

CableLabs Security

Gateway Device Security Best Common Practices

CL-GL-GDS-BCP-V02-260317

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Key to Document Status Codes

Work in Progress	An incomplete document, designed to guide discussion and generate feedback that may include several alternative requirements for consideration.
Draft	A document that is considered largely complete, but lacking review by members and vendors. Drafts are susceptible to substantial change during the review process.
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1 SCOPE

1.1 Introduction and Overview

This Gateway Device Security document specifies best common practices to serve as an industry metric for retail and leased devices (gateways, routers, access points, and cable modems) for security—this includes manufacturing process, supply chain, hardware and firmware configuration procedures, software, and management protocols.

1.2 Purpose of Document

The purpose of this document is to provide a common set of requirements and best practices for vendors of gateway devices (routers, access points, etc.) and cable modems that are agreed upon by the operators and manufacturers. Note that each operator may have additional or different requirements from those specified in this document.

The requirements and best practices cover the following areas.

1. Hardware/manufacturing considerations
2. “Default” (out-of-box) security
3. Secure boot and root of trust
4. Software/firmware verification
5. Encryption requirements (in-transit and at-rest data)
6. Physical security
7. Privacy

The requirements and best practices elicited in this document are expected to be applied to “production” devices, i.e., devices that are to be deployed in an operational network. Devices meant for demonstration and/or compliance testing, certification, or lab trials may not necessarily incorporate these requirements and best practices unless the device is explicitly being tested/validated for conformance to this document.

1.3 Use of the Document

These security best common practices are guidelines and do not constitute a CableLabs security specification. Therefore, the security practices herein are not prescriptive. Because security needs change over time and different networks may be architected and configured differently, cable operators and manufacturers may deviate from these security best practices. The guidelines in this document are focused on operational security based on existing industry practices. These security guidelines do not expressly cover protocol interoperability or implementation.

These security best common practices may be updated as needed. CableLabs’ Gateway Device Security Working Group will continue to work with cable Internet providers and cable gateway device manufacturers to update these guidelines to be in accordance with industry best practices.

2 REFERENCES

2.1 Informative References

This document references standards published by groups in the European Union and North America to ensure the requirements in this document are in alignment with them. They are included in the list below, and links are provided.

[OTIS BCP]	CableLabs Zero Trust and Infrastructure Security BCP, https://www.cablelabs.com/specifications/CL-GL-0TIS-BCP
[2024 CWE 25]	2024 Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE™) Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses, https://cwe.mitre.org/top25/archive/2024/2024_cwe_top25.html
[BCMO]	NIST Special Publication 800-38A, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation, https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38a.pdf
[BCMO-CCM]	NIST Special Publication 800-38C, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality, https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38c.pdf
[BCMO-GCM]	NIST Special Publication 800-38D, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38d.pdf
[BCMO-XTS-AES]	NIST Special Publication 800-38E, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS-AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices, https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38e.pdf
[BCMO-Key Wrap]	NIST Special Publication 800-38F, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping, https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38f.pdf
[CA SB-327]	California SB-327 Information privacy: connected devices, 2018, https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB327
[CVSS v3.1]	Common Vulnerability Scoring System v3.1, https://www.first.org/cvss/v3.1/specification-document
[CycloneDX]	OWASP CycloneDX SBOM, https://cyclonedx.org/specification/
[FIPS 140-3]	NIST FIPS 140-3, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, March 2019, https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/140/3/final
[FIPS 180-4]	NIST FIPS 180-4, Secure Hash Standard, August 2015, https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf
[IEEE 1588-2019]	IEEE Standard for a Precision Clock Synchronization Protocol for Networked Measurement and Control Systems, (Precision Time Protocol), https://standards.ieee.org/standard/1588-2019.html
[NIST 800-56A]	NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3.pdf
[NIST 800-56B]	NIST Special Publication 800-56-B Revision 2, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Using Integer Factorization Cryptography, https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Br2.pdf
[NIST 800-56C]	NIST Special Publication 800-56C, Recommendation for Key-Derivation Methods in Key-Establishment Schemes, https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Cr2.pdf
[NIST 800-63-3]	NIST Special Publication 800-63 Revision 3, Digital Identity Guidelines, https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/sp800-63-3.html
[NIST 800-63B]	NIST Special Publication 800-63B, Digital Identity Guidelines – Authentication and Lifecycle Management, https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/sp800-63b.html
[NIST 800-88r1]	NIST Special Publication 800-88r1, Guidelines for Media Sanitization, http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-88r1
[NIST 800-133]	NIST Special Publication 800-133 Revision 2, Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation, https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-133r2.pdf

[NIST 8259A]	NISTIR 8259A, IoT Device Cybersecurity Capability Core Baseline, https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8259A
[NIST 8425A]	NISTIR 8425A, Recommended Cybersecurity Requirements for Consumer-Grade Router Products, https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8425A
[OWASP]	Open Web Application Security Project® (OWASP®), https://owasp.org/
[OWASP 10]	OWASP Top 10, https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/
[OWASP PC]	OWASP Proactive Controls, https://owasp.org/www-project-proactive-controls/
[OWASP WSTG]	OWASP Web Security Testing Guide, https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/stable/
[RFC 8446]	IETF RFC 8446, The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446
[RFC 5905]	Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Specification, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5905
[SBOM Elements]	2025 Minimum Elements for SBOM, https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/2025-minimum-elements-software-bill-materials-sbom
[SBOM Framing]	Framing Software Component Transparency, https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/framing-software-component-transparency-2024
[SECv4.0]	DOCSIS 4.0 Security Specification, https://www.cablelabs.com/specifications/CM-SP-SECv4.0
[SPDX]	The Software Package Data Exchange, https://spdx.dev/specifications/
[SWID]	Guidelines for creation of interoperable Software Identification Tags, https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2016/NIST.IR.8060.pdf
[WFA Security]	Wi-Fi Certified WPA2/WPA3 Specification, https://www.wi-fi.org/discover-wi-fi/security

3 TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

This document uses the following terms.

cryptographic material	Any material/data essential for encryption, decryption, verification, and/or authentication operations, including but not limited to asymmetric keys, symmetric keys, nonces, seeds for random functions, and parameters used for cryptographic functions.
data at rest	Data stored on a device and/or persistent storage medium that may be protected as required by encryption, access controls, and physical security.
data in transit	Data moving across networks (e.g., between client and server or between devices) that may be protected as required by transport encryption (TLS, VPN, SSH, etc.).
data in use	Data being actively processed by applications or systems that typically resides in volatile memory (RAM, CPU caches, registers, etc.) and may be protected by TEE as required (including side-channel protections).
interface	Any physical, logical, network, or virtual communication port implemented on the device, including but not limited to the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • local communications ports (serial, USB), • network interfaces (Ethernet, Wi-Fi, BT, etc.), • IP listen ports/sockets, • virtualized interfaces, and • interfaces meant for operator management of device.
operator interface	An interface used to allow the network operator to access the device (either locally or over the network) primarily for management and configuration of the device.
end-user interface	An end-user (non-management) interface primarily meant for regular operations and data exchange.
persistent keys	Keys used in symmetric or asymmetric cryptographic operations that usually persist through device reboots and are used multiple times across different cryptographic sessions.
secure channel	Any data exchange channel that provides confidentiality (through encryption) and integrity protection. Establishment of the secure channel includes authentication of one or both endpoints.
tamper-evident	Pertains to mechanisms (mechanical or electronic) applied to reveal any unauthorized access to a device or its components. Examples of tamper-evident mechanisms can include but are not limited to security tape or seal that is damaged or destroyed in the process of unauthorized access, pressure pads, infrared/light sensors, and trigger switches.
tamper-resistant	Pertains to mechanisms (mechanical or electronic) applied to hinder and/or deter unauthorized access to a device or its components. Examples of tamper-resistant mechanisms can include but are not limited to one-way screws or bolts and secure cryptoprocessors.
trust anchors	Public keys—certificates for which trust is assumed and not derived—that are used to verify digital signatures and validate certificate chains.

4 ABBREVIATIONS

This document uses the following abbreviations.

AEAD	authenticated encryption with additional data
AP	access point
BCP	best common practices
BOM	bill of materials
BPI+	Baseline Private Interface Plus
BT	Bluetooth
CVSS	Common Vulnerability Scoring System
CSRF	cross-site request forgery
DE	data encryption
EAE	early authentication and encryption
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standards
FSBL	first stage boot loader
GDS	gateway device security
HR	general hardware requirements
IoT	Internet of Things
IP	Internet Protocol
JTAG	Joint Test Action Group
MAC	media access control
mDNS	Multicast Domain Name System
MI	management interface
MoCA	Multimedia over Coax Alliance
MSO	multiple system operator
OEM	original equipment manufacturer
OOB	out of box
OTP	one-time password
OS	operating system
PFS	perfect forward secrecy
PII	personally identifiable information
PKI	public key infrastructure
ROM	read-only memory
SB	secure boot
SBOM	software bill of materials
SNMP	Simple Network Management Protocol
SoC	system-on-chip
SSDP	Simple Service Discovery Protocol
SSH	Secure Shell
SWD	Serial Wire Debug
TLS	Transport Layer Security
TS	time synchronization
UI	user interface
UPnP	Universal Plug and Play
USB	Universal Serial Bus
WAN	wide area network
WPA	Wi-Fi Protected Access

5 REQUIREMENTS COMPLIANCE

The following requirement key words are used within this document.

- **SHALL:** This word means that the definition is as an absolute requirement of this document.
- **SHALL NOT:** This phrase means that the definition is an absolute prohibition of this document.
- **SHOULD:** This word means that there may exist valid reasons in particular circumstances to ignore a particular item, but the full implications must be understood and carefully weighed before choosing a different course.

5.1 Compliance Classification

The requirements outlined in this document cover a wide range of criteria, and it is important that there be a mechanism by which a manufacturer can prove/demonstrate that its product complies with the requirements. Depending on the requirement, compliance checks are done by one of the following verification steps.

5.1.1 Compliance through Disclosure and Documentation

Certain requirements, such as disclosing all open source components used and their versions, are met in the form of relevant documents and links to information about how the manufacturer incorporated a specific feature in its product.

5.1.2 Compliance through Attestation by Manufacturer

Requirements that are not easily testable (either manually or using tools) need to be attested by the manufacturer, and compliance is confirmed through a legal agreement or disclosure. The customer/client also has the right to test/assess for compliance and not require explicit permissions for it (e.g., pen testing, destructive testing).

5.1.3 Compliance through Automated Testing/Tools

Requirements that can be validated by use of automated tooling will be tested by providing artifacts (e.g., binary firmware images, flash dumps, source code, or similar) into a tool for analysis. This will be done by the customer/client or their authorized consultants/vendor. Results will be analyzed to ensure accuracy.

5.1.4 Compliance through Manual Verification

Requirements that can be validated by manual analysis are to be tested by basic dynamic testing (e.g., network scans) or an in-depth hardware or firmware penetration test (as needed). This is done by the customer/client or their authorized consultants/vendor.

6 TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS

The requirements are categorized in the following functional areas.

1. General hardware requirements (HR)
2. Secure boot (SB)
3. Secure upgrade (SU)
4. Initial/out-of-box configuration (OOB)
5. Data-at-rest protection (DRP)
6. Data exchange encryption/integrity (DE)
7. Securing cryptographic material (KEY)
8. Physical and remote management interfaces (MI)
9. Diagnostic, debug, and development access (DIAG)
10. Logging (LOG)
11. Time synchronization (TS)
12. Software BOMs and software updates (SBOM)
13. Network services and listening processes (including APIs) (NETS)
14. Network access mechanisms (Wi-Fi/Ethernet) (NETA)
15. Additional requirements (AR)

Although this document focuses on the best practices for the overall device, it should be noted that devices typically operate within the context of the network infrastructure and that the security and protection of the device depends on the overall security posture of the network infrastructure. This document advocates for the principles laid out by the CableLabs guideline on Zero Trust Architecture [0TIS BCP]; more specifically, it is recommended that devices do not rely on network location, network identifiers, or network metadata as trust factors.

6.1 General Hardware Requirements

Table 1 - General Hardware Requirements (HR)

REQ#	Description	Status/Comment
HR-001	No hardware-based serial consoles SHALL be left open or active in production devices.	
HR-002	Any hardware-based connectors or ports used for debugging, testing and/or provisioning (e.g., JTAG/SWD) SHALL be disabled in production devices.	
HR-003	A device that is expected to be deployed in a location outside an operator's secure facility SHALL include tamper-evident capabilities.	
HR-004	A device that is expected to be deployed in a location outside an operator's secure facility SHOULD include tamper-resistant capabilities.	
HR-005	A manufacturer SHALL provide a detailed component list of hardware for a device.	

6.1.1 HR Requirements Clarifications

HR-001/HR-002

The hardware-based serial console and its connectors or ports need to be electronically and/or physically disabled so that both the ability to manipulate the device and the ability to read the information from the device is prevented in production scenarios. The intent is to ensure that applicable hardware interfaces on the devices are secured and only accessible by authorized entities such as the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and/or system-on-chip (SoC)

manufacturer that is enabling the console or the connectors or ports for debugging/troubleshooting through secure and robust manufacturer-specific mechanisms.

HR-003

The expectation is that the device is deployed outside the operator's facility (e.g., subscriber's premise). If the device has the capability to detect a tamper event, it is recommended that the device report this event over the administrative interface.

HR-004

Whereas HR-003 applies to deployments where a device is in a facility/location that is not easily accessible, HR-004 applies to situations where the device may be openly accessible. Tamper-resistant mechanisms can be software-based and/or physical controls.

HR-005

The expectation is to provide a list of components (chipset, GPU/CPU, flash/memory, network adapter, etc.) that have processing capability and are applicable to security and/or can be used to access the device (through physical access or network access). The list includes the physical ports (USB, ethernet, serial, etc.). The list is to be provided to the operator and any test lab working on behalf of the operator.

6.2 Secure Boot Requirements

Table 2 - Secure Boot Requirements (SB)

REQ#	Description	Status/Comment
SB-001	A device SHALL verify the integrity of the firmware prior to transferring execution to it.	
SB-002	A device SHALL have a hardware root of trust that is used to validate the integrity and authenticity of the bootloader and firmware.	
SB-003	A device SHOULD have an anti-rollback mechanism to prevent any downgrade of the firmware during the boot process.	
SB-004	A device SHALL validate the integrity and authenticity of each software component(s) prior to execution.	
SB-005	Device firmware SHOULD be stored in encrypted form on the device.	

6.2.1 SB Requirements Clarifications

SB-001

The intent is for every stage of the boot process to be verified. The mechanism of integrity verification is expected to be implementation dependent. In the context of this document, "firmware" refers to the software embedded in the device's hardware that provides the essential instructions for the hardware to function and communicate with higher-level software.

SB-003

The specific mechanism to prevent downgrade is implementation dependent. This requirement needs to be balanced with SU-002 to ensure that the recovery mechanism is not abused to perform a downgrade attack.

SB-004

Whereas SB-001 ensures that the device starts in a trusted operational environment, SB-004 ensures that only trusted software components are executed in the operational environment.

SB-005

Refer to Sections 6.5 and 6.6 for requirements related to encryption.

6.3 Secure Upgrade Requirements

Table 3 - Secure Upgrade Requirements (SU)

REQ#	Description	Status/Comment
SU-001	A device SHALL verify the integrity and authenticity of any new firmware that it downloads.	
SU-002	A device SHALL gracefully recover to a working state using the last known good image in the event a software upgrade fails without enabling image downgrade attacks.	
SU-003	All firmware updates SHALL be digitally signed by the manufacturer and the signature be verifiable to a trusted source.	
SU-004	Any firmware updates SHALL be delivered to the device with integrity protection.	
SU-005	A device SHOULD accept firmware updates in encrypted format.	
SU-006	A device SHALL have a mechanism to prevent accepting an obsolete or revoked version of firmware.	

6.3.1 SU Requirements Clarifications

SU-001

Integrity and authenticity can typically be verified by checking that the firmware is signed and the signature is valid. Other equivalent mechanisms based on cryptography recommendations in this document may be utilized (e.g., HMAC-based cryptographic hash functions). It is recommended that the manufacturer provides information on their verification process.

SU-002

The intent is to avoid the device becoming "bricked." Refer to SU-006 for mechanisms to allow the use of "working" firmware.

SU-003

It is possible that the firmware/software updates are digitally co-signed by the operator.

SU-005

The intent here is to protect any embedded secret or cryptographic material. Refer to Sections 6.5 and 6.6 for requirements related to encryption.

SU-006

The specific mechanism for allowing use of older firmware will depend on the type of device (e.g., cable modem, gateway, or router) and the manufacturer. Note that this mechanism has to work in conjunction with any mechanisms used in relation to SB-003. For cable modems, the DOCSIS 4.0 Security specification [SECv4.0] specifies the mechanisms for anti-rollback support.

6.4 Initial/Out-of-Box Configuration Requirements

Table 4 - Initial/Out-of-Box Configuration Requirements (OOB)

REQ#	Description	Status/Comment
OOB-001	A device SHALL NOT allow an immutable login credential (username/password).	
OOB-002	A device SHALL store passwords and other secret information in a salted and hashed form.	
OOB-003	A device SHALL NOT transmit a credential received in the clear for authentication.	
OOB-004	A device SHALL be configured only with device unique passwords in default configuration.	

REQ#	Description	Status/Comment
OOB-005	A device SHALL disable optional network services by default.	
OOB-006	A device SHOULD require that any device-unique default password be changed upon initial setup.	
OOB-007	A device SHOULD support changing the host name where applicable of the device on the network.	
OOB-008	A device SHALL NOT allow remote access to the user administrative interface unless a device-unique password is specified, or the initial password has been changed by the user.	
OOB-009	A device SHALL be able to reset to the default factory settings and erase all customer-related PII.	
OOB-010	A device SHALL have the means to authenticate itself to the operator's network.	
OOB-011	A device SHALL have a logical identifier that is cryptographically attestable.	
OOB-012	A device SHALL NOT allow a weak password or credential to be set.	
OOB-013	A device SHOULD support passwordless authentication frameworks (e.g., passkeys).	

6.4.1 OOB Requirements Clarifications

OOB-001/OOB-012

It is recommended to use a passphrase instead of a password. If a password is to be used, it is recommended that the password have a minimum length of 12 characters and not be easily guessable; the maximum supported value should be no less than that recommended by section 5.1.1.2 of [NIST 800-63B].

OOB-002

It is recommended to protect any form of secret information such as PINs or answers to challenge questions.

Refer to section 5.1.1.2 of [NIST 800-63B] for guidance on

- password storage,
- salt size,
- hash function strength, and
- the cost factor of key derivation functions.

This document recommends the following:

- deprecated hashing functions like SHA1 and MD5 are not to be used.

OOB-003

Refer to NETS-001 for a recommendation. It is expected that if the credential is in the form of asymmetric credentials, then the public part of the credential can be sent without protection.

OOB-004

Refer to OOB-001 for guidance on password strength.

OOB-005

Examples of optional services are UPnP (Universal Plug and Play) and SSDP (Simple Service Discovery Protocol) or even MoCA (Multimedia over Coax Alliance). Refer to Section 5.11 for more details.

OOB-008

Remote access to the administrative interface includes access to the device over the network through allowable protocols like SSH, HTTPS or equivalent mechanisms. OOB-004 specifies that a device be configured with device-unique password and the changed password be strong as per OOB-001 and OOB-012. It is expected that access to an interface that allows setting or changing the password will always be available.

OOB-009

The expectation is to ensure that any customer data (e.g., keys, passwords, confidential data, and any other data that legally needs to be protected from disclosure etc.) is cleared out, and the device is in factory out-of-box state to be provisioned as a new device. Any logs that are retained needs to be sanitized as well (see Section 6.10, "Logging Requirements," for details).

OOB-010

The device is expected to authenticate and identify itself through some device specific logical identifier and is implementation specific. For CMs, it is recommended to use the Device Certificate Id. It is also recommended that the identifier be attestable (See OOB-011); and if manufacturer specific values like a serial number are used, it is recommended to namespace them.

OOB-011

For specific recommendations around attestable identifiers, refer to [OTIS BCP] for identity and access management of network elements. Details on SoC identifiers will be provided in a forthcoming DHS A 1.0 BCP document.

6.5 Data-at-Rest Protection Requirements*Table 5 - Data-at-Rest Protection Requirements (DRP)*

REQ#	Description	Status/Comment
DRP-001	Any confidential or sensitive data/content in flash memory SHALL be encrypted.	

6.5.1 DRP Requirements Clarifications**DRP-001**

Confidential or sensitive data include device-specific data, operational information (e.g., Wi-Fi SSID/password), and data that legally need to be protected from disclosure. It is recommended that all data—including both firmware and operational/configuration data—be encrypted. Refer to KEY-002 for guidance on storage of encryption/decryption keys. If the firmware is also encrypted, it is possible that the mechanism to encrypt the firmware (e.g., usage of key/algorithm) may be different from the mechanisms used to encrypt the data.

6.6 Data Exchange Encryption/Integrity Requirements*Table 6 - Data Exchange Encryption/Integrity Requirements (DE)*

REQ#	Description	Status/Comment
DE-002	A device SHALL only use approved and non-deprecated cipher suites for TLS connections.	
DE-003	A device's factory default configuration SHALL select key agreement protocols that provide forward secrecy (FS).	
DE-004	A device's factory default configuration SHALL select encryption algorithms that provide authenticated encryption with additional data (AEAD).	
DE-005	The AEAD data SHOULD be used to provide additional context for the encryption.	
DE-006	A device's factory default configuration SHALL select a hash function that has equivalent security strength to SHA2 or higher.	
DE-007	A device SHALL support disabling a given cipher suite.	
DE-008	A device using TLS SHALL use TLS 1.2 or higher.	
DE-009	A device using TLS SHOULD negotiate the highest supported version.	

6.6.1 DE Requirements Clarifications

DE-002

The list of recommended/approved cipher suites includes TLS 1.3 non-deprecated cipher suites [RFC 8446]. Additionally, for DOCSIS cable modems, the TLS 1.2 cipher suites specified in the following documents are allowed.

- the [SECV4.0] specification

Additional cipher suites may be explicitly required by the operator to support legacy devices.

DE-003

Forward secrecy is defined in section 7.6 of [NIST 800-56A].

The following key types are recommended in key-agreement schemes.

- For elliptic curve-based protocols, use protocols from curves in [NIST 800-56C].
- For RSA-based protocols, use keys as per [NIST 800-56B], with 4096-bit keys preferred.
- For TLS connections, see the clarification for DE-002 for allowed cipher suites.

For backwards compatibility, devices using DOCSIS BPI+ v1 are allowed even though it does not provide FS.

DE-004

It is expected that given a choice of available cipher suites, if a cipher suite that provides AEAD is available and supported, then that cipher suite be selected for usage over non-AEAD cipher suites.

DE-006

It is expected that usage of SHA1 and/or MD5 be deprecated and be used only to support legacy services and/or backward compatibility. Refer to [FIPS 180-4] for correct usage of secure hash algorithms.

DE-007

It is recommended that two different cipher suites be available for a given cryptographic function to support continued operation in the face of a cryptographic vulnerability. It is expected that disabling a cipher suite will typically be done by a network operator or manufacturer when such a cipher suite is deemed unsuitable or compromised for the intended usage.

6.7 Securing Cryptographic Material Requirements

Table 7 - Securing Cryptographic Material Requirements (KEY)

REQ#	Description	Status/Comment
KEY-001	Any private keys used by the device for asymmetric cryptography and any persistent symmetric keys SHALL be stored in tamper-resistant hardware-based secure storage or protected by a key-encryption key stored in tamper-resistant hardware.	
KEY-002	Any persistent keys used by the device SHALL be stored in tamper-resistant hardware-based secure storage or protected by a key-encryption key stored in tamper-resistant hardware.	
KEY-003	The device SHALL maintain integrity protected trust store to store any certificate (trust anchors) the device uses to validate certificates from remote end-points.	
KEY-004	The gateway SHALL provide a mechanism to securely update trust anchors.	
KEY-005	The gateway SHOULD provide a mechanism to securely renew any certificates and associated key pairs issued to the device.	
KEY-006	Any device specific cryptographic material SHALL be unique for each device.	

6.7.1 KEY Requirements Clarifications

KEY-001

Tamper-resistant storage mechanisms are expected to be implementation-specific (e.g., Microchip ECC608B module). For symmetric keys, the requirement applies only to persistent symmetric keys, i.e., temporal and session keys that are not reused do not need secure storage but may require that they be used only within a secure processor.

KEY-002

Persistent keys are different from ephemeral keys that are generated and/or derived for each cryptographic session.

KEY-004/KEY-005

The manufacturer is to provide documentation for the mechanism(s). It is possible that the trust anchor for validation of firmware (secure boot) may not be updatable. Currently, certificates issued to devices for DOCSIS-based networks are not upgradeable.

KEY-005

Devices might not have the mechanisms to generate new private keys (e.g., in a crypto module).

KEY-006

The intent is to ensure any cryptographic material (e.g., keys) that the device uses to identify itself (to assert its identity, any device specific configuration, establishing authenticated sessions, etc.) is derived in a manner to ensure it is unique for that device.

6.8 Physical and Remote Management Interfaces Requirements

Table 8 - Physical and Remote Management Interfaces Requirements (MI)

REQ#	Description	Status/Comment
MI-001	A device SHALL receive any operational configuration over a secure channel.	
MI-002	A device SHALL only use secure protocols to establish any control and management channel(s).	
MI-003	A device SHALL disable by default any physical and/or local communications ports that are not required for normal operations.	
MI-004	A device SHALL support multi-factor authentication for administrative access.	
MI-005	A device SHALL implement mechanisms to prevent brute force login/access attacks as recommended in [NIST 800-63B].	
MI-006	A device that provides multiple simultaneous access sessions SHALL limit administrators to one session per login credential by default.	
MI-007	A device SHALL NOT expose end-user administrative access on a public/Internet facing interface by default.	
MI-008	Devices supporting advanced architectures such as virtual interfaces SHALL secure the virtual interfaces with the same controls as applied to physical interfaces to prevent unauthorized access.	
MI-009	A device SHALL require periodic reauthentication (or authentication) following a configurable period of inactivity.	
MI-010	Login sessions to a device SHALL have a configurable session inactivity timeout not to exceed 30 minutes.	
MI-011	Devices SHALL support enabling and disabling any service or protocol and all associated ports or interfaces.	
MI-012	Devices SHALL validate all inputs to the device to prevent improper resource use.	
MI-013	Devices SHALL enable secure device management protocols only on interfaces over which they are expected to be used for the operation of the device.	
MI-014	All end-user interfaces and protocols on the device SHALL be documented by the manufacturer.	

6.8.1 MI Requirements Clarifications

MI-001

For CMs, the operational configuration is provided through a config file that is secured when EAE (early authentication and encryption) is enabled. See [SECv4.0] for details on EAE.

MI-002

For example, if SNMP is being used and the device supports SNMP v3, an operator may enable SNMP v2 or v1 explicitly.

MI-004

The requirement is for the device to be able to support multi-factor authentication so that it can be enabled by the operator. See section 4.2.1 of [NIST 800-63B] for recommended multi-factor authenticator types. Support for multi-factor authentication can be in the form of a software-based implementation. The manufacturer may require that the device be online in order to support multi-factor authentication. An example of support for multi-factor authentication is the Linux PAM-based framework to support secondary authentication.

MI-006

In most common usages, a single administrative session is sufficient to perform administrative operations. If multiple sessions are being opened simultaneously, it can indicate a security event (e.g., an unauthorized access), a possible erroneous access (e.g., multiple authorized individuals accessing simultaneously), or a legitimate but rare multiple-session access (e.g., for debug/diagnostic purposes). Getting a notification of simultaneous access and enforcement of a single session by default allows the administrator to take appropriate action depending on the situation.

MI-007

A device is expected to have multiple interfaces including but not limited to Ethernet, Wi-Fi, and virtualized interfaces. During normal operations, these interfaces can have different accessibility scope:

- accessible only on a local/LAN IP subnet for the subscriber,
- accessible only on the WAN side by the network operator's infrastructure if it is also the operator management interface,
- accessible by any endpoint within certain physical proximity of the device (administrative access disabled by default), or
- accessible by any endpoint on the Internet (administrative access disabled by default).

Documentation for all operator interfaces needs to be provided to the operator.

MI-009

Refer to sections 4.3.3 and 7.2 of [NIST 800-63B] for recommended reauthentication timeout and periodic reauthentication.

MI-010

The session inactivity timeout needs to be provided as a global configurable option.

MI-011

A device is expected to disable by default any services that are not required for the device to become operational. Additional services are to be enabled based on configured operational configuration. Services like mDNS, SSDP/UPnP, etc., that are meant to operate within a subnet should not respond on management interfaces.

MI-012

Validating inputs can include using best practices for input sanitization (sections C4 and C5 of [OWASP PC]).

MI-013

Management protocols like TR-069/TR-369/SNMP/RESTCONF are not to be enabled on end-user interfaces. However, it is possible, such as in the case of DOCSIS CMCI interface, for SNMP to be enabled on that interface to

support a self-install deployment model. In such instances, the access is to be authenticated according to best practices specified in this document.

MI-014

Documentation is typically provided in an instruction manual and includes use of supported protocols available on the interfaces (i.e., what is available on the device).

6.9 Diagnostic, Debug, and Development Access Requirements

Table 9 - Diagnostic, Debug, and Development Access Requirements (DIAG)

REQ#	Description	Status/Comment
DIAG-001	All access methods SHALL be documented (including any diagnostic access methods by supplier).	
DIAG-002	Devices SHALL support enabling/disabling all methods of access to the device (local and remote).	

6.9.1 DIAG Requirements Clarifications

DIAG-001

This requirement works in conjunction with MI-003 to ensure any access methods are disabled/secured by default. This information can be documented in an instruction manual if applicable and/or provided to the operator as part of an agreement.

DIAG-002

This includes any mechanisms covered by MI-003, MI-008, and MI-011.

6.10 Logging Requirements

Table 10 - Logging Requirements (LOG)

REQ#	Description	Status/Comment
LOG-001	A device SHALL support logging of all administrative events.	
LOG-002	A device SHOULD support remote logging via syslog or equivalent standard protocol.	
LOG-003	A device SHOULD allow two or more remote logging endpoints to be defined.	
LOG-004	A device SHALL use a secure channel for sending all remote logging traffic.	
LOG-005	A device SHALL NOT log any sensitive information, including but not limited to PII (e.g., passwords, encryption keys, API keys, usernames) for unsuccessful login attempts, session keys, or other forms of credentials.	

6.10.1 LOG Requirements Clarifications

LOG-001

The specific mechanism of logging will depend on the types of events being logged and is beyond the scope of this document.

Administrative events are events mandated by respective specifications.

Administrative events can result from changes/modifications to the operational configuration of the device and its services or can be notifications generated by the system in relation to the state of running processes. Some examples of administrative events are

- multiple failed login attempts,
- change of an administrative and/or user password,

- change in the firewall rules,
- change in the DNS or other network configuration, and
- a process or service exits abruptly.

LOG-004

This requirement is only applicable if LOG-002 is implemented.

Refer to the Data Encryption/Integrity section, specifically DE-002 and DE-004, for recommended encryption methods.

LOG-005

In the event that any customer data legally need to be protected from disclosure, such data will not be logged.

6.11 Time Synchronization Requirements

Table 11 - Time Synchronization Requirements (TS)

REQ#	Description	Status/Comment
TS-001	A device SHALL support the capability to synchronize time using a standards-based time synchronization protocol.	
TS-002	A device SHOULD support use of authenticated time-synchronization protocols.	

6.11.1 TS Requirements Clarifications**TS-001**

It is expected that the network will provide the mechanism to synchronize the time on the device.

Common protocols include NTP [RFC 5905] and PTP [IEEE 1588-2019]. This requirement helps ensure that time-dependent operations (e.g., certificate validation, incident response) function correctly.

6.12 Software BOMs and Software Updates Requirements

Table 12 - Software BOMs and Software Updates Requirements (SBOM)

REQ#	Description	Status/Comment
SBOM-001	A manufacturer SHALL provide an SBOM that includes the following baseline attributes as specified in [SBOM Framing] and [SBOM Elements]: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • author name, • timestamp, • type, • primary component, • component name, • version, • supplier name, and • component hash. 	
SBOM-002	A manufacturer SHOULD provide the following baseline attributes as specified in [SBOM Framing] and [SBOM Elements]: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • unique identifier if the identifier is globally unique, • relationship, • license (for the primary component), and • copyright notice. 	
SBOM-003	A device SHALL provide downgrade protection to prevent inadvertent installation of a prior version of firmware that may contain known vulnerabilities.	
SBOM-004	A manufacturer SHALL NOT use software components/libraries that have publicly known vulnerabilities of [CVSS v3.1] base severity level of medium and higher.	

REQ#	Description	Status/Comment
SBOM-005	A manufacturer SHALL maintain a list of all software/libraries used and provide the specific version of each component.	
SBOM-006	A device SHALL use a [FIPS 140-3]-compliant version of a cryptographic library for new protocol implementations.	
SBOM-007	A manufacturer SHALL NOT use a deprecated version of software components/libraries.	
SBOM-008	A manufacturer SHOULD use the most recent stable versions of the software/libraries.	
SBOM-009	All firmware updates SHOULD be capable of being digitally co-signed by the operator.	
SBOM-010	A manufacturer SHOULD upgrade any software components/libraries with known applicable security vulnerabilities in a timely manner.	
SBOM-011	Where allowable by contractual, legal, and regulatory requirements, discovered security vulnerabilities SHALL be disclosed to the operator and applicable partners.	
SBOM-012	A manufacturer SHOULD include information on any additional software component, such as a mobile app or cloud service, that allows access to the device configuration and operation.	

6.12.1 SBOM Requirements Clarifications

SBOM-001/SBOM-002

It is expected that the SBOM be provided in a machine-readable or parsable format (e.g., [CycloneDX] and/or [SPDX]). Refer to section 2.5 of [SBOM Framing] for a mapping of attributes across various formats.

SBOM-003

Note that downgrade protection is different from the ability to roll back to a previous working version if the new version breaks a certain functionality of the device. The intent is to prevent unintentional rollback to a previous version. Refer to [NIST 8259A] for guidance. The version numbers referred to here in reference to downgrade protection are different from the DOCSIS 4.0 Security Version Numbers (SVN) used for anti-rollback.

SBOM-004

Note that software components also include the underlying operating system, system libraries, and bootloaders. This is intended to apply to known vulnerabilities at the time of device firmware release. In certain circumstances (e.g., software components for legacy features or specialized capabilities), it is possible to not have feasible alternatives. Such situations need to be handled on a case-by-case basis.

SBOM-005

It is recommended that this list be maintained in a commonly used machine-readable format (e.g., [SPDX], [CycloneDX]). The list may be provided to the operator as part of an agreement.

SBOM-006

There are limited notable legacy exceptions to this requirement, like DOCSIS versions below 3.1 and SNMPv3 key derivation functions (uses SHA1).

SBOM-007

The intent here is to avoid using deprecated software and versions at the time of the firmware/software release. A specific version of software may be deprecated after it has been used in a release. In such cases, SBOM-004 and SBOM-010 allow upgrading to a non-deprecated version.

SBOM-008

It is recommended to use the latest stable version of the library to the extent possible. This may not be possible in all situations, however, such as when there is a non-backward compatible API/function change in the latest version that may not work with the rest of the software.

SBOM-010

It is recommended that any software components/libraries with known security vulnerabilities (publicly provided or identified through internal process) be upgraded in the subsequent release. It is recommended that software components and libraries are always kept up to date in each release, regardless of known applicable security vulnerabilities as part of life-cycle management, including avoiding software that is no longer supported. This reduces the difficulty of update when a vulnerability is detected. The expectation is that this is handled on a case-by-case basis.

SBOM-011

The specific procedure and timeline for such disclosures are beyond the scope of this document.

SBOM-012

It is recommended that the manufacturer include information about supported management and/or configuration protocols supported by the device and corresponding software applications and/or cloud services if applicable (and if provided by the manufacturer).

6.13 Network Services and Listening Processes Requirements

Table 13 - Network Services and Listening Processes Requirements (NETS)

REQ#	Description	Status/Comment
NETS-001	A device that serves a Web UI SHALL use HTTPS to serve the UI.	
NETS-002	A device that serves a Web UI SHALL follow [OWASP WSTG] security best practices (CSRF, session management, etc.).	
NETS-003	A device that uses TLS SHALL use TLS 1.2 or higher.	
NETS-004	A device SHALL NOT enable protocols primarily meant to operate on a local network on its WAN interface under any circumstances.	
NETS-005	A device SHALL NOT implement or enable Telnet, FTP, or any other services that do not provide confidentiality, integrity, and authentication.	
NETS-006	A firewall on the device SHALL support ingress and egress filtering of IPv4 and IPv6 packets.	
NETS-007	A firewall on the device SHALL permit only required protocols and services by default.	
NETS-008	A device that serves a Web UI SHOULD support mutual authentication for operator-only administrative interfaces.	
NETS-009	Any additional software components and/or cloud services capable of configuring and/or managing the device SHALL be accessible only after network authentication and authorization.	
NETS-010	A device SHALL NOT enable UPnP IGD functionality even when it enables UPnP on the LAN interface.	

6.13.1 NETS Requirements Clarifications**NETS-001**

It is recommended that any services and traffic to HTTP be redirected to HTTPS. If a TLS domain certificate is not feasible, a self-signed certificate should be used. Note that DOCSIS networks specify access over HTTP on the CMCI interface that currently does not require TLS.

NETS-002

Refer to [OWASP] and [OWASP 10] for more details.

NETS-003

Recommended to use TLS 1.3.

NETS-004

Certain home networking protocols like SSDP/UPnP, mDNS, etc., are meant to be operated within a local network segment, and services utilizing such protocols should not listen and/or respond on WAN and/or Internet-facing interfaces.

NETS-005

Insecure protocols such as telnet, FTP, and TCP Small Services are to be kept disabled as well.

NET-007

It is recommended that a set of firewall rules be available in the form of an easy-to-apply profile (e.g., high/medium/low). It is recommended that firewalls implement a least privileged design restricting services and protocols to only those required to deliver services to the customer.

NET-008

In the context of a web user interface (UI), the most common mechanism is based on TLS. The expectation is that the client and server have the keys that tie to the root of trust. Other newer mechanisms like FIDO and PAKE-based authentication can perform mutual authentication using different methods.

NET-009

In the context of this document, network authentication and authorization refers to the protocols and processes used to ensure that any access to external cloud/network services is authenticated using standard network authentication protocols (e.g., HTTPS/TLS, OAuth, SSH) and that the authenticated entity provides proof that authorizes it to access the specific service (using standard authorization protocols like OAuth tokens, SAML assertions, or equivalent).

6.14 Network Access Mechanisms Requirements

Table 14 - Network Access Mechanisms (Wi-Fi/Ethernet) Requirements (NETA)

REQ#	Description	Status/Comment
NETA-001	A device that hosts a Wi-Fi access point (or mesh controller) SHALL use Wi-Fi credentials that are unique for each customer.	
NETA-002	A device that hosts a Wi-Fi access point (or mesh controller) SHALL enable WPA2 [WFA Security] or higher by default.	
NETA-003	A device that has wired ethernet ports SHOULD support 802.1X network authentication on those ports.	

6.14.1 NETA Requirements Clarifications**NETA-002**

WPA3 is recommended. See [WFA Security] for more details. Anything below WPA2 is not to be allowed.

NETA-003

The intent is to ensure all ports are secured and avoid misuse (e.g., theft of service, unauthorized access) where the device is deployed in a public setting (ports can be accessed by unauthorized individuals).

6.15 Additional Requirements

Table 15 - Additional Requirements (AR)

REQ#	Description	Status/Comment
AR-001	A device that includes any audio, video, or other sensors (e.g., microphone or camera) SHALL inform the consumer that the capability exists.	
AR-002	A device while using any audio, video, or other sensors (e.g., microphone or camera) SHALL have an indication to show that the capability is active.	
AR-003	A device that includes any audio, video, or other sensors SHOULD provide the capability for the consumer to disable the sensor.	

6.15.1 AR Requirements Clarifications

AR-001/AR-002

Both are security requirements in the context of ensuring that unauthorized or unintentional use can be monitored by the user. The end user can be informed by having an icon/sticker indicating that the capability/sensor exists and/or alternately document it in the instruction manual.

AR-002

The mechanism of providing the indication is implementation dependent (e.g., tied to the hardware). If the gateway includes a surveillance function by design, implementation requirements are left to the operator.

7 ADVERSARIAL ENGINEERING

This document is intended to provide basic requirements that will improve the experience of subscribers. However, security functions and features always exist in an adversarial context—there are people actively trying to subvert or change the subscriber experience. Moreover, new exploits are often discovered that are not addressed by existing security requirements. Gateway devices must respond to this environment. New requirements can be developed at any time; parties responsible for the security of gateway devices are expected to diligently improve security even beyond current requirements.

Two unique resources that may assist in achieving this goal are the OWASP Top 10 [OWASP 10] and the CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses [2024 CWE 25]. These are periodically updated, and links are provided in the References section.

Appendix I Acknowledgements

We wish to thank the following participants contributing directly to this document.

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