD and Code Verification Certificates (CVCs) from the OSS to the DPoE System across the D interface.

This executable image is subject to code verification with a CVC. The DPoE System MUST reject code images that are not signed by the vendor's Mfg CVC, as described in [SECv3.0]. Service providers may digitally co-sign vendor code images with the operator's CVC. Code verification CA certificates are installed on the DPoE System for use in validating CVCs.

The DPoE System validates the CVCs for a D-ONU upgrade according to the requirements in [SECv3.0] for authenticating code file content and updating time varying controls, except for using the DPoE certificate chain instead of the DOCSIS chain (see Section 13.3). The DPoE System MUST maintain the PKCS #7 digital signature and any SSD download parameters when forwarding the code image to the ONU. Before installing a code image upgrade the D-ONU MUST validate the image according to the requirements in [SECv3.0] for authenticating code file content and updating time varying controls, except for using the DPoE certificate chain instead of the DOCSIS chain (see Section 13.3).

14.2 Secure File Transfer across the TU Interface

The DPoE System MUST support transmission of any executable image (code) files over the TU interface. Since downstream encryption is required to be enabled across the TU interface, all file transfers, including the executable image (code) file transfer, are encrypted on the data path to a particular D-ONU. The DPoE System MUST transmit executable image files only after encryption is enabled. The DPoE System MUST initiate file transfer only from the DPoE System in accordance with the transfer protocol defined in [DPoE-SP-OAMv2.0].

A D-ONU does not initiate a file transfer by requesting a file. A file transfer can only be initiated from the DPoE System. Because DPoE OAM is a controlled channel and such frames cannot be injected from any source other than the DPoE System, this requirement means that the DPoE System and only the DPoE System initiates a file transfer.

Appendix I Example Frames

I.1 AES 128 CFB Encrypted Frame

Initial Vector (Hex):

```
30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37
38 39 3a 3b 8e 3e 5a ff
```

Key (Hex):

```
2b 7e 15 16 28 ae d2 a6
ab f7 15 88 09 cf 4f 3c
```

Plain Text (Hex):

```
DA -> 01 00 ff ff ff ff 42 43
44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b
4c 4d 4d 4f 50 51 52 53
54 55 56 57 58 59 5a 5b
5c 5d 5e 5f 60 61 62 63
64 65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b
6c 6d 6e 6f 70 71 72 73
74 75 76 77 91 73 1b 29 <- FCS
```

Cipher Text (Hex):

```
DA -> a4 7c a2 de 9f 4d ba f4
db ff 7d bd be 8b ed 72
78 fe 3c 5e 22 a8 84 8f
e3 e2 d4 8b 46 96 2b ab
4e cb 93 9c 62 b9 90 a7
8f 0c a6 6a 2c 31 38 be
8b 6e 9d 84 d9 c2 ff 04
e0 c3 34 46 96 c8 33 ba <- FCS
```

I.2 D-ONU Certificate Response Frames¹⁸

D-ONU -> DPoE System: Certificate Fragment 1/2

// Ethernet

```
01 80 C2 00 00 03
00 0D B6 41 C0 30
88 8E
```

// EAPOL

```
03 00 05 8A
```

// EAP

```
02 // Response
01 // to ID 1
05 8A // Length 1418 bytes
0D // "EAP-TLS"
```

// EAP-TLS

```
C0 // Flags: Length present, more fragments
00 00 07 1B // Total 1819 bytes in TLS Record to follow
```

¹⁸ Revised per SECv2.0-n-13.0071-1 on 7/30/13 by JB.

```

// TLS Record
16 // Type "Handshake"
03 02 // Version 1.1
05 7B // Current Fragment Length 1403 bytes

0B // Handshake type "Certificate"

// ONU certificate
00 07 12 // length 1810 bytes

// certificate data
00 07 0F 00 03 30 30 82 03 2C 30
82 02 14 A0 03 02 01 02 02 09 00 DF 47 8D 85 57
68 94 5A 30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 05
05 00 30 76 31 0B 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 55
53 31 11 30 0F 06 03 55 04 08 13 08 43 6F 6C 6F
72 61 64 6F 31 13 30 11 06 03 55 04 07 13 0A 4C
6F 75 69 73 76 69 6C 6C 65 31 12 30 10 06 03 55
04 0A 13 09 43 61 62 6C 65 4C 61 62 73 31 10 30
0E 06 03 55 04 0B 13 07 43 41 30 30 30 30 38 31
19 30 17 06 03 55 04 03 13 10 43 61 62 6C 65 4C
61 62 73 20 4D 66 67 20 43 41 30 1E 17 0D 31 31
30 36 33 30 31 33 35 32 30 38 5A 17 0D 31 32 30
36 32 39 31 33 35 32 30 38 5A 30 6A 31 0B 30 09
06 03 55 04 06 13 02 55 53 31 16 30 14 06 03 55
04 08 13 0D 4D 61 73 73 61 63 68 75 73 65 74 74
73 31 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 07 13 09 4D 61 6E 73
66 69 65 6C 64 31 1E 30 1C 06 03 55 04 0A 13 15
42 72 6F 61 64 63 6F 6D 2C 20 43 6F 72 70 6F 72
61 74 69 6F 6E 31 0F 30 0D 06 03 55 04 03 13 06
66 65 6E 77 61 79 30 81 9F 30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48
86 F7 0D 01 01 01 05 00 03 81 8D 00 30 81 89 02
81 81 00 B1 40 5A 42 A1 30 FB 03 26 ED DC 56 C9
03 22 64 77 7E F3 F1 65 58 B8 AE 2C 16 F9 AF 03
95 EB 40 5F C7 69 94 C4 AC 30 B4 52 90 0A 0A 05
65 0B 05 DF 21 DA B6 DA 07 F9 74 C7 5A 13 69 1B
F2 2D 8C 38 FB F0 22 A9 68 A1 88 A3 AF 66 C2 E4
9F A9 DD EB 42 C6 C4 9F F1 A1 E7 7F E6 5F 3E 2C
69 60 4E 7F 3D 56 0C 68 55 0E 33 62 B9 99 3E 03
1F 08 90 8D B0 D6 4B FA B4 C7 65 D9 1F C3 02 80
FC FC A9 02 03 01 00 01 A3 4D 30 4B 30 09 06 03
55 1D 13 04 02 30 00 30 1D 06 03 55 1D 0E 04 16
04 14 26 A9 CE CD D8 D1 13 86 C9 69 F5 CC 33 BB
C9 1A DC 28 24 A1 30 1F 06 03 55 1D 23 04 18 30
16 80 14 BF 31 ED C5 37 7D 09 27 F8 32 71 11 DC
88 A6 54 78 44 FD D6 30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7
0D 01 01 05 05 00 03 82 01 01 00 45 2D F9 F7 83
D1 06 45 3B 5E BB E2 A9 53 F8 3B BA 04 C8 1E 1C
92 02 ED D5 57 0A 70 51 07 98 E6 64 F0 D6 85 19
B7 74 E8 79 7E B6 4F 23 51 4A 0A 2D CE 4E 5A 00
36 02 66 E8 BD 65 81 06 B2 E1 90 28 50 FC E8 6F
2E BB 38 6B 54 10 3C 48 E8 9D AA B3 E8 EF 10 D7
C2 0B 7D 07 E2 C9 9A C0 F3 C6 40 6E 8A 25 82 D8
94 98 A1 03 22 5B AD 92 04 F1 D5 8B DA C5 F4 96
B9 A6 C3 02 F4 29 D8 0E D4 A5 6E C3 8C A2 5B 8B
CF 31 F6 CC 22 3D 54 7A 6E C4 00 C0 80 D7 43 9B
42 95 55 28 E9 E6 DF 0A 3F 1E 91 BF 41 17 98 1B
AA 5E B6 E2 6C 89 17 6F 04 90 FD 8A 14 F3 5C EE
5D 57 BF 68 B2 BA 59 3B 91 4F 85 3C F8 D1 3E 33
EF D2 D8 59 C8 1E 62 12 B2 10 6A 55 9E 0F D5 6A
45 E0 DE B3 7C B3 EB C2 89 53 71 97 0F F9 D5 3B
DA 24 02 50 F3 35 FD C8 E9 95 3F 09 3C 94 6D AC
31 45 EF 17 60 39 E3 26 66 21 AD 00 03 D9 30 82

```

```

03 D5 30 82 02 BD A0 03 02 01 02 02 09 00 DF 47
8D 85 57 68 94 55 30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D
01 01 05 05 00 30 4A 31 0B 30 09 06 03 55 04 06
13 02 55 53 31 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 0A 13 09 43
61 62 6C 65 4C 61 62 73 31 27 30 25 06 03 55 04
03 13 1E 43 61 62 6C 65 4C 61 62 73 20 4D 61 6E
75 66 61 63 74 75 72 65 72 20 52 6F 6F 74 20 43
41 30 1E 17 0D 31 31 30 36 33 30 31 33 34 37 32
33 5A 17 0D 32 31 30 36 32 37 31 33 34 37 32 33
5A 30 76 31 0B 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 55 53
31 11 30 0F 06 03 55 04 08 13 08 43 6F 6C 6F 72
61 64 6F 31 13 30 11 06 03 55 04 07 13 0A 4C 6F
75 69 73 76 69 6C 6C 65 31 12 30 10 06 03 55 04
0A 13 09 43 61 62 6C 65 4C 61 62 73 31 10 30 0E
06 03 55 04 0B 13 07 43 41 30 30 30 30 38 31 19
30 17 06 03 55 04 03 13 10 43 61 62 6C 65 4C 61
62 73 20 4D 66 67 20 43 41 30 82 01 22 30 0D 06
09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 01 05 00 03 82 01 0F
00 30 82 01 0A 02 82 01 01 00 A9 51 67 1E EA 05
8A 10 43 55 0A 85 34 AA FD DF 98 C2 55 C0 E9 3B
92 2A 64 57 9E DB 9A 66 EE A8 51 B4 41 E7 B7 87
BD 7F 22 AA DB 03 1D C1 66 66 CC 0A A1 D4 45 48
0D 6D DA 0A AE 05 F2 0E FF 86 13 6B 19 5B FB 27
86 53 C5 73 FF DF 21 9A F6 6B 21 9E 92 D2 B1 F9
67 DD 27 66 85 F5 20 C2 49 11 C1 B1 7B 15 4A F9
0A 50 78 00 B3 14 D2 3F 8B 31 61 75 44 9B 2D A4
3C 11 06 6D 24 E0 38 E5 75 05 5A 6C B3 DB B4 85
0C ED E8 AA 00 CD B0 A0 6D 4A 69 82 52 11 1A 9E
69 0A 04 C1 80 37 30 1D 9C 29 9E 9C 2F D2 D7 D8
FC 60 EF E6 E6 0D 4C 92 A1 B1 93 33 DB C7 6B 43
8A 78 92 C3 89 ED CA 51 1A 43 57 63 34 C9 1A 4C
7B 9D 37 49 83 28 C7 D8 F1 A0 E8 43 8B BB 02 49
07 6C 0A 15 44 96 31 65 6A F2 8F 6A 2B F4 63 56
1C 79 4A 51 58 7A 9E 09 F5 68 B6 E6 97 A8 FA A3
EC 88 7D 0A 44 79 FA 51 79 FF 02 03 01 00 01 A3
81 91 30 81 8E 30 12 06 03 55 1D 13

```

// 4-byte Ethernet FCS not shown

D-ONU -> DPoE System: Certificate Fragment 2/2

// Ethernet

```

01 80 C2 00 00 03
00 0D B6 41 C0 30
88 8E

```

// EAPOL

```

03 00 01 A6

```

// EAP

```

02 // Response
02 // to ID 2
01 A6 // Length 422 bytes
0D // "EAP-TLS"

```

// EAP-TLS

```

00 // No Length, No More Fragments

```

// TLS Record

```

16 // Type "Handshake"
03 02 // Version 1.1
01 9B // Current Fragment Length 411 bytes

```

```
// certificate data
01 01 FF
04 08 30 06 01 01 FF 02 01 00 30 0E 06 03 55 1D
0F 01 01 FF 04 04 03 02 01 06 30 28 06 03 55 1D
11 04 21 30 1F A4 1D 30 1B 31 19 30 17 06 03 55
04 03 13 10 44 65 76 69 63 65 32 30 34 38 2D 31
2D 32 35 37 30 1D 06 03 55 1D 0E 04 16 04 14 BF
31 ED C5 37 7D 09 27 F8 32 71 11 DC 88 A6 54 78
44 FD D6 30 1F 06 03 55 1D 23 04 18 30 16 80 14
7A 84 CE 23 3A 77 BC 80 3D 4E CF 63 6E 90 A4 4E
16 52 07 87 30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01
05 05 00 03 82 01 01 00 C1 BF 89 0D 55 1E CB 92
FD 88 E9 54 75 D8 8B 1F 13 6C 31 33 4A E6 89 67
79 A1 EF C6 BB D0 0A 21 F3 5E 93 BC 24 0B 8A CC
98 EC F8 B3 D5 33 E9 39 0E 58 BC 7D 74 A0 60 CC
1B F2 D1 D1 FF 66 51 BA 9F 2E 09 A0 B0 1C FD 0E
C2 24 9A 5A F9 32 49 3C 94 DF BB E1 41 0B 50 10
E6 44 96 4D BA 72 EE 14 76 73 D4 83 47 8C 67 40
04 37 F1 5F 13 D5 11 38 BF F9 DD C6 70 89 7D FD
7F 4E 4F 26 1C E7 36 8F 26 03 C1 7B F5 5C 4B 73
1B C8 58 5F 18 89 31 6B 97 02 36 58 96 4E 70 CE
30 FE A6 E3 F4 E1 F6 B3 8D 75 E5 EC 87 CA 31 38
DF B1 41 17 FF 1A 13 6C 82 C3 C7 0E FF BE 04 A9
F5 21 DA 23 5C 10 AC 2D 9A 1B C8 F3 04 0B 1B D7
09 86 10 73 07 6F FE 50 D1 68 67 55 3F D9 99 99
03 FE 77 BB 70 EE 7D 74 79 13 C4 FE E9 D4 60 20
FA C9 33 AA A3 67 EA 56 CD D6 CC 2B A4 EF EB 92
C6 80 E5 39 3C 2D 39 8A
```

```
// 4-byte Ethernet FCS not shown
```


Appendix II Reference AES Implementation (C programming language)

```

/**
 * rijndael-alg-fst.c
 *
 * @version 3.0 (December 2000)
 *
 * Optimised ANSI C code for the Rijndael cipher (now AES)
 *
 * @author Vincent Rijmen <vincent.rijmen@esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
 * @author Antoon Bosselaers <antoon.bosselaers@esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
 * @author Paulo Barreto <paulo.barreto@terra.com.br>
 *
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 * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
 * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
 * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
 * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE
 * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE,
 * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 */

#include <assert.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "Python.h"

#define MODULE_NAME AES
#define BLOCK_SIZE 16
#define KEY_SIZE 0

#define MAXKC (256/32)
#define MAXKB (256/8)
#define MAXNR 14

typedef unsigned char    u8;
typedef unsigned short   u16;
typedef unsigned int     u32;

typedef struct {
    u32 ek[ 4*(MAXNR+1) ];
    u32 dk[ 4*(MAXNR+1) ];
    int rounds;
} block_state;

void rijndaelEncrypt(u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], int Nr, const u8 pt[16], u8 ct[16]);
void rijndaelDecrypt(u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], int Nr, const u8 ct[16], u8 pt[16]);

#ifdef INTERMEDIATE_VALUE_KAT
void rijndaelEncryptRound(const u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], int Nr, u8 block[16], int rounds);
void rijndaelDecryptRound(const u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], int Nr, u8 block[16], int rounds);
#endif /* INTERMEDIATE_VALUE_KAT */

/*

```

```

Te0[x] = S [x].[02, 01, 01, 03];
Te1[x] = S [x].[03, 02, 01, 01];
Te2[x] = S [x].[01, 03, 02, 01];
Te3[x] = S [x].[01, 01, 03, 02];
Te4[x] = S [x].[01, 01, 01, 01];

```

```

Td0[x] = Si[x].[0e, 09, 0d, 0b];
Td1[x] = Si[x].[0b, 0e, 09, 0d];
Td2[x] = Si[x].[0d, 0b, 0e, 09];
Td3[x] = Si[x].[09, 0d, 0b, 0e];
Td4[x] = Si[x].[01, 01, 01, 01];
*/

```

```

static const u32 Te0[256] = {
    0xc66363a5U, 0xf87c7c84U, 0xee777799U, 0xf67b7b8dU,
    0xffff2f20dU, 0xd66b6bbdU, 0xde6f6fb1U, 0x91c5c554U,
    0x60303050U, 0x02010103U, 0xce6767a9U, 0x562b2b7dU,
    0xe7fefe19U, 0xb5d7d762U, 0x4dababe6U, 0xec76769aU,
    0x8fcaca45U, 0x1f82829dU, 0x89c9c940U, 0xfa7d7d87U,
    0xeffafa15U, 0xb25959ebU, 0x8e4747c9U, 0xfbf0f00bU,
    0x41adadecU, 0xb3d4d467U, 0x5fa2a2fdU, 0x45afafeaU,
    0x239c9cbfU, 0x53a4a4f7U, 0xe4727296U, 0x9bc0c05bU,
    0x75b7b7c2U, 0xe1dfd1cU, 0x3d9393aeU, 0x4c26266aU,
    0x6c36365aU, 0x7e3f3f41U, 0xf5f7f702U, 0x83cccc4fU,
    0x6834345cU, 0x51a5a5f4U, 0xd1e5e534U, 0xf9f1f108U,
    0xe2717193U, 0xabd8d873U, 0x62313153U, 0x2a15153fU,
    0x0804040cU, 0x95c7c752U, 0x46232365U, 0x9dc3c35eU,
    0x30181828U, 0x379696a1U, 0x0a05050fU, 0x2f9a9ab5U,
    0x0e070709U, 0x24121236U, 0x1b80809bU, 0xdf2e2e23dU,
    0xcdebeb26U, 0x4e272769U, 0x7fb2b2cdU, 0xea75759fU,
    0x1209091bU, 0x1d83839eU, 0x582c2c74U, 0x341a1a2eU,
    0x361b1b2dU, 0xdc6e6eb2U, 0xb45a5aeeU, 0x5ba0a0fbU,
    0xa45252f6U, 0x763b3b4dU, 0xb7d6d661U, 0x7db3b3ceU,
    0x5229297bU, 0xdde3e33eU, 0x5e2f2f71U, 0x13848497U,
    0xa65353f5U, 0xb9d1d168U, 0x00000000U, 0xc1eded2cU,
    0x40202060U, 0xe3fcfc1fU, 0x79b1b1c8U, 0xb65b5bedU,
    0xd46a6abeU, 0x8dcbc46U, 0x67bebed9U, 0x7239394bU,
    0x944a4adeU, 0x984c4cd4U, 0xb05858e8U, 0x85cfcf4aU,
    0xbbd0d06bU, 0xc5efef2aU, 0x4faaaae5U, 0xedfbfb16U,
    0x864343c5U, 0x9a4d4dd7U, 0x66333355U, 0x11858594U,
    0x8a4545cfU, 0xe9f9f910U, 0x04020206U, 0xfe7f7f81U,
    0xa05050f0U, 0x783c3c44U, 0x259f9fbaU, 0x4ba8a8e3U,
    0xa25151f3U, 0x5da3a3feU, 0x804040c0U, 0x058f8f8aU,
    0x3f9292adU, 0x219d9dbcU, 0x70383848U, 0xf1f5f504U,
    0x63bcbcdfU, 0x77b6b6c1U, 0xafdada75U, 0x42212163U,
    0x20101030U, 0xe5ffff1aU, 0xfdf3f30eU, 0xbfd2d26dU,
    0x81cdcd4cU, 0x180c0c14U, 0x26131335U, 0xc3ecec2fU,
    0xbe5f5fe1U, 0x359797a2U, 0x884444ccU, 0x2e171739U,
    0x93c4c457U, 0x55a7a7f2U, 0xfc7e7e82U, 0x7a3d3d47U,
    0xc86464acU, 0xba5d5de7U, 0x3219192bU, 0xe6737395U,
    0xc06060a0U, 0x19818198U, 0x9e4f4fd1U, 0xa3dcdc7fU,
    0x44222266U, 0x542a2a7eU, 0x3b9090abU, 0x0b888883U,
    0x8c4646caU, 0xc7eeee29U, 0x6bb8b8d3U, 0x2814143cU,
    0xa7dede79U, 0xbc5e5ee2U, 0x160b0b1dU, 0xaddbdb76U,
    0xdbe0e03bU, 0x64323256U, 0x743a3a4eU, 0x140a0a1eU,
    0x924949dbU, 0x0c06060aU, 0x4824246cU, 0xb85c5ce4U,
    0x9fc2c25dU, 0xbdd3d36eU, 0x43acacefU, 0xc46262a6U,
    0x399191a8U, 0x319595a4U, 0xd3e4e437U, 0xf279798bU,
    0xd5e7e732U, 0x8bc8c843U, 0x6e373759U, 0xda6d6db7U,
    0x018d8d8cU, 0xb1d5d564U, 0x9c4e4ed2U, 0x49a9a9e0U,
    0xd86c6cb4U, 0xac5656faU, 0xf3f4f407U, 0xcfeaea25U,
    0xca6565afU, 0xf47a7a8eU, 0x47aeae9U, 0x10080818U,
    0x6fbabad5U, 0xf0787888U, 0x4a25256fU, 0x5c2e2e72U,

```

```

0x381c1c24U, 0x57a6a6f1U, 0x73b4b4c7U, 0x97c6c651U,
0xcbe8e823U, 0xa1dddd7cU, 0xe874749cU, 0x3e1f1f21U,
0x964b4bddU, 0x61bdbddcU, 0x0d8b8b86U, 0x0f8a8a85U,
0xe0707090U, 0x7c3e3e42U, 0x71b5b5c4U, 0xcc6666aaU,
0x904848d8U, 0x06030305U, 0xf7f6f601U, 0x1c0e0e12U,
0xc26161a3U, 0x6a35355fU, 0xae5757f9U, 0x69b9b9d0U,
0x17868691U, 0x99c1c158U, 0x3a1d1d27U, 0x279e9eb9U,
0xd9e1e138U, 0xebf8f813U, 0x2b9898b3U, 0x22111133U,
0xd26969bbU, 0xa9d9d970U, 0x078e8e89U, 0x339494a7U,
0x2d9b9bb6U, 0x3c1e1e22U, 0x15878792U, 0xc9e9e920U,
0x87cece49U, 0xaa5555ffU, 0x50282878U, 0xa5dfdf7aU,
0x038c8c8fU, 0x59a1a1f8U, 0x09898980U, 0x1a0d0d17U,
0x65bfbfdaU, 0xd7e6e631U, 0x844242c6U, 0xd06868b8U,
0x824141c3U, 0x299999b0U, 0x5a2d2d77U, 0x1e0f0f11U,
0x7bb0b0cbU, 0xa85454fcU, 0x6dbbbb6dU, 0x2c16163aU,
};
static const u32 Te1[256] = {
0xa5c66363U, 0x84f87c7cU, 0x99ee7777U, 0x8df67b7bU,
0x0dfff2f2U, 0xbdd66b6bU, 0xb1de6f6fU, 0x5491c5c5U,
0x50603030U, 0x03020101U, 0xa9ce6767U, 0x7d562b2bU,
0x19e7fefeU, 0x62b5d7d7U, 0xe64dababU, 0x9aec7676U,
0x458fcacaU, 0x9d1f8282U, 0x4089c9c9U, 0x87fa7d7dU,
0x15effafaU, 0xebb25959U, 0xc98e4747U, 0x0bfbf0f0U,
0xec41adadU, 0x67b3d4d4U, 0xfd5fa2a2U, 0xea45afafU,
0xbff239c9cU, 0xf753a4a4U, 0x96e47272U, 0x5b9bc0c0U,
0xc275b7b7U, 0x1ce1fdfdU, 0xae3d9393U, 0x6a4c2626U,
0x5a6c3636U, 0x417e3f3fU, 0x02f5f7f7U, 0x4f83ccccU,
0x5c683434U, 0xf451a5a5U, 0x34d1e5e5U, 0x08f9f1f1U,
0x93e27171U, 0x73abd8d8U, 0x53623131U, 0x3f2a1515U,
0x0c080404U, 0x5295c7c7U, 0x65462323U, 0x5e9dc3c3U,
0x28301818U, 0xa1379696U, 0x0f0a0505U, 0xb52f9a9aU,
0x090e0707U, 0x36241212U, 0x9b1b8080U, 0x3ddf2e2eU,
0x26cdebcbU, 0x694e2727U, 0xcd7fb2b2U, 0x9fea7575U,
0x1b120909U, 0x9e1d8383U, 0x74582c2cU, 0x2e341a1aU,
0x2d361b1bU, 0xb2dc6e6eU, 0xeeb45a5aU, 0xfb5ba0a0U,
0xf6a45252U, 0x4d763b3bU, 0x61b7d6d6U, 0xce7db3b3U,
0x7b522929U, 0x3edde3e3U, 0x715e2f2fU, 0x97138484U,
0xf5a65353U, 0x68b9d1d1U, 0x00000000U, 0x2cc1ededU,
0x60402020U, 0x1fe3fcfcU, 0xc879b1b1U, 0xedb65b5bU,
0xbcd46a6aU, 0x468dcbbcU, 0xd967bebeU, 0x4b723939U,
0xde944a4aU, 0xd4984c4cU, 0xe8b05858U, 0x4a85cfcfU,
0x6bbbd0d0U, 0x2ac5efefU, 0xe54faaaaU, 0x16edfbfbU,
0xc5864343U, 0xd79a4d4dU, 0x55663333U, 0x94118585U,
0xcf8a4545U, 0x10e9f9f9U, 0x06040202U, 0x81fe7f7fU,
0xf0a05050U, 0x44783c3cU, 0xba259f9fU, 0xe34ba8a8U,
0xf3a25151U, 0xfe5da3a3U, 0xc0804040U, 0x8a058f8fU,
0xad3f9292U, 0xbc219d9dU, 0x48703838U, 0x04f1f5f5U,
0xdf63bcbcbU, 0xc177b6b6U, 0x75afdadaU, 0x63422121U,
0x30201010U, 0x1ae5ffffU, 0x0efdf3f3U, 0x6dbfd2d2U,
0x4c81cdcdU, 0x14180c0cU, 0x35261313U, 0x2fc3ececU,
0xe1be5f5fU, 0xa2359797U, 0xcc884444U, 0x392e1717U,
0x5793c4c4U, 0xf255a7a7U, 0x82fc7e7eU, 0x477a3d3dU,
0xacc86464U, 0xe7ba5d5dU, 0x2b321919U, 0x95e67373U,
0xa0c06060U, 0x98198181U, 0xd19e4f4fU, 0x7fa3dcdcdU,
0x66442222U, 0x7e542a2aU, 0xab3b9090U, 0x830b8888U,
0xca8c4646U, 0x29c7eeeeU, 0xd36bb8b8U, 0x3c281414U,
0x79a7dedeU, 0xe2bc5e5eU, 0x1d160b0bU, 0x76addbdbU,
0x3bdbe0e0U, 0x56643232U, 0x4e743a3aU, 0x1e140a0aU,
0xdb924949U, 0x0a0c0606U, 0x6c482424U, 0xe4b85c5cU,
0x5d9fc2c2U, 0x6ebdd3d3U, 0xef43acacU, 0xa6c46262U,
0xa8399191U, 0xa4319595U, 0x37d3e4e4U, 0x8bf27979U,
0x32d5e7e7U, 0x438bc8c8U, 0x596e3737U, 0xb7da6d6dU,
0x8c018d8dU, 0x64b1d5d5U, 0xd29c4e4eU, 0xe049a9a9U,

```

```

0xb4d86c6cU, 0xfaac5656U, 0x07f3f4f4U, 0x25cfeaeaU,
0xafca6565U, 0x8ef47a7aU, 0xe947aeaeU, 0x18100808U,
0xd56fbabaU, 0x88f07878U, 0x6f4a2525U, 0x725c2e2eU,
0x24381c1cU, 0xf157a6a6U, 0xc773b4b4U, 0x5197c6c6U,
0x23cbe8e8U, 0x7ca1dddddU, 0x9ce87474U, 0x213e1f1fU,
0xdd964b4bU, 0xdc61bdbdU, 0x860d8b8bU, 0x850f8a8aU,
0x90e07070U, 0x427c3e3eU, 0xc471b5b5U, 0xaacc6666U,
0xd8904848U, 0x05060303U, 0x01f7f6f6U, 0x121c0e0eU,
0xa3c26161U, 0x5f6a3535U, 0xf9ae5757U, 0xd069b9b9U,
0x91178686U, 0x5899c1c1U, 0x273a1d1dU, 0xb9279e9eU,
0x38d9e1e1U, 0x13ebf8f8U, 0xb32b9898U, 0x33221111U,
0xbbd26969U, 0x70a9d9d9U, 0x89078e8eU, 0xa7339494U,
0xb62d9b9bU, 0x223c1e1eU, 0x92158787U, 0x20c9e9e9U,
0x4987ceceU, 0xffaa5555U, 0x78502828U, 0x7aa5dfdfU,
0x8f038c8cU, 0xf859a1a1U, 0x80098989U, 0x171a0d0dU,
0xda65bfbfU, 0x31d7e6e6U, 0xc6844242U, 0xb8d06868U,
0xc3824141U, 0xb0299999U, 0x775a2d2dU, 0x111e0f0fU,
0xcb7bb0b0U, 0xfca85454U, 0xd66dbbbbU, 0x3a2c1616U,

```

```
};
```

```

static const u32 Te2[256] = {
0x63a5c663U, 0x7c84f87cU, 0x7799ee77U, 0x7b8df67bU,
0xf20dfff2U, 0x6bbdd66bU, 0x6fb1de6fU, 0xc55491c5U,
0x30506030U, 0x01030201U, 0x67a9ce67U, 0x2b7d562bU,
0xfe19e7feU, 0xd762b5d7U, 0xabe64dabU, 0x769aec76U,
0xca458fcaU, 0x829d1f82U, 0xc94089c9U, 0x7d87fa7dU,
0xfa15effaU, 0x59ebb259U, 0x47c98e47U, 0xf00bfbf0U,
0xadec41adU, 0xd467b3d4U, 0xa2fd5fa2U, 0xafea45afU,
0x9cbf239cU, 0xa4f753a4U, 0x7296e472U, 0xc05b9bc0U,
0xb7c275b7U, 0xfd1ce1fdU, 0x93ae3d93U, 0x266a4c26U,
0x365a6c36U, 0x3f417e3fU, 0xf702f5f7U, 0xcc4f83ccU,
0x345c6834U, 0xa5f451a5U, 0xe534d1e5U, 0xf108f9f1U,
0x7193e271U, 0xd873abd8U, 0x31536231U, 0x153f2a15U,
0x040c0804U, 0xc75295c7U, 0x23654623U, 0xc35e9dc3U,
0x18283018U, 0x96a13796U, 0x050f0a05U, 0x9ab52f9aU,
0x07090e07U, 0x12362412U, 0x809b1b80U, 0xe23ddf2eU,
0xeb26cdebU, 0x27694e27U, 0xb2cd7fb2U, 0x759fea75U,
0x091b1209U, 0x839e1d83U, 0x2c74582cU, 0x1a2e341aU,
0x1b2d361bU, 0x6eb2dc6eU, 0x5aeeb45aU, 0xa0fb5ba0U,
0x52f6a452U, 0x3b4d763bU, 0xd661b7d6U, 0xb3ce7db3U,
0x297b5229U, 0xe33edde3U, 0x2f715e2fU, 0x84971384U,
0x53f5a653U, 0xd168b9d1U, 0x00000000U, 0xed2cc1edU,
0x20604020U, 0xfc1fe3fcU, 0xb1c879b1U, 0x5bedb65bU,
0x6abed46aU, 0xcb468dcbU, 0xbed967beU, 0x394b7239U,
0x4ade944aU, 0x4cd4984cU, 0x58e8b058U, 0xcf4a85cfU,
0xd06b6bbdU, 0xef2ac5efU, 0xaae54faaU, 0xfb16edfbU,
0x43c58643U, 0x4dd79a4dU, 0x33556633U, 0x85941185U,
0x45cf8a45U, 0xf910e9f9U, 0x02060402U, 0x7f81fe7fU,
0x50f0a050U, 0x3c44783cU, 0x9fba259fU, 0xa8e34ba8U,
0x51f3a251U, 0xa3fe5da3U, 0x40c08040U, 0x8f8a058fU,
0x92ad3f92U, 0x9dbc219dU, 0x38487038U, 0xf504f1f5U,
0xbcdf63bcU, 0xb6c177b6U, 0xda75afdaU, 0x21634221U,
0x10302010U, 0xff1ae5ffU, 0xf30efdf3U, 0xd26dbfd2U,
0xcd4c81cdU, 0x0c14180cU, 0x13352613U, 0xec2fc3ecU,
0x5fe1be5fU, 0x97a23597U, 0x44cc8844U, 0x17392e17U,
0xc45793c4U, 0xa7f255a7U, 0x7e82fc7eU, 0x3d477a3dU,
0x64acc864U, 0x5de7ba5dU, 0x192b3219U, 0x7395e673U,
0x60a0c060U, 0x81981981U, 0x4fd19e4fU, 0xdc7fa3dcU,
0x22664422U, 0x2a7e542aU, 0x90ab3b90U, 0x88830b88U,
0x46ca8c46U, 0xee29c7eeU, 0xb8d36bb8U, 0x143c2814U,
0xde79a7deU, 0x5ee2bc5eU, 0x0b1d160bU, 0xdb76addbU,
0xe03bdbe0U, 0x32566432U, 0x3a4e743aU, 0x0a1e140aU,
0x49db9249U, 0x060a0c06U, 0x246c4824U, 0x5ce4b85cU,
0xc25d9fc2U, 0xd36ebdd3U, 0xacef43acU, 0x62a6c462U,

```

```
0x91a83991U, 0x95a43195U, 0xe437d3e4U, 0x798bf279U,  
0xe732d5e7U, 0xc8438bc8U, 0x37596e37U, 0x6db7da6dU,  
0x8d8c018dU, 0xd564b1d5U, 0x4ed29c4eU, 0xa9e049a9U,  
0x6cb4d86cU, 0x56faac56U, 0xf407f3f4U, 0xea25cfeaU,  
0x65afca65U, 0x7a8ef47aU, 0xaee947aeU, 0x08181008U,  
0xbad56fbaU, 0x7888f078U, 0x256f4a25U, 0x2e725c2eU,  
0x1c24381cU, 0xa6f157a6U, 0xb4c773b4U, 0xc65197c6U,  
0xe823cbe8U, 0xdd7ca1ddU, 0x749ce874U, 0x1f213e1fU,  
0x4bdd964bU, 0xbddc61bdU, 0x8b860d8bU, 0x8a850f8aU,  
0x7090e070U, 0x3e427c3eU, 0xb5c471b5U, 0x66aacc66U,  
0x48d89048U, 0x03050603U, 0xf601f7f6U, 0x0e121c0eU,  
0x61a3c261U, 0x355f6a35U, 0x57f9ae57U, 0xb9d069b9U,  
0x86911786U, 0xc15899c1U, 0x1d273a1dU, 0x9eb9279eU,  
0xe138d9e1U, 0xf813ebf8U, 0x98b32b98U, 0x11332211U,  
0x69bbd269U, 0xd970a9d9U, 0x8e89078eU, 0x94a73394U,  
0x9bb62d9bU, 0x1e223c1eU, 0x87921587U, 0xe920c9e9U,  
0xce4987ceU, 0x55ffaa55U, 0x28785028U, 0xdf7aa5dfU,  
0x8c8f038cU, 0xa1f859a1U, 0x89800989U, 0x0d171a0dU,  
0xbfdad65bfU, 0xe631d7e6U, 0x42c68442U, 0x68b8d068U,  
0x41c38241U, 0x99b02999U, 0x2d775a2dU, 0x0f111e0fU,  
0xb0cb7bb0U, 0x54fca854U, 0xbbd66dbbU, 0x163a2c16U,  
};  
static const u32 Te3[256] = {
```

```
0x6363a5c6U, 0x7c7c84f8U, 0x777799eeU, 0x7b7b8df6U,  
0xf2f20dffU, 0x6b6bddd6U, 0x6f6fb1deU, 0xc5c55491U,  
0x30305060U, 0x01010302U, 0x6767a9ceU, 0x2b2b7d56U,  
0xfe19e7U, 0xd7d762b5U, 0xababe64dU, 0x76769aecU,  
0xcaca458fU, 0x82829d1fU, 0xc9c94089U, 0x7d7d87faU,  
0xfafa15efU, 0x5959ebb2U, 0x4747c98eU, 0xf0f00bfbU,  
0xadadec41U, 0xd4d467b3U, 0xa2a2fd5fU, 0xafafea45U,  
0x9c9cbf23U, 0xa4a4f753U, 0x727296e4U, 0xc0c05b9bU,  
0xb7b7c275U, 0xfdfd1ce1U, 0x9393ae3dU, 0x26266a4cU,  
0x36365a6cU, 0x3f3f417eU, 0xf7f702f5U, 0xcccc4f83U,  
0x34345c68U, 0xa5a5f451U, 0xe5e534d1U, 0xf1f108f9U,  
0x717193e2U, 0xd8d873abU, 0x31315362U, 0x15153f2aU,  
0x04040c08U, 0xc7c75295U, 0x23236546U, 0xc3c35e9dU,  
0x18182830U, 0x9696a137U, 0x05050f0aU, 0x9a9a5b52fU,  
0x0707090eU, 0x12123624U, 0x80809b1bU, 0xe2e23ddfU,  
0xeb26cdU, 0x2727694eU, 0xb2b2cd7fU, 0x75759feaU,  
0x09091b12U, 0x83839e1dU, 0x2c2c7458U, 0x1a1a2e34U,  
0x1b1b2d36U, 0x6e6eb2dcU, 0x5a5aeeb4U, 0xa0a0fb5bU,  
0x5252f6a4U, 0x3b3b4d76U, 0xd6d661b7U, 0xb3b3ce7dU,  
0x29297b52U, 0xe3e33eddU, 0x2f2f715eU, 0x84849713U,  
0x5353f5a6U, 0xd1d168b9U, 0x00000000U, 0xeded2cc1U,  
0x20206040U, 0xfcfc1fe3U, 0xb1b1c879U, 0x5b5bedb6U,  
0x6a6abed4U, 0xcbcb468dU, 0xb6b6967U, 0x39394b72U,  
0x4a4ade94U, 0x4c4cd498U, 0x5858e8b0U, 0xcfcf4a85U,  
0xd0d06bbbU, 0xefef2ac5U, 0xaaaae54fU, 0xfbfb16edU,  
0x4343c586U, 0x4d4dd79aU, 0x33335566U, 0x85859411U,  
0x4545cf8aU, 0xf9f910e9U, 0x02020604U, 0x7f7f81feU,  
0x5050f0a0U, 0x3c3c4478U, 0x9f9fba25U, 0xa8a8e34bU,  
0x5151f3a2U, 0xa3a3fe5dU, 0x4040c080U, 0x8f8f8a05U,  
0x9292ad3fU, 0x9d9dbc21U, 0x38384870U, 0xf5f504f1U,  
0xbcbcdf63U, 0xb6b6c177U, 0xdada75afU, 0x21216342U,  
0x10103020U, 0xffff1ae5U, 0xf3f30efdU, 0xd2d26dbfU,  
0xcdcd4c81U, 0x0c0c1418U, 0x13133526U, 0xecec2fc3U,  
0x5f5f1beU, 0x9797a235U, 0x4444cc88U, 0x1717392eU,  
0xc4c45793U, 0xa7a7f255U, 0x7e7e82fcU, 0x3d3d477aU,  
0x6464acc8U, 0x5d5de7baU, 0x19192b32U, 0x737395e6U,  
0x6060a0c0U, 0x81819819U, 0x4f4fd19eU, 0xdcdc7fa3U,  
0x22226644U, 0x2a2a7e54U, 0x9090ab3bU, 0x8888830bU,  
0x4646ca8cU, 0xeeee29c7U, 0xb8b8d36bU, 0x14143c28U,
```

```

0xdede79a7U, 0x5e5ee2bcU, 0x0b0b1d16U, 0xdbdb76adU,
0xe0e03bdbU, 0x32325664U, 0x3a3a4e74U, 0x0a0a1e14U,
0x4949db92U, 0x06060a0cU, 0x24246c48U, 0x5c5ce4b8U,
0xc2c25d9fU, 0xd3d36ebdU, 0xacacef43U, 0x6262a6c4U,
0x9191a839U, 0x9595a431U, 0xe4e437d3U, 0x79798bf2U,
0xe7e732d5U, 0xc8c8438bU, 0x3737596eU, 0x6d6db7daU,
0x8d8d8c01U, 0xd5d564b1U, 0x4e4ed29cU, 0xa9a9e049U,
0x6c6cb4d8U, 0x5656faacU, 0xf4f407f3U, 0xeaea25cfU,
0x6565afcaU, 0x7a7a8ef4U, 0xaeae947U, 0x08081810U,
0xbabad56fU, 0x787888f0U, 0x25256f4aU, 0x2e2e725cU,
0x1c1c2438U, 0xa6a6f157U, 0xb4b4c773U, 0xc6c65197U,
0xe8e823cbU, 0xdddd7ca1U, 0x74749ce8U, 0x1f1f213eU,
0x4b4bdd96U, 0xbdbddc61U, 0x8b8b860dU, 0x8a8a850fU,
0x707090e0U, 0x3e3e427cU, 0xb5b5c471U, 0x6666aaccU,
0x4848d890U, 0x03030506U, 0xf6f601f7U, 0x0e0e121cU,
0x6161a3c2U, 0x35355f6aU, 0x5757f9aeU, 0xb9b9d069U,
0x86869117U, 0xc1c15899U, 0x1d1d273aU, 0x9e9eb927U,
0xe1e138d9U, 0xf8f813ebU, 0x9898b32bU, 0x11113322U,
0x6969bbd2U, 0xd9d970a9U, 0x8e8e8907U, 0x9494a733U,
0x9b9bb62dU, 0x1e1e223cU, 0x87879215U, 0xe9e920c9U,
0xcece4987U, 0x5555ffaaU, 0x28287850U, 0xdfdf7aa5U,
0x8c8c8f03U, 0xa1a1f859U, 0x89898009U, 0x0d0d171aU,
0xbfbfda65U, 0xe6e631d7U, 0x4242c684U, 0x6868b8d0U,
0x4141c382U, 0x9999b029U, 0x2d2d775aU, 0xf0f0111eU,
0xb0b0cb7bU, 0x5454fca8U, 0xbbbbd66dU, 0x16163a2cU,

```

```
};
```

```

static const u32 Te4[256] = {
0x63636363U, 0x7c7c7c7cU, 0x77777777U, 0x7b7b7b7bU,
0xf2f2f2f2U, 0x6b6b6b6bU, 0x6f6f6f6fU, 0xc5c5c5c5U,
0x30303030U, 0x01010101U, 0x67676767U, 0x2b2b2b2bU,
0xfefefefeU, 0xd7d7d7d7U, 0xababababU, 0x76767676U,
0xcacacacaU, 0x82828282U, 0xc9c9c9c9U, 0x7d7d7d7dU,
0xfafafafaU, 0x59595959U, 0x47474747U, 0xf0f0f0f0U,
0xadadadadU, 0xd4d4d4d4U, 0xa2a2a2a2U, 0xafafafafU,
0x9c9c9c9cU, 0xa4a4a4a4U, 0x72727272U, 0xc0c0c0c0U,
0xb7b7b7b7U, 0xfdfdfdfdU, 0x93939393U, 0x26262626U,
0x36363636U, 0x3f3f3f3fU, 0xf7f7f7f7U, 0xc0c0c0c0U,
0x34343434U, 0xa5a5a5a5U, 0xe5e5e5e5U, 0xf1f1f1f1U,
0x71717171U, 0xd8d8d8d8U, 0x31313131U, 0x15151515U,
0x04040404U, 0xc7c7c7c7U, 0x23232323U, 0xc3c3c3c3U,
0x18181818U, 0x96969696U, 0x05050505U, 0x9a9a9a9aU,
0x07070707U, 0x12121212U, 0x80808080U, 0xe2e2e2e2U,
0xebebebebeU, 0x27272727U, 0xb2b2b2b2U, 0x75757575U,
0x09090909U, 0x83838383U, 0x2c2c2c2cU, 0x1a1a1a1aU,
0x1b1b1b1bU, 0x6e6e6e6eU, 0x5a5a5a5aU, 0xa0a0a0a0U,
0x52525252U, 0x3b3b3b3bU, 0xd6d6d6d6U, 0xb3b3b3b3U,
0x29292929U, 0xe3e3e3e3U, 0x2f2f2f2fU, 0x84848484U,
0x53535353U, 0xd1d1d1d1U, 0x00000000U, 0xededededU,
0x20202020U, 0xfcfcfcfcU, 0xb1b1b1b1U, 0x5b5b5b5bU,
0x6a6a6a6aU, 0xcbcbcbcbU, 0xbebebebeU, 0x39393939U,
0x4a4a4a4aU, 0x4c4c4c4cU, 0x58585858U, 0xcfcfcfcfU,
0xd0d0d0d0U, 0xefefefefU, 0xaaaaaaaaU, 0xfbfbfbfbU,
0x43434343U, 0x4d4d4d4dU, 0x33333333U, 0x85858585U,
0x45454545U, 0xf9f9f9f9U, 0x02020202U, 0x7f7f7f7fU,
0x50505050U, 0x3c3c3c3cU, 0x9f9f9f9fU, 0xa8a8a8a8U,
0x51515151U, 0xa3a3a3a3U, 0x40404040U, 0x8f8f8f8fU,
0x29292929U, 0x9d9d9d9dU, 0x38383838U, 0xf5f5f5f5U,
0xbcbcbcbcbU, 0xb6b6b6b6U, 0xdadadadaU, 0x21212121U,
0x10101010U, 0xffffffffU, 0xf3f3f3f3U, 0xd2d2d2d2U,
0xcdcdcdcdU, 0xc0c0c0c0U, 0x13131313U, 0xeccececeU,
0x5f5f5f5fU, 0x97979797U, 0x44444444U, 0x17171717U,
0xc4c4c4c4U, 0xa7a7a7a7U, 0x7e7e7e7eU, 0x3d3d3d3dU,
0x64646464U, 0x5d5d5d5dU, 0x19191919U, 0x73737373U,

```

```
0x60606060U, 0x81818181U, 0x4f4f4f4fU, 0xdcddcdcdU,
0x22222222U, 0x2a2a2a2aU, 0x90909090U, 0x88888888U,
0x46464646U, 0xe0e0e0e0U, 0xb8b8b8b8U, 0x14141414U,
0xdedededeU, 0x5e5e5e5eU, 0x0b0b0b0bU, 0xdbdbdbdbU,
0xe0e0e0e0U, 0x32323232U, 0x3a3a3a3aU, 0x0a0a0a0aU,
0x49494949U, 0x06060606U, 0x24242424U, 0x5c5c5c5cU,
0xc2c2c2c2U, 0xd3d3d3d3U, 0xacacacacU, 0x62626262U,
0x91919191U, 0x95959595U, 0xe4e4e4e4U, 0x79797979U,
0xe7e7e7e7U, 0xc8c8c8c8U, 0x37373737U, 0x6d6d6d6dU,
0x8d8d8d8dU, 0xd5d5d5d5U, 0x4e4e4e4eU, 0xa9a9a9a9U,
0x6c6c6c6cU, 0x56565656U, 0xf4f4f4f4U, 0xeaeaeaeaU,
0x65656565U, 0x7a7a7a7aU, 0xaeaeaeaeU, 0x08080808U,
0xbabababaU, 0x78787878U, 0x25252525U, 0x2e2e2e2eU,
0x1c1c1c1cU, 0xa6a6a6a6U, 0xb4b4b4b4U, 0xc6c6c6c6U,
0xe8e8e8e8U, 0xddddddddU, 0x74747474U, 0x1f1f1f1fU,
0x4b4b4b4bU, 0xbdbdbdbdbU, 0x8b8b8b8bU, 0x8a8a8a8aU,
0x70707070U, 0x3e3e3e3eU, 0xb5b5b5b5U, 0x66666666U,
0x48484848U, 0x03030303U, 0xf6f6f6f6U, 0x0e0e0e0eU,
0x61616161U, 0x35353535U, 0x57575757U, 0xb9b9b9b9U,
0x86868686U, 0xc1c1c1c1U, 0x1d1d1d1dU, 0x9e9e9e9eU,
0xe1e1e1e1U, 0xf8f8f8f8U, 0x98989898U, 0x11111111U,
0x69696969U, 0xd9d9d9d9U, 0x8e8e8e8eU, 0x94949494U,
0x9b9b9b9bU, 0x1e1e1e1eU, 0x87878787U, 0xe9e9e9e9U,
0xcecececeU, 0x55555555U, 0x28282828U, 0xdfdfdfdfU,
0x8c8c8c8cU, 0xa1a1a1a1U, 0x89898989U, 0x0d0d0d0dU,
0xbfbfbfbfU, 0xe6e6e6e6U, 0x42424242U, 0x68686868U,
0x41414141U, 0x99999999U, 0x2d2d2d2dU, 0xf0f0f0f0U,
0xb0b0b0b0U, 0x54545454U, 0xbbbbccccU, 0x16161616U,
};
static const u32 Td0[256] = {
0x51f4a750U, 0x7e416553U, 0x1a17a4c3U, 0x3a275e96U,
0x3bab6bcbU, 0x1f9d45f1U, 0xacfa58abU, 0x4be30393U,
0x2030fa55U, 0xad766df6U, 0x88cc7691U, 0xf5024c25U,
0x4fe5d7fcU, 0xc52acbd7U, 0x26354480U, 0xb562a38fU,
0xdeb15a49U, 0x25ba1b67U, 0x45ea0e98U, 0x5dfec0e1U,
0xc32f7502U, 0x814cf012U, 0x8d4697a3U, 0x6bd3f9c6U,
0x038f5fe7U, 0x15929c95U, 0xbf6d7aebU, 0x955259daU,
0xd4be832dU, 0x587421d3U, 0x49e06929U, 0x8ec9c844U,
0x75c2896aU, 0xf48e7978U, 0x99583e6bU, 0x27b971ddU,
0xbec14fb6U, 0xf088ad17U, 0xc920ac66U, 0x7dce3ab4U,
0x63df4a18U, 0xe51a3182U, 0x97513360U, 0x62537f45U,
0xb16477e0U, 0xbb6bae84U, 0xfe81a01cU, 0xf9082b94U,
0x70486858U, 0x8f45fd19U, 0x94de6c87U, 0x527bf8b7U,
0xab73d323U, 0x724b02e2U, 0xe31f8f57U, 0x6655ab2aU,
0xb2eb2807U, 0x2fb5c203U, 0x86c57b9aU, 0xd33708a5U,
0x302887f2U, 0x23bfa5b2U, 0x02036abaU, 0xed16825cU,
0x8acf1c2bU, 0xa779b492U, 0xf307f2f0U, 0x4e69e2a1U,
0x65daf4cdU, 0x0605bed5U, 0xd134621fU, 0xc4a6fe8aU,
0x342e539dU, 0xa2f355a0U, 0x058ae132U, 0xa4f6eb75U,
0x0b83ec39U, 0x4060efaaU, 0x5e719f06U, 0xbd6e1051U,
0x3e218af9U, 0x96dd063dU, 0xdd3e05aeU, 0x4de6bd46U,
0x91548db5U, 0x71c45d05U, 0x0406d46fU, 0x605015ffU,
0x1998fb24U, 0xd6bde997U, 0x894043ccU, 0x67d99e77U,
0xb0e842bdU, 0x07898b88U, 0xe7195b38U, 0x79c8eedbU,
0xa17c0a47U, 0x7c420fe9U, 0xf8841ec9U, 0x00000000U,
0x09808683U, 0x322bed48U, 0x1e1170acU, 0x6c5a724eU,
0xfd0efffbU, 0xf853856U, 0x3daed51eU, 0x362d3927U,
0x0a0fd964U, 0x685ca621U, 0x9b5b54d1U, 0x24362e3aU,
0x0c0a67b1U, 0x9357e70fU, 0xb4ee96d2U, 0x1b9b919eU,
0x80c0c54fU, 0x61dc20a2U, 0x5a774b69U, 0x1c121a16U,
0xe293ba0aU, 0xc0a02ae5U, 0x3c22e043U, 0x121b171dU,
0x0e090d0bU, 0xf28bc7adU, 0x2db6a8b9U, 0x141ea9c8U,
0x57f11985U, 0xaf75074cU, 0xee99dabbU, 0xa37f60fdU,
```

```

0xf701269fU, 0x5c72f5bcU, 0x44663bc5U, 0x5bfb7e34U,
0x8b432976U, 0xcb23c6dcU, 0xb6edfc68U, 0xb8e4f163U,
0xd731dccaU, 0x42638510U, 0x13972240U, 0x84c61120U,
0x854a247dU, 0xd2bb3df8U, 0xae93211U, 0xc729a16dU,
0x1d9e2f4bU, 0xdc230f3U, 0x0d8652ecU, 0x77c1e3d0U,
0x2bb3166cU, 0xa970b999U, 0x119448faU, 0x47e96422U,
0xa8fc8cc4U, 0xa0f03f1aU, 0x567d2cd8U, 0x223390efU,
0x87494ec7U, 0xd938d1c1U, 0x8ccaa2feU, 0x98d40b36U,
0xa6f581cfU, 0xa57ade28U, 0xdab78e26U, 0x3fadbf4aU,
0x2c3a9de4U, 0x5078920dU, 0x6a5fcc9bU, 0x547e4662U,
0xf68d13c2U, 0x90d8b8e8U, 0x2e39f75eU, 0x82c3aff5U,
0x9f5d80beU, 0x69d0937cU, 0x6fd52da9U, 0xcf2512b3U,
0xc8ac993bU, 0x10187da7U, 0xe89c636eU, 0xdb3bbb7bU,
0xcd267809U, 0x6e5918f4U, 0xec9ab701U, 0x834f9aa8U,
0xe6956e65U, 0xaaaffe67eU, 0x21bccf08U, 0xef15e8e6U,
0xbae79bd9U, 0x4a6f36ceU, 0xea9f09d4U, 0x29b07cd6U,
0x31a4b2afU, 0x2a3f2331U, 0xc6a59430U, 0x35a266c0U,
0x744ebc37U, 0xfc82caa6U, 0xe090d0b0U, 0x33a7d815U,
0xf104984aU, 0x41ecdaf7U, 0x7fcd500eU, 0x1791f62fU,
0x764dd68dU, 0x43efb04dU, 0xccaa4d54U, 0xe49604dfU,
0x9ed1b5e3U, 0x4c6a881bU, 0xc12c1fb8U, 0x4665517fU,
0x9d5eea04U, 0x018c355dU, 0xfa877473U, 0xfb0b412eU,
0xb3671d5aU, 0x92dbd252U, 0xe9105633U, 0x6dd64713U,
0x9ad7618cU, 0x37a10c7aU, 0x59f8148eU, 0xeb133c89U,
0xcea927eeU, 0xb761c935U, 0xe11ce5edU, 0x7a47b13cU,
0x9cd2df59U, 0x55f2733fU, 0x1814ce79U, 0x73c737bfU,
0x53f7cdeaU, 0x5ffdaa5bU, 0xdf3d6f14U, 0x7844db86U,
0xcaaff381U, 0xb968c43eU, 0x3824342cU, 0xc2a3405fU,
0x161dc372U, 0xbce2250cU, 0x283c498bU, 0xff0d9541U,
0x39a80171U, 0x080cb3deU, 0xd8b4e49cU, 0x6456c190U,
0x7bcb8461U, 0xd532b670U, 0x486c5c74U, 0xd0b85742U,
};
static const u32 Td1[256] = {
0x5051f4a7U, 0x537e4165U, 0xc31a17a4U, 0x963a275eU,
0xcb3bab6bU, 0xf11f9d45U, 0xabacfa58U, 0x934be303U,
0x552030faU, 0xf6ad766dU, 0x9188cc76U, 0x25f5024cU,
0xfc4fe5d7U, 0xd7c52acbU, 0x80263544U, 0x8fb562a3U,
0x49deb15aU, 0x6725ba1bU, 0x9845ea0eU, 0xe15dfec0U,
0x02c32f75U, 0x12814cf0U, 0xa38d4697U, 0xc66bd3f9U,
0xe7038f5fU, 0x9515929cU, 0xebbf6d7aU, 0xda955259U,
0x2dd4be83U, 0xd3587421U, 0x2949e069U, 0x448ec9c8U,
0x6a75c289U, 0x78f48e79U, 0x6b99583eU, 0xdd27b971U,
0xb6bee14fU, 0x17f088adU, 0x66c920acU, 0xb47dce3aU,
0x1863df4aU, 0x82e51a31U, 0x60975133U, 0x4562537fU,
0xe0b16477U, 0x84bb6baeU, 0x1cfe81a0U, 0x94f9082bU,
0x58704868U, 0x198f45fdU, 0x8794de6cU, 0xb7527bf8U,
0x23ab73d3U, 0xe2724b02U, 0x57e31f8fU, 0x2a6655abU,
0x07b2eb28U, 0x032fb5c2U, 0x9a86c57bU, 0xa5d33708U,
0xf2302887U, 0xb223bfa5U, 0xba02036aU, 0x5ced1682U,
0x2b8acf1cU, 0x92a779b4U, 0xf0f307f2U, 0xa14e69e2U,
0xcd65daf4U, 0xd50605beU, 0x1fd13462U, 0x8ac4a6feU,
0x9d342e53U, 0xa0a2f355U, 0x32058ae1U, 0x75a4f6ebU,
0x390b83ecU, 0xaa4060efU, 0x065e719fU, 0x51bd6e10U,
0xf93e218aU, 0x3d96dd06U, 0xaedd3e05U, 0x464de6bdU,
0xb591548dU, 0x0571c45dU, 0x6f0406d4U, 0xff605015U,
0x241998fbU, 0x97d6bde9U, 0xcc894043U, 0x7767d99eU,
0xbdb0e842U, 0x8807898bU, 0x38e7195bU, 0xdb79c8eeU,
0x47a17c0aU, 0xe97c420fU, 0xc9f8841eU, 0x00000000U,
0x83098086U, 0x48322bedU, 0xac1e1170U, 0x4e6c5a72U,
0xfbfdf0effU, 0x560f8538U, 0x1e3daed5U, 0x27362d39U,
0x640a0fd9U, 0x21685ca6U, 0xd19b5b54U, 0x3a24362eU,
0xb10c0a67U, 0x0f9357e7U, 0xd2b4ee96U, 0x9e1b9b91U,
0x4f80c0c5U, 0xa261dc20U, 0x695a774bU, 0x161c121aU,

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0x0ae293baU, 0xe5c0a02aU, 0x433c22e0U, 0x1d121b17U,
0x0b0e090dU, 0xadf28bc7U, 0xb92db6a8U, 0xc8141ea9U,
0x8557f119U, 0x4caf7507U, 0xbbee99ddU, 0xfda37f60U,
0x9ff70126U, 0xbc5c72f5U, 0xc544663bU, 0x345bfb7eU,
0x768b4329U, 0xdccb23c6U, 0x68b6edfcU, 0x63b8e4f1U,
0xcad731dcU, 0x10426385U, 0x40139722U, 0x2084c611U,
0x7d854a24U, 0xf8d2bb3dU, 0x11aef932U, 0x6dc729a1U,
0x4b1d9e2fU, 0xf3dcb230U, 0xec0d8652U, 0xd077c1e3U,
0x6c2bb316U, 0x99a970b9U, 0xfa119448U, 0x2247e964U,
0xc4a8fc8cU, 0x1aa0f03fU, 0xd8567d2cU, 0xef223390U,
0xc787494eU, 0xc1d938d1U, 0xfe8ccaa2U, 0x3698d40bU,
0xcfa6f581U, 0x28a57adeU, 0x26dab78eU, 0xa43fadbffU,
0xe42c3a9dU, 0x0d507892U, 0x9b6a5fccU, 0x62547e46U,
0xc2f68d13U, 0xe890d8b8U, 0x5e2e39f7U, 0xf582c3afU,
0xbe9f5d80U, 0x7c69d093U, 0xa96fd52dU, 0xb3cf2512U,
0x3bc8ac99U, 0xa710187dU, 0x6ee89c63U, 0x7bdb3bbbU,
0x09cd2678U, 0xf46e5918U, 0x01ec9ab7U, 0xa8834f9aU,
0x65e6956eU, 0x7eaaaffeU, 0x0821bccfU, 0xe6ef15e8U,
0xd9bae79bU, 0xce4a6f36U, 0xd4ea9f09U, 0xd629b07cU,
0xaf31a4b2U, 0x312a3f23U, 0x30c6a594U, 0xc035a266U,
0x37744ebcU, 0xa6fc82caU, 0xb0e090d0U, 0x1533a7d8U,
0x4af10498U, 0xf741ecdau, 0x0e7fcd50U, 0x2f1791f6U,
0x8d764dd6U, 0x4d43efb0U, 0x54ccaa4dU, 0xdfe49604U,
0xe39ed1b5U, 0x1b4c6a88U, 0xb8c12c1fU, 0x7f466551U,
0x049d5eeaU, 0x5d018c35U, 0x73fa8774U, 0x2efb0b41U,
0x5ab3671dU, 0x5292dbd2U, 0x33e91056U, 0x136dd647U,
0x8c9ad761U, 0x7a37a10cU, 0x8e59f814U, 0x89eb133cU,
0xeecea927U, 0x35b761c9U, 0xede11ce5U, 0x3c7a47b1U,
0x599cd2dfU, 0x3f55f273U, 0x791814ceU, 0xbf73c737U,
0xea53f7cdU, 0x5b5ffdaaU, 0x14df3d6fU, 0x867844dbU,
0x81caaff3U, 0x3eb968c4U, 0x2c382434U, 0x5fc2a340U,
0x72161dc3U, 0x0cbce225U, 0x8b283c49U, 0x41ff0d95U,
0x7139a801U, 0xde080cb3U, 0x9cd8b4e4U, 0x906456c1U,
0x617bcb84U, 0x70d532b6U, 0x74486c5cU, 0x42d0b857U,
};
static const u32 Td2[256] = {
0xa75051f4U, 0x65537e41U, 0xa4c31a17U, 0x5e963a27U,
0x6bcb3babU, 0x45f11f9dU, 0x58abacfaU, 0x03934be3U,
0xfa552030U, 0x6df6ad76U, 0x769188ccU, 0x4c25f502U,
0xd7fc4fe5U, 0xcbd7c52aU, 0x44802635U, 0xa38fb562U,
0x5a49deb1U, 0x1b6725baU, 0x0e9845eaU, 0xc0e15dfeU,
0x7502c32fU, 0xf012814cU, 0x97a38d46U, 0xf9c66bd3U,
0x5fe7038fU, 0x9c951592U, 0x7aebbf6dU, 0x59da9552U,
0x832dd4beU, 0x21d35874U, 0x692949e0U, 0xc8448ec9U,
0x896a75c2U, 0x7978f48eU, 0x3e6b9958U, 0x71dd27b9U,
0x4fb6bee1U, 0xad17f088U, 0xac66c920U, 0x3ab47dceU,
0x4a1863dfU, 0x3182e51aU, 0x33609751U, 0x7f456253U,
0x77e0b164U, 0xae84bb6bU, 0xa01cfe81U, 0x2b94f908U,
0x68587048U, 0xfd198f45U, 0x6c879adeU, 0xf8b7527bU,
0xd323ab73U, 0x02e2724bU, 0x8f57e31fU, 0xab2a6655U,
0x2807b2ebU, 0xc2032fb5U, 0x7b9a86c5U, 0x08a5d337U,
0x87f23028U, 0xa5b223bfU, 0x6aba0203U, 0x825ced16U,
0x1c2b8acfU, 0xb492a779U, 0xf2f0f307U, 0xe2a14e69U,
0xf4cd65daU, 0xbcd50605U, 0x621fd134U, 0xfe8ac4a6U,
0x539d342eU, 0x55a0a2f3U, 0xe132058aU, 0xeb75a4f6U,
0xec390b83U, 0xefaa4060U, 0x9f065e71U, 0x1051bd6eU,

0x8af93e21U, 0x063d96ddU, 0x05aedd3eU, 0xbd464de6U,
0x8db59154U, 0x5d0571c4U, 0xd46f0406U, 0x15ff6050U,
0xfb241998U, 0xe997d6bdU, 0x43cc8940U, 0x9e7767d9U,
0x42bdb0e8U, 0x8b880789U, 0x5b38e719U, 0xcedb79c8U,
0x0a47a17cU, 0x0fe97c42U, 0x1ec9f884U, 0x00000000U,
0x86830980U, 0xed48322bU, 0x70ac1e11U, 0x724e6c5aU,

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0xffffbfd0eU, 0x38560f85U, 0xd51e3daeU, 0x3927362dU,
0xd9640a0fU, 0xa621685cU, 0x54d19b5bU, 0x2e3a2436U,
0x67b10c0aU, 0xe70f9357U, 0x96d2b4eeU, 0x919e1b9bU,
0xc54f80c0U, 0x20a261dcU, 0x4b695a77U, 0x1a161c12U,
0xba0ae293U, 0x2ae5c0a0U, 0xe0433c22U, 0x171d121bU,
0x0d0b0e09U, 0xc7adf28bU, 0xa8b92db6U, 0xa9c8141eU,
0x198557f1U, 0x074caf75U, 0xddbbbee99U, 0x60fda37fU,
0x269ff701U, 0xf5bc5c72U, 0x3bc54466U, 0x7e345bfbU,
0x29768b43U, 0xc6dccb23U, 0xfc68b6edU, 0xf163b8e4U,
0xdccad731U, 0x85104263U, 0x22401397U, 0x112084c6U,
0x247d854aU, 0x3df8d2bbU, 0x3211aef9U, 0xa16dc729U,
0x2f4b1d9eU, 0x30f3dcb2U, 0x52ec0d86U, 0xe3d077c1U,
0x166c2bb3U, 0xb999a970U, 0x48fa1194U, 0x642247e9U,
0x8cc4a8fcU, 0x3f1aa0f0U, 0x2cd8567dU, 0x90ef2233U,
0x4ec78749U, 0xd1c1d938U, 0xa2fe8ccaU, 0x0b3698d4U,
0x81cfa6f5U, 0xde28a57aU, 0x8e26dab7U, 0xbfa43fadU,
0x9de42c3aU, 0x920d5078U, 0xcc9b6a5fU, 0x4662547eU,
0x13c2f68dU, 0xb8e890d8U, 0xf75e2e39U, 0xaff582c3U,
0x80be9f5dU, 0x937c69d0U, 0x2da96fd5U, 0x12b3cf25U,
0x993bc8acU, 0x7da71018U, 0x636ee89cU, 0xbb7bdb3bU,
0x7809cd26U, 0x18f46e59U, 0xb701ec9aU, 0x9aa8834fU,
0x6e65e695U, 0xe67eaaffU, 0xcf0821bcU, 0xe8e6ef15U,
0x9bd9bae7U, 0x36ce4a6fU, 0x09d4ea9fU, 0x7cd629b0U,
0xb2af31a4U, 0x23312a3fU, 0x9430c6a5U, 0x66c035a2U,
0xbc37744eU, 0xcaa6fc82U, 0xd0b0e090U, 0xd81533a7U,
0x984af104U, 0xdaf741ecU, 0x500e7fcdU, 0xf62f1791U,
0xd68d764dU, 0xb04d43efU, 0x4d54ccaaU, 0x04dfe496U,
0xb5e39ed1U, 0x881b4c6aU, 0x1fb8c12cU, 0x517f4665U,
0xea049d5eU, 0x355d018cU, 0x7473fa87U, 0x412efb0bU,
0x1d5ab367U, 0xd25292dbU, 0x5633e910U, 0x47136dd6U,
0x618c9ad7U, 0x0c7a37a1U, 0x148e59f8U, 0x3c89eb13U,
0x27eecea9U, 0xc935b761U, 0xe5ede11cU, 0xb13c7a47U,
0xdf599cd2U, 0x733f55f2U, 0xce791814U, 0x37bf73c7U,
0xcdea53f7U, 0xaa5b5ffdu, 0x6f14df3dU, 0xdb867844U,
0xf381caafU, 0xc43eb968U, 0x342c3824U, 0x405fc2a3U,
0xc372161dU, 0x250cbce2U, 0x498b283cU, 0x9541ff0dU,
0x017139a8U, 0xb3de080cU, 0xe49cd8b4U, 0xc1906456U,
0x84617bcbU, 0xb670d532U, 0x5c74486cU, 0x5742d0b8U,

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};
```

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static const u32 Td3[256] = {
0xf4a75051U, 0x4165537eU, 0x17a4c31aU, 0x275e963aU,
0xab6bcb3bU, 0x9d45f11fU, 0xfa58abacU, 0xe303934bU,
0x30fa5520U, 0x766df6adU, 0xcc769188U, 0x024c25f5U,
0xe5d7fc4fU, 0x2acbd7c5U, 0x35448026U, 0x62a38fb5U,
0xb15a49deU, 0xba1b6725U, 0xea0e9845U, 0xfec0e15dU,
0x2f7502c3U, 0x4cf01281U, 0x4697a38dU, 0xd3f9c66bU,
0x8f5fe703U, 0x929c9515U, 0x6d7aebbfU, 0x5259da95U,
0xbe832dd4U, 0x7421d358U, 0xe0692949U, 0xc9c8448eU,
0xc2896a75U, 0x8e7978f4U, 0x583e6b99U, 0xb971dd27U,
0xe14fb6beU, 0x88ad17f0U, 0x20ac66c9U, 0xce3ab47dU,
0xdf4a1863U, 0x1a3182e5U, 0x51336097U, 0x537f4562U,
0x6477e0b1U, 0x6bae84bbU, 0x81a01cfeU, 0x082b94f9U,
0x48685870U, 0x45fd198fU, 0xde6c8794U, 0x7bf8b752U,
0x73d323abU, 0x4b02e272U, 0x1f8f57e3U, 0x55ab2a66U,
0xeb2807b2U, 0xb5c2032fU, 0xc57b9a86U, 0x3708a5d3U,
0x2887f230U, 0xbfa5b223U, 0x036aba02U, 0x16825cedU,
0xcf1c2b8aU, 0x79b492a7U, 0x07f2f0f3U, 0x69e2a14eU,
0xda4cd65U, 0x05bed506U, 0x34621fd1U, 0xa6fe8ac4U,
0x2e539d34U, 0xf355a0a2U, 0x8ae13205U, 0xf6eb75a4U,
0x83ec390bU, 0x60efaa40U, 0x719f065eU, 0x6e1051bdU,
0x218af93eU, 0xdd063d96U, 0x3e05aeddU, 0xe6bd464dU,
0x548db591U, 0xc45d0571U, 0x06d46f04U, 0x5015ff60U,
0x98fb2419U, 0xbde997d6U, 0x4043cc89U, 0xd99e7767U,

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```
0xe842bdb0U, 0x898b8807U, 0x195b38e7U, 0xc8eedb79U,
0x7c0a47a1U, 0x420fe97cU, 0x841ec9f8U, 0x00000000U,
0x80868309U, 0x2bed4832U, 0x1170ac1eU, 0x5a724e6cU,
0x0efffbfdU, 0x8538560fU, 0xaed51e3dU, 0x2d392736U,
0x0fd9640aU, 0x5ca62168U, 0x5b54d19bU, 0x362e3a24U,
0x0a67b10cU, 0x57e70f93U, 0xee96d2b4U, 0x9b919e1bU,
0xc0c54f80U, 0xdc20a261U, 0x774b695aU, 0x121a161cU,
0x93ba0ae2U, 0xa02ae5c0U, 0x22e0433cU, 0x1b171d12U,
0x090d0b0eU, 0x8bc7adf2U, 0xb6a8b92dU, 0x1ea9c814U,
0xf1198557U, 0x75074cafU, 0x99ddbbeeU, 0x7f60fda3U,
0x01269ff7U, 0x72f5bc5cU, 0x663bc544U, 0xfb7e345bU,
0x4329768bU, 0x23c6dccbU, 0xedfc68b6U, 0xe4f163b8U,
0x31dccad7U, 0x63851042U, 0x97224013U, 0xc6112084U,
0x4a247d85U, 0xbb3df8d2U, 0xf93211aeU, 0x29a16dc7U,
0x9e2f4b1dU, 0xb230f3dcU, 0x8652ec0dU, 0xc1e3d077U,
0xb3166c2bU, 0x70b999a9U, 0x9448fa11U, 0xe9642247U,
0xfc8cc4a8U, 0xf03f1aa0U, 0x7d2cd856U, 0x3390ef22U,
0x494ecf7fU, 0x38d1c1d9U, 0xcaa2fe8cU, 0xd40b3698U,
0xf581cfa6U, 0x7ade28a5U, 0xb78e26daU, 0xadbf43fU,
0x3a9de42cU, 0x78920d50U, 0x5fcc9b6aU, 0x7e466254U,
0x8d13c2f6U, 0xd8b8e890U, 0x39f75e2eU, 0xc3aff582U,
0x5d80be9fU, 0xd0937c69U, 0xd52da96fU, 0x2512b3cfU,
0xac993bc8U, 0x187da710U, 0x9c636ee8U, 0x3bbb7bdbU,
0x267809cdU, 0x5918f46eU, 0x9ab701ecU, 0x4f9aa883U,
0x956e65e6U, 0xffe67eaaU, 0xbccf0821U, 0x15e8e6efU,
0xe79bd9baU, 0x6f36ce4aU, 0x9f09d4eaU, 0xb07cd629U,
0xa4b2af31U, 0x3f23312aU, 0xa59430c6U, 0xa266c035U,
0x4ebc3774U, 0x82caa6fcU, 0x90d0b0e0U, 0xa7d81533U,
0x04984af1U, 0xecdaf741U, 0xcd500e7fU, 0x91f62f17U,
0x4dd68d76U, 0xefb04d43U, 0xaa4d54ccU, 0x9604dfe4U,
0xd1b5e39dU, 0x6a881b4cU, 0x2c1fb8c1U, 0x65517f46U,
0x5eea049dU, 0x8c355d01U, 0x877473faU, 0x0b412efbU,
0x671d5ab3U, 0xdbd25292U, 0x105633e9U, 0xd647136dU,
0xd7618c9aU, 0xa10c7a37U, 0xf8148e59U, 0x133c89ebU,
0xa927eeceU, 0x61c935b7U, 0x1ce5ede1U, 0x47b13c7aU,
0xd2df599cU, 0xf2733f55U, 0x14ce7918U, 0xc737bf73U,
0xf7cdea53U, 0xfdaa5b5fU, 0x3d6f14dfU, 0x44db8678U,
0xaff381caU, 0x68c43eb9U, 0x24342c38U, 0xa3405fc2U,
0x1dc37216U, 0xe2250cbcU, 0x3c498b28U, 0x0d9541ffU,
0xa8017139U, 0x0cb3de08U, 0xb4e49cd8U, 0x56c19064U,
0xcb84617bU, 0x32b670d5U, 0x6c5c7448U, 0xb85742d0U,
};
static const u32 Td4[256] = {
0x52525252U, 0x09090909U, 0x6a6a6a6aU, 0xd5d5d5d5U,
0x30303030U, 0x36363636U, 0xa5a5a5a5U, 0x38383838U,
0xbfbfbfbfU, 0x40404040U, 0xa3a3a3a3U, 0x9e9e9e9eU,
0x81818181U, 0xf3f3f3f3U, 0xd7d7d7d7U, 0xfbfbfbfbU,
0x7c7c7c7cU, 0xe3e3e3e3U, 0x39393939U, 0x82828282U,
0x9b9b9b9bU, 0x2f2f2f2fU, 0xffffffffU, 0x87878787U,
0x34343434U, 0x8e8e8e8eU, 0x43434343U, 0x44444444U,
0xc4c4c4c4U, 0xdedededeU, 0xe9e9e9e9U, 0xcbcbcbcbU,
0x54545454U, 0x7b7b7b7bU, 0x94949494U, 0x32323232U,
0xa6a6a6a6U, 0xc2c2c2c2U, 0x23232323U, 0x3d3d3d3dU,
0xe0e0e0e0U, 0x4c4c4c4cU, 0x95959595U, 0xb0b0b0b0U,
0x42424242U, 0xfafafafaU, 0xc3c3c3c3U, 0x4e4e4e4eU,
0x08080808U, 0x2e2e2e2eU, 0xa1a1a1a1U, 0x66666666U,
0x28282828U, 0xd9d9d9d9U, 0x24242424U, 0xb2b2b2b2U,
0x76767676U, 0x5b5b5b5bU, 0xa2a2a2a2U, 0x49494949U,
0x6d6d6d6dU, 0x8b8b8b8bU, 0xd1d1d1d1U, 0x25252525U,
0x72727272U, 0xf8f8f8f8U, 0xf6f6f6f6U, 0x64646464U,
0x86868686U, 0x68686868U, 0x98989898U, 0x16161616U,
0xd4d4d4d4U, 0xa4a4a4a4U, 0x5c5c5c5cU, 0xc0c0c0c0U,
0x5d5d5d5dU, 0x65656565U, 0xb6b6b6b6U, 0x92929292U,
```

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0x6c6c6c6cU, 0x70707070U, 0x48484848U, 0x50505050U,
0xfdfdfdfdfU, 0xededededU, 0xb9b9b9b9U, 0xdadadadaU,
0x5e5e5e5eU, 0x15151515U, 0x46464646U, 0x57575757U,
0xa7a7a7a7U, 0x8d8d8d8dU, 0x9d9d9d9dU, 0x84848484U,
0x90909090U, 0xd8d8d8d8U, 0xababababU, 0x00000000U,
0x8c8c8c8cU, 0xbcbcbcbcbU, 0xd3d3d3d3U, 0x0a0a0a0aU,
0xf7f7f7f7U, 0xe4e4e4e4U, 0x58585858U, 0x05050505U,
0xb8b8b8b8U, 0xb3b3b3b3U, 0x45454545U, 0x06060606U,
0xd0d0d0d0U, 0x2c2c2c2cU, 0x1e1e1e1eU, 0x8f8f8f8fU,
0xcacacacaU, 0x3f3f3f3fU, 0x0f0f0f0fU, 0x02020202U,
0xc1c1c1c1U, 0xafafafafU, 0xbdbdbdbdbU, 0x03030303U,
0x01010101U, 0x13131313U, 0x8a8a8a8aU, 0x6b6b6b6bU,
0x3a3a3a3aU, 0x91919191U, 0x11111111U, 0x41414141U,
0x4f4f4f4fU, 0x67676767U, 0xdcddcdcdU, 0xeaeaeaeaU,
0x97979797U, 0xf2f2f2f2U, 0xcfcfcfcfU, 0xcecececeU,
0xf0f0f0f0U, 0xb4b4b4b4U, 0xe6e6e6e6U, 0x73737373U,
0x96969696U, 0xacacacacU, 0x74747474U, 0x22222222U,
0xe7e7e7e7U, 0xadadadadU, 0x35353535U, 0x85858585U,
0xe2e2e2e2U, 0xf9f9f9f9U, 0x37373737U, 0xe8e8e8e8U,
0x1c1c1c1cU, 0x75757575U, 0xdfdfdfdfU, 0x6e6e6e6eU,
0x47474747U, 0xf1f1f1f1U, 0x1a1a1a1aU, 0x71717171U,
0x1d1d1d1dU, 0x29292929U, 0xc5c5c5c5U, 0x89898989U,
0x6f6f6f6fU, 0xb7b7b7b7U, 0x62626262U, 0x0e0e0e0eU,
0xaaaaaaaaU, 0x18181818U, 0xbebebebeU, 0x1b1b1b1bU,
0xfcfcfcfcU, 0x56565656U, 0x3e3e3e3eU, 0x4b4b4b4bU,
0xc6c6c6c6U, 0xd2d2d2d2U, 0x79797979U, 0x20202020U,
0x9a9a9a9aU, 0xdbdbdbdbU, 0xc0c0c0c0U, 0xfefefefefU,
0x78787878U, 0xcdcdcdcdU, 0x5a5a5a5aU, 0xf4f4f4f4U,
0x1f1f1f1fU, 0xddddddddU, 0xa8a8a8a8U, 0x33333333U,
0x88888888U, 0x07070707U, 0xc7c7c7c7U, 0x31313131U,
0xb1b1b1b1U, 0x12121212U, 0x10101010U, 0x59595959U,
0x27272727U, 0x80808080U, 0xececececU, 0x5f5f5f5fU,
0x60606060U, 0x51515151U, 0x7f7f7f7fU, 0xa9a9a9a9U,
0x19191919U, 0xb5b5b5b5U, 0x4a4a4a4aU, 0x0d0d0d0dU,
0x2d2d2d2dU, 0xe5e5e5e5U, 0x7a7a7a7aU, 0x9f9f9f9fU,
0x93939393U, 0xc9c9c9c9U, 0x9c9c9c9cU, 0xefefefefU,
0xa0a0a0a0U, 0xe0e0e0e0U, 0x3b3b3b3bU, 0x4d4d4d4dU,
0xaeaeaeaeU, 0x2a2a2a2aU, 0xf5f5f5f5U, 0xb0b0b0b0U,
0xc8c8c8c8U, 0xeb0b0b0bU, 0xb0b0b0b0U, 0x3c3c3c3cU,
0x83838383U, 0x53535353U, 0x99999999U, 0x61616161U,
0x17171717U, 0x2b2b2b2bU, 0x04040404U, 0x7e7e7e7eU,
0xbabababaU, 0x77777777U, 0xd6d6d6d6U, 0x26262626U,
0xe1e1e1e1U, 0x69696969U, 0x14141414U, 0x63636363U,
0x55555555U, 0x21212121U, 0x0c0c0c0cU, 0x7d7d7d7dU,
};
static const u32 rcon[] = {
    0x01000000, 0x02000000, 0x04000000, 0x08000000,
    0x10000000, 0x20000000, 0x40000000, 0x80000000,
    0x1B000000, 0x36000000, /* for 128-bit blocks, Rijndael never uses more than 10
rcon values */
};

#define SWAP(x) (_lrotl(x, 8) & 0x00ff00ff | _lrotr(x, 8) & 0xff00ff00)

#ifdef _MSC_VER
#define GETU32(p) SWAP(*((u32 *)(p)))
#define PUTU32(ct, st) { *((u32 *)(ct)) = SWAP((st)); }
#else
#define GETU32(pt) (((u32)(pt)[0] << 24) ^ ((u32)(pt)[1] << 16) ^ ((u32)(pt)[2] << 8)
^ ((u32)(pt)[3]))
#define PUTU32(ct, st) { (ct)[0] = (u8)((st) >> 24); (ct)[1] = (u8)((st) >> 16);
(ct)[2] = (u8)((st) >> 8); (ct)[3] = (u8)(st); }
#endif

```

```

/**
 * Expand the cipher key into the encryption key schedule.
 *
 * @return the number of rounds for the given cipher key size.
 */
int rijndaelKeySetupEnc(u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], const u8 cipherKey[], int keyBits) {
    int i = 0;
    u32 temp;

    rk[0] = GETU32(cipherKey);
    rk[1] = GETU32(cipherKey + 4);
    rk[2] = GETU32(cipherKey + 8);
    rk[3] = GETU32(cipherKey + 12);
    if (keyBits == 128) {
        for (;;) {
            temp = rk[3];
            rk[4] = rk[0] ^
                (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^
                (Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
                (Te4[(temp) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
                (Te4[(temp >> 24)] & 0x000000ff) ^
                rcon[i];
            rk[5] = rk[1] ^ rk[4];
            rk[6] = rk[2] ^ rk[5];
            rk[7] = rk[3] ^ rk[6];
            if (++i == 10) {
                return 10;
            }
            rk += 4;
        }
    }
    rk[4] = GETU32(cipherKey + 16);
    rk[5] = GETU32(cipherKey + 20);
    if (keyBits == 192) {
        for (;;) {
            temp = rk[5];
            rk[6] = rk[0] ^
                (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^
                (Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
                (Te4[(temp) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
                (Te4[(temp >> 24)] & 0x000000ff) ^
                rcon[i];
            rk[7] = rk[1] ^ rk[6];
            rk[8] = rk[2] ^ rk[7];
            rk[9] = rk[3] ^ rk[8];
            if (++i == 8) {
                return 12;
            }
            rk[10] = rk[4] ^ rk[9];
            rk[11] = rk[5] ^ rk[10];
            rk += 6;
        }
    }
    rk[6] = GETU32(cipherKey + 24);
    rk[7] = GETU32(cipherKey + 28);
    if (keyBits == 256) {
        for (;;) {
            temp = rk[7];
            rk[8] = rk[0] ^
                (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^
                (Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^

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        (Te4[(temp      ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
        (Te4[(temp >> 24)      ] & 0x000000ff) ^
        rcon[i];
    rk[ 9] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 8];
    rk[10] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 9];
    rk[11] = rk[ 3] ^ rk[10];
    if (++i == 7) {
        return 14;
    }
    temp = rk[11];
    rk[12] = rk[ 4] ^
        (Te4[(temp >> 24)      ] & 0xff000000) ^
        (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
        (Te4[(temp >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
        (Te4[(temp      ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff);
    rk[13] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[12];
    rk[14] = rk[ 6] ^ rk[13];
    rk[15] = rk[ 7] ^ rk[14];

    rk += 8;
}
}
return 0;
}

/**
 * Expand the cipher key into the decryption key schedule.
 *
 * @return the number of rounds for the given cipher key size.
 */
int rijndaelKeySetupDec(u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], const u8 cipherKey[], int keyBits) {
    int Nr, i, j;
    u32 temp;

    /* expand the cipher key: */
    Nr = rijndaelKeySetupEnc(rk, cipherKey, keyBits);
    /* invert the order of the round keys: */
    for (i = 0, j = 4*Nr; i < j; i += 4, j -= 4) {
        temp = rk[i      ]; rk[i      ] = rk[j      ]; rk[j      ] = temp;
        temp = rk[i + 1]; rk[i + 1] = rk[j + 1]; rk[j + 1] = temp;
        temp = rk[i + 2]; rk[i + 2] = rk[j + 2]; rk[j + 2] = temp;
        temp = rk[i + 3]; rk[i + 3] = rk[j + 3]; rk[j + 3] = temp;
    }
    /* apply the inverse MixColumn transform to all round keys but the first and
the last: */
    for (i = 1; i < Nr; i++) {
        rk += 4;
        rk[0] =
            Td0[Te4[(rk[0] >> 24)      ] & 0xff] ^
            Td1[Te4[(rk[0] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
            Td2[Te4[(rk[0] >>  8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
            Td3[Te4[(rk[0]      ) & 0xff] & 0xff];
        rk[1] =
            Td0[Te4[(rk[1] >> 24)      ] & 0xff] ^
            Td1[Te4[(rk[1] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
            Td2[Te4[(rk[1] >>  8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
            Td3[Te4[(rk[1]      ) & 0xff] & 0xff];
        rk[2] =
            Td0[Te4[(rk[2] >> 24)      ] & 0xff] ^
            Td1[Te4[(rk[2] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
            Td2[Te4[(rk[2] >>  8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
            Td3[Te4[(rk[2]      ) & 0xff] & 0xff];
        rk[3] =

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        Td0[Te4[(rk[3] >> 24)          ] & 0xff] ^
        Td1[Te4[(rk[3] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
        Td2[Te4[(rk[3] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
        Td3[Te4[(rk[3]          ) & 0xff] & 0xff];
    }
    return Nr;
}

void rijndaelEncrypt(u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], int Nr, const u8 pt[16], u8 ct[16]) {
    u32 s0, s1, s2, s3, t0, t1, t2, t3;
#ifdef FULL_UNROLL
    int r;
#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */

    /*
     * map byte array block to cipher state
     * and add initial round key:
     */
    s0 = GETU32(pt          ) ^ rk[0];
    s1 = GETU32(pt + 4) ^ rk[1];
    s2 = GETU32(pt + 8) ^ rk[2];
    s3 = GETU32(pt + 12) ^ rk[3];
#ifdef FULL_UNROLL
    /* round 1: */
    t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 &
0xff] ^ rk[ 4];
    t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 &
0xff] ^ rk[ 5];
    t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 &
0xff] ^ rk[ 6];
    t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 &
0xff] ^ rk[ 7];
    /* round 2: */
    s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 &
0xff] ^ rk[ 8];
    s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 &
0xff] ^ rk[ 9];
    s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 &
0xff] ^ rk[10];
    s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 &
0xff] ^ rk[11];
    /* round 3: */
    t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 &
0xff] ^ rk[12];
    t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 &
0xff] ^ rk[13];
    t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 &
0xff] ^ rk[14];
    t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 &
0xff] ^ rk[15];
    /* round 4: */
    s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 &
0xff] ^ rk[16];
    s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 &
0xff] ^ rk[17];
    s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 &
0xff] ^ rk[18];
    s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 &
0xff] ^ rk[19];
    /* round 5: */
    t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 &
0xff] ^ rk[20];

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    t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 &
0xff] ^ rk[21];
    t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 &
0xff] ^ rk[22];
    t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 &
0xff] ^ rk[23];
    /* round 6: */
    s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 &
0xff] ^ rk[24];
    s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 &
0xff] ^ rk[25];
    s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 &
0xff] ^ rk[26];
    s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 &
0xff] ^ rk[27];
    /* round 7: */
    t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 &
0xff] ^ rk[28];
    t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 &
0xff] ^ rk[29];
    t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 &
0xff] ^ rk[30];
    t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 &
0xff] ^ rk[31];
    /* round 8: */
    s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 &
0xff] ^ rk[32];
    s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 &
0xff] ^ rk[33];
    s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 &
0xff] ^ rk[34];
    s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 &
0xff] ^ rk[35];
    /* round 9: */
    t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 &
0xff] ^ rk[36];
    t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 &
0xff] ^ rk[37];
    t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 &
0xff] ^ rk[38];
    t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 &
0xff] ^ rk[39];
    if (Nr > 10) {
        /* round 10: */
        s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[40];
        s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[41];
        s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[42];
        s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[43];
        /* round 11: */
        t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[44];
        t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[45];
        t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[46];
        t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[47];
        if (Nr > 12) {
            /* round 12: */

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        s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) &
0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[48];
        s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) &
0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[49];
        s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) &
0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[50];
        s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) &
0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[51];
        /* round 13: */
        t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) &
0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[52];
        t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) &
0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[53];
        t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) &
0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[54];
        t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) &
0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[55];
    }
    }
    rk += Nr << 2;
#else /* !FULL_UNROLL */
    /*
     * Nr - 1 full rounds:
     */
    r = Nr >> 1;
    for (;;) {
        t0 =
            Te0[(s0 >> 24) ] ^
            Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
            Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
            Te3[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^
            rk[4];

        t1 =
            Te0[(s1 >> 24) ] ^
            Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
            Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
            Te3[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^
            rk[5];

        t2 =
            Te0[(s2 >> 24) ] ^
            Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
            Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
            Te3[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^
            rk[6];

        t3 =
            Te0[(s3 >> 24) ] ^
            Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
            Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
            Te3[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^
            rk[7];

        rk += 8;
        if (--r == 0) {
            break;
        }

        s0 =
            Te0[(t0 >> 24) ] ^
            Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
            Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
            Te3[(t3 ) & 0xff] ^
            rk[0];

        s1 =

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        Te0[(t1 >> 24)          ] ^
        Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
        Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
        Te3[(t0          ) & 0xff] ^
        rk[1];
    s2 =
        Te0[(t2 >> 24)          ] ^
        Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
        Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
        Te3[(t1          ) & 0xff] ^
        rk[2];
    s3 =
        Te0[(t3 >> 24)          ] ^
        Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
        Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
        Te3[(t2          ) & 0xff] ^
        rk[3];
}
#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */
/*
 * apply last round and
 * map cipher state to byte array block:
 */
s0 =
    (Te4[(t0 >> 24)          ] & 0xff000000) ^
    (Te4[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
    (Te4[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
    (Te4[(t3          ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
    rk[0];
PUTU32(ct      , s0);
s1 =
    (Te4[(t1 >> 24)          ] & 0xff000000) ^
    (Te4[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
    (Te4[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
    (Te4[(t0          ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
    rk[1];
PUTU32(ct + 4, s1);
s2 =
    (Te4[(t2 >> 24)          ] & 0xff000000) ^
    (Te4[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
    (Te4[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
    (Te4[(t1          ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
    rk[2];
PUTU32(ct + 8, s2);
s3 =
    (Te4[(t3 >> 24)          ] & 0xff000000) ^
    (Te4[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
    (Te4[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
    (Te4[(t2          ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
    rk[3];
PUTU32(ct + 12, s3);
}

void rijndaelDecrypt(u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], int Nr, const u8 ct[16], u8 pt[16]) {
    u32 s0, s1, s2, s3, t0, t1, t2, t3;
#ifdef FULL_UNROLL
    int r;
#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */

    /*
     * map byte array block to cipher state
     * and add initial round key:
     */

```

```

    s0 = GETU32(ct      ) ^ rk[0];
    s1 = GETU32(ct + 4) ^ rk[1];
    s2 = GETU32(ct + 8) ^ rk[2];
    s3 = GETU32(ct + 12) ^ rk[3];
#ifdef FULL_UNROLL
    /* round 1: */
    t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 &
0xff] ^ rk[ 4];
    t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 &
0xff] ^ rk[ 5];
    t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 &
0xff] ^ rk[ 6];
    t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 &
0xff] ^ rk[ 7];
    /* round 2: */
    s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 &
0xff] ^ rk[ 8];
    s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 &
0xff] ^ rk[ 9];
    s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 &
0xff] ^ rk[10];
    s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 &
0xff] ^ rk[11];
    /* round 3: */
    t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 &
0xff] ^ rk[12];
    t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 &
0xff] ^ rk[13];
    t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 &
0xff] ^ rk[14];
    t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 &
0xff] ^ rk[15];
    /* round 4: */
    s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 &
0xff] ^ rk[16];
    s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 &
0xff] ^ rk[17];
    s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 &
0xff] ^ rk[18];
    s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 &
0xff] ^ rk[19];
    /* round 5: */
    t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 &
0xff] ^ rk[20];
    t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 &
0xff] ^ rk[21];
    t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 &
0xff] ^ rk[22];
    t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 &
0xff] ^ rk[23];
    /* round 6: */
    s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 &
0xff] ^ rk[24];
    s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 &
0xff] ^ rk[25];
    s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 &
0xff] ^ rk[26];
    s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 &
0xff] ^ rk[27];
    /* round 7: */
    t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 &
0xff] ^ rk[28];

```

```

    t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 &
0xff] ^ rk[29];
    t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 &
0xff] ^ rk[30];
    t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 &
0xff] ^ rk[31];
    /* round 8: */
    s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 &
0xff] ^ rk[32];
    s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 &
0xff] ^ rk[33];
    s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 &
0xff] ^ rk[34];
    s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 &
0xff] ^ rk[35];
    /* round 9: */
    t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 &
0xff] ^ rk[36];
    t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 &
0xff] ^ rk[37];
    t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 &
0xff] ^ rk[38];
    t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 &
0xff] ^ rk[39];
    if (Nr > 10) {
        /* round 10: */
        s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[40];
        s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[41];
        s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[42];
        s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[43];
        /* round 11: */
        t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[44];
        t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[45];
        t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[46];
        t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[47];
        if (Nr > 12) {
            /* round 12: */
            s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) &
0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[48];
            s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) &
0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[49];
            s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) &
0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[50];
            s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) &
0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[51];
            /* round 13: */
            t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) &
0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[52];
            t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) &
0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[53];
            t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) &
0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[54];
            t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) &
0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[55];
        }
    }

```

```

    }
    rk += Nr << 2;
#else /* !FULL_UNROLL */
    /*
     * Nr - 1 full rounds:
     */
    r = Nr >> 1;
    for (;;) {
        t0 =
            Td0[(s0 >> 24) ] ^
            Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
            Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
            Td3[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^
            rk[4];

        t1 =
            Td0[(s1 >> 24) ] ^
            Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
            Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
            Td3[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^
            rk[5];

        t2 =
            Td0[(s2 >> 24) ] ^
            Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
            Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
            Td3[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^
            rk[6];

        t3 =
            Td0[(s3 >> 24) ] ^
            Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
            Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
            Td3[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^
            rk[7];

        rk += 8;
        if (--r == 0) {
            break;
        }

        s0 =
            Td0[(t0 >> 24) ] ^
            Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
            Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
            Td3[(t1 ) & 0xff] ^
            rk[0];

        s1 =
            Td0[(t1 >> 24) ] ^
            Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
            Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
            Td3[(t2 ) & 0xff] ^
            rk[1];

        s2 =
            Td0[(t2 >> 24) ] ^
            Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
            Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
            Td3[(t3 ) & 0xff] ^
            rk[2];

        s3 =
            Td0[(t3 >> 24) ] ^
            Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
            Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
            Td3[(t0 ) & 0xff] ^
            rk[3];
    }
}

```

```

#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */
/*
 * apply last round and
 * map cipher state to byte array block:
 */
s0 =
    (Td4[(t0 >> 24)          ] & 0xff000000) ^
    (Td4[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
    (Td4[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
    (Td4[(t1          ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
    rk[0];
PUTU32(pt      , s0);
s1 =
    (Td4[(t1 >> 24)          ] & 0xff000000) ^
    (Td4[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
    (Td4[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
    (Td4[(t2          ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
    rk[1];
PUTU32(pt + 4, s1);
s2 =
    (Td4[(t2 >> 24)          ] & 0xff000000) ^
    (Td4[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
    (Td4[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
    (Td4[(t3          ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
    rk[2];
PUTU32(pt + 8, s2);
s3 =
    (Td4[(t3 >> 24)          ] & 0xff000000) ^
    (Td4[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
    (Td4[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
    (Td4[(t0          ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
    rk[3];
PUTU32(pt + 12, s3);
}

#ifdef INTERMEDIATE_VALUE_KAT

void rijndaelEncryptRound(const u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], int Nr, u8 block[16], int
rounds) {
    int r;
    u32 s0, s1, s2, s3, t0, t1, t2, t3;

    /*
     * map byte array block to cipher state
     * and add initial round key:
     */
    s0 = GETU32(block      ) ^ rk[0];
    s1 = GETU32(block + 4) ^ rk[1];
    s2 = GETU32(block + 8) ^ rk[2];
    s3 = GETU32(block + 12) ^ rk[3];
    rk += 4;

    /*
     * Nr - 1 full rounds:
     */
    for (r = (rounds < Nr ? rounds : Nr - 1); r > 0; r--) {
        t0 =
            Te0[(s0 >> 24)          ] ^
            Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
            Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
            Te3[(s3          ) & 0xff] ^
            rk[0];
        t1 =

```

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        Te0[(s1 >> 24)          ] ^
        Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
        Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
        Te3[(s0          ) & 0xff] ^
        rk[1];
    t2 =
        Te0[(s2 >> 24)          ] ^
        Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
        Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
        Te3[(s1          ) & 0xff] ^
        rk[2];
    t3 =
        Te0[(s3 >> 24)          ] ^
        Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
        Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
        Te3[(s2          ) & 0xff] ^
        rk[3];

    s0 = t0;
    s1 = t1;
    s2 = t2;
    s3 = t3;
    rk += 4;
}

/*
 * apply last round and
 * map cipher state to byte array block:
 */
if (rounds == Nr) {
    t0 =
        (Te4[(s0 >> 24)          ] & 0xff000000) ^
        (Te4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
        (Te4[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
        (Te4[(s3          ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
        rk[0];
    t1 =
        (Te4[(s1 >> 24)          ] & 0xff000000) ^
        (Te4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
        (Te4[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
        (Te4[(s0          ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
        rk[1];
    t2 =
        (Te4[(s2 >> 24)          ] & 0xff000000) ^
        (Te4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
        (Te4[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
        (Te4[(s1          ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
        rk[2];
    t3 =
        (Te4[(s3 >> 24)          ] & 0xff000000) ^
        (Te4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
        (Te4[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
        (Te4[(s2          ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
        rk[3];

    s0 = t0;
    s1 = t1;
    s2 = t2;
    s3 = t3;
}

PUTU32(block      , s0);

```

```

    PUTU32(block + 4, s1);
    PUTU32(block + 8, s2);
    PUTU32(block + 12, s3);
}

void rijndaelDecryptRound(const u32 rk[/4*(Nr + 1)*/], int Nr, u8 block[16], int
rounds) {
    int r;
    u32 s0, s1, s2, s3, t0, t1, t2, t3;

    /*
     * map byte array block to cipher state
     * and add initial round key:
     */
    s0 = GETU32(block) ^ rk[0];
    s1 = GETU32(block + 4) ^ rk[1];
    s2 = GETU32(block + 8) ^ rk[2];
    s3 = GETU32(block + 12) ^ rk[3];
    rk += 4;

    /*
     * Nr - 1 full rounds:
     */
    for (r = (rounds < Nr ? rounds : Nr) - 1; r > 0; r--) {
        t0 =
            Td0[(s0 >> 24) ] ^
            Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
            Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
            Td3[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^
            rk[0];
        t1 =
            Td0[(s1 >> 24) ] ^
            Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
            Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
            Td3[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^
            rk[1];
        t2 =
            Td0[(s2 >> 24) ] ^
            Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
            Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
            Td3[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^
            rk[2];
        t3 =
            Td0[(s3 >> 24) ] ^
            Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
            Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^
            Td3[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^
            rk[3];

        s0 = t0;
        s1 = t1;
        s2 = t2;
        s3 = t3;
        rk += 4;
    }

    /*
     * complete the last round and
     * map cipher state to byte array block:
     */
    t0 =
        (Td4[(s0 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^

```



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        (Td4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
        (Td4[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
        (Td4[(s1 >> 0) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff);
t1 =
        (Td4[(s1 >> 24) & 0xff000000] ^
        (Td4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
        (Td4[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
        (Td4[(s2 >> 0) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff);
t2 =
        (Td4[(s2 >> 24) & 0xff000000] ^
        (Td4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
        (Td4[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
        (Td4[(s3 >> 0) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff);
t3 =
        (Td4[(s3 >> 24) & 0xff000000] ^
        (Td4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
        (Td4[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
        (Td4[(s0 >> 0) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff);

if (rounds == Nr) {
    t0 ^= rk[0];
    t1 ^= rk[1];
    t2 ^= rk[2];
    t3 ^= rk[3];
}

PUTU32(block, t0);
PUTU32(block + 4, t1);
PUTU32(block + 8, t2);
PUTU32(block + 12, t3);
}

#endif /* INTERMEDIATE_VALUE_KAT */

static void block_init(block_state *state, unsigned char *key,
                       int keylen)
{
    int Nr = 0;

    if (keylen != 16 && keylen != 24 && keylen != 32) {
        PyErr_SetString(PyExc_ValueError,
                        "AES key must be either 16, 24, or 32 bytes long");
        return;
    }
    switch (keylen) {
        case(16): Nr = 10; break;
        case(24): Nr = 12; break;
        case(32): Nr = 14; break;
    }
    state->rounds = Nr;
    rijndaelKeySetupEnc(state->ek, key, keylen*8);
    rijndaelKeySetupDec(state->dk, key, keylen*8);
}

static void block_encrypt(block_state *self, u8 *in, u8 *out)
{
    rijndaelEncrypt(self->ek, self->rounds, in, out);
}

static void block_decrypt(block_state *self, u8 *in, u8 *out)
{
    rijndaelDecrypt(self->dk, self->rounds, in, out);
}

```

Appendix III Acknowledgments

On behalf of our industry, we would like to thank the following individuals for their contributions to the development of this specification, listed in alphabetical order of company affiliation.

Contributor	Company Affiliation
John Dickinson, Edwin Mallette	Bright House Networks
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Appendix IV Revision History

IV.1 Engineering Changes for DPoE-SP-SECv2.0-I02-130808

ECN	Date	Summary	Author
SECv2.0-N-13.0071-1	03/21/2013	SECv1.0 EC Propagation	Drew Davis
SECv2.0-N-13.0090-1	06/20/2013	EAE and Config File TLV 29 Clarifications and Requirements	Stuart Hoggan

IV.2 Engineering Change for DPoE-SP-SECv2.0-I03-140327

ECN	Date	Summary	Author
SECv2.0-N-14.0119-1	02/13/2014	D-ONU Encryption Clarification	Brionna Lopez

IV.3 Engineering Changes for DPoE-SP-SECv2.0-I04-140807

ECN	Date	Summary	Author
SECv2.0-N-14.0176-1	7/3/2014	Alignment and cleanup of 802.3 references	Marek Hajduczenia
SECv2.0-N-14.0191-2	7/10/2014	DPoEv2 SEC Edits to Support 2G-EPON	Lane Johnson

IV.4 Engineering Change for DPoE-SP-SECv2.0-I05-160602

ECN	Date	Summary	Author
SECv2.0-N-15.0232-1	12/31/2015	Remove DEMARC Specification References and Attributes	Steve Burroughs
SECv2.0-N-16.0242-1	3/31/2016	DPoE 2.0 SEC - Retire SOAM Specification	Steve Burroughs